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[ No relevant upstream commit. ]
This problem was fixed upstream by commit 1e9f3d6f1c40 ("ip6tnl: fix use after
free of fb_tnl_dev").
The upstream patch depends on upstream commit 0bd8762824e7 ("ip6tnl: add x-netns
support"), which was not backported into 3.10 branch.
First, explain the problem: when the ip6_tunnel module is unloaded,
ip6_tunnel_cleanup() is called.
rmmod ip6_tunnel
=> ip6_tunnel_cleanup()
=> rtnl_link_unregister()
=> __rtnl_kill_links()
=> for_each_netdev(net, dev) {
if (dev->rtnl_link_ops == ops)
ops->dellink(dev, &list_kill);
}
At this point, the FB device is deleted (and all ip6tnl tunnels).
=> unregister_pernet_device()
=> unregister_pernet_operations()
=> ops_exit_list()
=> ip6_tnl_exit_net()
=> ip6_tnl_destroy_tunnels()
=> t = rtnl_dereference(ip6n->tnls_wc[0]);
unregister_netdevice_queue(t->dev, &list);
We delete the FB device a second time here!
The previous fix removes these lines, which fix this double free. But the patch
introduces a memory leak when a netns is destroyed, because the FB device is
never deleted. By adding an rtnl ops which delete all ip6tnl device excepting
the FB device, we can keep this exlicit removal in ip6_tnl_destroy_tunnels().
CC: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CC: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com> (and our entire MRG team)
Tested-by: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <lgoncalv@redhat.com>
Tested-by: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ No relevant upstream commit. ]
This reverts commit 22c3ec552c29cf4bd4a75566088950fe57d860c4.
This patch is not the right fix, it introduces a memory leak when a netns is
destroyed (the FB device is never deleted).
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com> (and our entire MRG team)
Tested-by: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <lgoncalv@redhat.com>
Tested-by: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ No relevant upstream commit. ]
This problem was fixed upstream by commit 9434266f2c64 ("sit: fix use after free
of fb_tunnel_dev").
The upstream patch depends on upstream commit 5e6700b3bf98 ("sit: add support of
x-netns"), which was not backported into 3.10 branch.
First, explain the problem: when the sit module is unloaded, sit_cleanup() is
called.
rmmod sit
=> sit_cleanup()
=> rtnl_link_unregister()
=> __rtnl_kill_links()
=> for_each_netdev(net, dev) {
if (dev->rtnl_link_ops == ops)
ops->dellink(dev, &list_kill);
}
At this point, the FB device is deleted (and all sit tunnels).
=> unregister_pernet_device()
=> unregister_pernet_operations()
=> ops_exit_list()
=> sit_exit_net()
=> sit_destroy_tunnels()
In this function, no tunnel is found.
=> unregister_netdevice_queue(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev, &list);
We delete the FB device a second time here!
Because we cannot simply remove the second deletion (sit_exit_net() must remove
the FB device when a netns is deleted), we add an rtnl ops which delete all sit
device excepting the FB device and thus we can keep the explicit deletion in
sit_exit_net().
CC: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com> (and our entire MRG team)
Tested-by: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <lgoncalv@redhat.com>
Tested-by: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a452ce345d63ddf92cd101e4196569f8718ad319 ]
I see a memory leak when using a transparent HTTP proxy using TPROXY
together with TCP early demux and Kernel v3.8.13.15 (Ubuntu stable):
unreferenced object 0xffff88008cba4a40 (size 1696):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294944115 (age 8907.520s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
0a e0 20 6a 40 04 1b 37 92 be 32 e2 e8 b4 00 00 .. j@..7..2.....
02 00 07 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff810b710a>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xad/0xb9
[<ffffffff81270185>] sk_prot_alloc+0x29/0xc5
[<ffffffff812702cf>] sk_clone_lock+0x14/0x283
[<ffffffff812aaf3a>] inet_csk_clone_lock+0xf/0x7b
[<ffffffff8129a893>] netlink_broadcast+0x14/0x16
[<ffffffff812c1573>] tcp_create_openreq_child+0x1b/0x4c3
[<ffffffff812c033e>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x38/0x25d
[<ffffffff812c13e4>] tcp_check_req+0x25c/0x3d0
[<ffffffff812bf87a>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x287/0x40e
[<ffffffff812a08a7>] ip_route_input_noref+0x843/0xa55
[<ffffffff812bfeca>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x4c9/0x725
[<ffffffff812a26f4>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xe9/0x154
[<ffffffff8127a927>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4b2/0x514
[<ffffffff8127aa77>] process_backlog+0xee/0x1c5
[<ffffffff8127c949>] net_rx_action+0xa7/0x200
[<ffffffff81209d86>] add_interrupt_randomness+0x39/0x157
But there are many more, resulting in the machine going OOM after some
days.
From looking at the TPROXY code, and with help from Florian, I see
that the memory leak is introduced in tcp_v4_early_demux():
void tcp_v4_early_demux(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* ... */
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
th = tcp_hdr(skb);
if (th->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4)
return;
sk = __inet_lookup_established(dev_net(skb->dev), &tcp_hashinfo,
iph->saddr, th->source,
iph->daddr, ntohs(th->dest),
skb->skb_iif);
if (sk) {
skb->sk = sk;
where the socket is assigned unconditionally to skb->sk, also bumping
the refcnt on it. This is problematic, because in our case the skb
has already a socket assigned in the TPROXY target. This then results
in the leak I see.
The very same issue seems to be with IPv6, but haven't tested.
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Holger Eitzenberger <holger@eitzenberger.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 95f4a45de1a0f172b35451fc52283290adb21f6e ]
Bob Falken reported that after 4G packets, multicast forwarding stopped
working. This was because of a rule reference counter overflow which
freed the rule as soon as the overflow happend.
This patch solves this by adding the FIB_LOOKUP_NOREF flag to
fib_rules_lookup calls. This is safe even from non-rcu locked sections
as in this case the flag only implies not taking a reference to the rule,
which we don't need at all.
Rules only hold references to the namespace, which are guaranteed to be
available during the call of the non-rcu protected function reg_vif_xmit
because of the interface reference which itself holds a reference to
the net namespace.
Fixes: f0ad0860d01e47 ("ipv4: ipmr: support multiple tables")
Fixes: d1db275dd3f6e4 ("ipv6: ip6mr: support multiple tables")
Reported-by: Bob Falken <NetFestivalHaveFun@gmx.com>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 24f5b855e17df7e355eacd6c4a12cc4d6a6c9ff0 ]
ip6_rt_copy only sets dst.from if ort has flag RTF_ADDRCONF and RTF_DEFAULT.
but the prefix routes which did get installed by hand locally can have an
expiration, and no any flag combination which can ensure a potential from
does never expire, so we should always set the new created dst's from.
This also fixes the new created dst is always expired since the ort, which
is created by RA, maybe has RTF_EXPIRES and RTF_ADDRCONF, but no RTF_DEFAULT.
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
CC: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <roy.qing.li@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a3300ef4bbb1f1e33ff0400e1e6cf7733d988f4f ]
Brett Ciphery reported that new ipv6 addresses failed to get installed
because the addrconf generated dsts where counted against the dst gc
limit. We don't need to count those routes like we currently don't count
administratively added routes.
Because the max_addresses check enforces a limit on unbounded address
generation first in case someone plays with router advertisments, we
are still safe here.
Reported-by: Brett Ciphery <brett.ciphery@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7150aede5dd241539686e17d9592f5ebd28a2cda ]
The behaviour of blackhole and prohibit routes has been corrected by setting
the input and output pointers of the dst variable appropriately. For
blackhole routes, they are set to dst_discard and to ip6_pkt_discard and
ip6_pkt_discard_out respectively for prohibit routes.
ipv6: ip6_pkt_prohibit(_out) should not depend on
CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES
We need ip6_pkt_prohibit(_out) available without
CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES
Signed-off-by: Kamala R <kamala@aristanetworks.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The upstream commit bb8140947a24 ("ip6tnl: allow to use rtnl ops on fb tunnel")
(backported into linux-3.10.y) left a bug which was fixed upstream by commit
1e9f3d6f1c40 ("ip6tnl: fix use after free of fb_tnl_dev").
The problem is a bit different in linux-3.10.y, because there is no x-netns
support (upstream commit 0bd8762824e7 ("ip6tnl: add x-netns support")).
When ip6_tunnel.ko is unloaded, FB device is deleted by rtnl_link_unregister()
and then we try to delete it again in ip6_tnl_destroy_tunnels().
This patch removes the second deletion.
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7f88c6b23afbd31545c676dea77ba9593a1a14bf ]
IPv6 stats are 64 bits and thus are protected with a seqlock. By not
disabling bottom-half we could deadlock here if we don't disable bh and
a softirq reentrantly updates the same mib.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6aafeef03b9d9ecf255f3a80ed85ee070260e1ae ]
Pushing original fragments through causes several problems. For example
for matching, frags may not be matched correctly. Take following
example:
<example>
On HOSTA do:
ip6tables -I INPUT -p icmpv6 -j DROP
ip6tables -I INPUT -p icmpv6 -m icmp6 --icmpv6-type 128 -j ACCEPT
and on HOSTB you do:
ping6 HOSTA -s2000 (MTU is 1500)
Incoming echo requests will be filtered out on HOSTA. This issue does
not occur with smaller packets than MTU (where fragmentation does not happen)
</example>
As was discussed previously, the only correct solution seems to be to use
reassembled skb instead of separete frags. Doing this has positive side
effects in reducing sk_buff by one pointer (nfct_reasm) and also the reams
dances in ipvs and conntrack can be removed.
Future plan is to remove net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c
entirely and use code in net/ipv6/reassembly.c instead.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9037c3579a277f3a23ba476664629fda8c35f7c4 ]
If reassembled packet would fit into outdev MTU, it is not fragmented
according the original frag size and it is send as single big packet.
The second case is if skb is gso. In that case fragmentation does not happen
according to the original frag size.
This patch fixes these.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1fa4c710b6fe7b0aac9907240291b6fe6aafc3b8 ]
Offenders don't have port numbers, so set it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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functions
[ Upstream commit 85fbaa75037d0b6b786ff18658ddf0b4014ce2a4 ]
Commit bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69 ("inet: prevent leakage
of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls") conditionally updated
addr_len if the msg_name is written to. The recv_error and rxpmtu
functions relied on the recvmsg functions to set up addr_len before.
As this does not happen any more we have to pass addr_len to those
functions as well and set it to the size of the corresponding sockaddr
length.
This broke traceroute and such.
Fixes: bceaa90240b6 ("inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls")
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Reported-by: Tom Labanowski
Cc: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69 ]
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f8c31c8f80dd882f7eb49276989a4078d33d67a7 ]
Fixes a suspicious rcu derference warning.
Cc: Florent Fourcot <florent.fourcot@enst-bretagne.fr>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f104a567e673f382b09542a8dc3500aa689957b4 ]
As the rfc 4191 said, the Router Preference and Lifetime values in a
::/0 Route Information Option should override the preference and lifetime
values in the Router Advertisement header. But when the kernel deals with
a ::/0 Route Information Option, the rt6_get_route_info() always return
NULL, that means that overriding will not happen, because those default
routers were added without flag RTF_ROUTEINFO in rt6_add_dflt_router().
In order to deal with that condition, we should call rt6_get_dflt_router
when the prefix length is 0.
Signed-off-by: Duan Jiong <duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0e033e04c2678dbbe74a46b23fffb7bb918c288e ]
Commit 1e2bd517c108816220f262d7954b697af03b5f9c ("udp6: Fix udp
fragmentation for tunnel traffic.") changed the calculation if
there is enough space to include a fragment header in the skb from a
skb->mac_header dervived one to skb_headroom. Because we already peeled
off the skb to transport_header this is wrong. Change this back to check
if we have enough room before the mac_header.
This fixes a panic Saran Neti reported. He used the tbf scheduler which
skb_gso_segments the skb. The offsets get negative and we panic in memcpy
because the skb was erroneously not expanded at the head.
Reported-by: Saran Neti <Saran.Neti@telus.com>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e3bc10bd95d7fcc3f2ac690c6ff22833ea6781d6 ]
On receiving a packet too big icmp error we check if our current cached
dst_entry in the socket is still valid. This validation check did not
care about the expiration of the (cached) route.
The error path I traced down:
The socket receives a packet too big mtu notification. It still has a
valid dst_entry and thus issues the ip6_rt_pmtu_update on this dst_entry,
setting RTF_EXPIRE and updates the dst.expiration value (which could
fail because of not up-to-date expiration values, see previous patch).
In some seldom cases we race with a) the ip6_fib gc or b) another routing
lookup which would result in a recreation of the cached rt6_info from its
parent non-cached rt6_info. While copying the rt6_info we reinitialize the
metrics store by copying it over from the parent thus invalidating the
just installed pmtu update (both dsts use the same key to the inetpeer
storage). The dst_entry with the just invalidated metrics data would
just get its RTF_EXPIRES flag cleared and would continue to stay valid
for the socket.
We should have not issued the pmtu update on the already expired dst_entry
in the first placed. By checking the expiration on the dst entry and
doing a relookup in case it is out of date we close the race because
we would install a new rt6_info into the fib before we issue the pmtu
update, thus closing this race.
Not reliably updating the dst.expire value was fixed by the patch "ipv6:
reset dst.expires value when clearing expire flag".
Reported-by: Steinar H. Gunderson <sgunderson@bigfoot.com>
Reported-by: Valentijn Sessink <valentyn@blub.net>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Valentijn Sessink <valentyn@blub.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c2f17e827b419918c856131f592df9521e1a38e3 ]
Routes need to be probed asynchronous otherwise the call stack gets
exhausted when the kernel attemps to deliver another skb inline, like
e.g. xt_TEE does, and we probe at the same time.
We update neigh->updated still at once, otherwise we would send to
many probes.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 550bab42f83308c9d6ab04a980cc4333cef1c8fa ]
Make sure rt6i_gateway contains nexthop information in
all routes returned from lookup or when routes are directly
attached to skb for generated ICMP packets.
The effect of this patch should be a faster version of
rt6_nexthop() and the consideration of local addresses as
nexthop.
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ This is a simplified -stable version of a set of upstream commits. ]
This is a replacement patch only for stable which does fix the problems
handled by the following two commits in -net:
"ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (e93b7d748be887cd7639b113ba7d7ef792a7efb9)
"ip6_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well" (c547dbf55d5f8cf615ccc0e7265e98db27d3fb8b)
Three frames are written on a corked udp socket for which the output
netdevice has UFO enabled. If the first and third frame are smaller than
the mtu and the second one is bigger, we enqueue the second frame with
skb_append_datato_frags without initializing the gso fields. This leads
to the third frame appended regulary and thus constructing an invalid skb.
This fixes the problem by always using skb_append_datato_frags as soon
as the first frag got enqueued to the skb without marking the packet
as SKB_GSO_UDP.
The problem with only two frames for ipv6 was fixed by "ipv6: udp
packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO"
(2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47).
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 80ad1d61e72d626e30ebe8529a0455e660ca4693 ]
commit 3ab5aee7fe84 ("net: Convert TCP & DCCP hash tables to use RCU /
hlist_nulls") incorrectly used sock_put() on TIMEWAIT sockets.
We should instead use inet_twsk_put()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bb8140947a247b9aa15652cc24dc555ebb0b64b0 ]
rtnl ops where introduced by c075b13098b3 ("ip6tnl: advertise tunnel param via
rtnl"), but I forget to assign rtnl ops to fb tunnels.
Now that it is done, we must remove the explicit call to
unregister_netdevice_queue(), because the fallback tunnel is added to the queue
in ip6_tnl_destroy_tunnels() when checking rtnl_link_ops of all netdevices (this
is valid since commit 0bd8762824e7 ("ip6tnl: add x-netns support")).
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 205983c43700ac3a81e7625273a3fa83cd2759b5 ]
rtnl ops where introduced by ba3e3f50a0e5 ("sit: advertise tunnel param via
rtnl"), but I forget to assign rtnl ops to fb tunnels.
Now that it is done, we must remove the explicit call to
unregister_netdevice_queue(), because the fallback tunnel is added to the queue
in sit_destroy_tunnels() when checking rtnl_link_ops of all netdevices (this
is valid since commit 5e6700b3bf98 ("sit: add support of x-netns")).
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9260d3e1013701aa814d10c8fc6a9f92bd17d643 ]
It is possible for the timer handlers to run after the call to
ipv6_mc_down so use in6_dev_put instead of __in6_dev_put in the
handler function in order to do proper cleanup when the refcnt
reaches 0. Otherwise, the refcnt can reach zero without the
inet6_dev being destroyed and we end up leaking a reference to
the net_device and see messages like the following,
unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1
Tested on linux-3.4.43.
Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3da812d860755925da890e8c713f2d2e2d7b1bae ]
gre_hlen already accounts for sizeof(struct ipv6_hdr) + gre header,
so initialize max_headroom to zero. Otherwise the
if (encap_limit >= 0) {
max_headroom += 8;
mtu -= 8;
}
increments an uninitialized variable before max_headroom was reset.
Found with coverity: 728539
Cc: Dmitry Kozlov <xeb@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7df37ff33dc122f7bd0614d707939fe84322d264 ]
When a router is doing DNAT for 6to4/6rd packets the latest
anti-spoofing commit 218774dc ("ipv6: add anti-spoofing checks for
6to4 and 6rd") will drop them because the IPv6 address embedded does
not match the IPv4 destination. This patch will allow them to pass by
testing if we have an address that matches on 6to4/6rd interface. I
have been hit by this problem using Fedora and IPV6TO4_IPV4ADDR.
Also, log the dropped packets (with rate limit).
Signed-off-by: Catalin(ux) M. BOIE <catab@embedromix.ro>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47 ]
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 703133de331a7a7df47f31fb9de51dc6f68a9de8 ]
If local fragmentation is allowed, then ip_select_ident() and
ip_select_ident_more() need to generate unique IDs to ensure
correct defragmentation on the peer.
For example, if IPsec (tunnel mode) has to encrypt large skbs
that have local_df bit set, then all IP fragments that belonged
to different ESP datagrams would have used the same identificator.
If one of these IP fragments would get lost or reordered, then
peer could possibly stitch together wrong IP fragments that did
not belong to the same datagram. This would lead to a packet loss
or data corruption.
Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka <aatteka@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0d2ede929f61783aebfb9228e4d32a0546ee4d23 ]
IFLA_IPTUN_LOCAL and IFLA_IPTUN_REMOTE were inverted.
Introduced by c075b13098b3 (ip6tnl: advertise tunnel param via rtnl).
Signed-off-by: Ding Zhi <zhi.ding@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ae7b4e1f213aa659aedf9c6ecad0bf5f0476e1e2 ]
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8112b1fe071be01a28a774ed55909e6f4b29712d ]
In rfc4942 and rfc2460 I cannot find anything which would implicate to
drop packets which have only padding in tlv.
Current behaviour breaks TAHI Test v6LC.1.2.6.
Problem was intruduced in:
9b905fe6843 "ipv6/exthdrs: strict Pad1 and PadN check"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3a1c756590633c0e86df606e5c618c190926a0df ]
In tcp_v6_do_rcv() code, when processing pkt options, we soley work
on our skb clone opt_skb that we've created earlier before entering
tcp_rcv_established() on our way. However, only in condition ...
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass)
np->rcv_tclass = ipv6_get_dsfield(ipv6_hdr(skb));
... we work on skb itself. As we extract every other information out
of opt_skb in ipv6_pktoptions path, this seems wrong, since skb can
already be released by tcp_rcv_established() earlier on. When we try
to access it in ipv6_hdr(), we will dereference freed skb.
[ Bug added by commit 4c507d2897bd9b ("net: implement IP_RECVTOS for
IP_PKTOPTIONS") ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 639739b5e609a5074839bb22fc061b37baa06269 ]
Commit b67bfe0d42cac56c512dd5da4b1b347a23f4b70a ("hlist: drop
the node parameter from iterators") changed the behavior of
hlist_for_each_entry_safe to leave the p argument NULL.
Fix this up by tracking the last argument.
Reported-by: Michele Baldessari <michele@acksyn.org>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Tested-by: Michele Baldessari <michele@acksyn.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 61e76b178dbe7145e8d6afa84bb4ccea71918994 ]
RFC 4443 has defined two additional codes for ICMPv6 type 1 (destination
unreachable) messages:
5 - Source address failed ingress/egress policy
6 - Reject route to destination
Now they are treated as protocol error and icmpv6_err_convert() converts them
to EPROTO.
RFC 4443 says:
"Codes 5 and 6 are more informative subsets of code 1."
Treat codes 5 and 6 as code 1 (EACCES)
Btw, connect() returning -EPROTO confuses firefox, so that fallback to
other/IPv4 addresses does not work:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=910773
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 25a6e6b84fba601eff7c28d30da8ad7cfbef0d43 ]
Allocating skbs when sending out neighbour discovery messages
currently uses sock_alloc_send_skb() based on a per net namespace
socket and thus share a socket wmem buffer space.
If a netdevice is temporarily unable to transmit due to carrier
loss or for other reasons, the queued up ndisc messages will cosnume
all of the wmem space and will thus prevent from any more skbs to
be allocated even for netdevices that are able to transmit packets.
The number of neighbour discovery messages sent is very limited,
use of alloc_skb() bypasses the socket wmem buffer size enforcement
while the manual call to skb_set_owner_w() maintains the socket
reference needed for the IPv6 output path.
This patch has orginally been posted by Eric Dumazet in a modified
form.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Stephen Warren <swarren@wwwdotorg.org>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f46078cfcd77fa5165bf849f5e568a7ac5fa569c ]
It is not allowed for an ipv6 packet to contain multiple fragmentation
headers. So discard packets which were already reassembled by
fragmentation logic and send back a parameter problem icmp.
The updates for RFC 6980 will come in later, I have to do a bit more
research here.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b08a8f1bd8cb4541c93ec170027b4d0782dab52 ]
Because of the max_addresses check attackers were able to disable privacy
extensions on an interface by creating enough autoconfigured addresses:
<http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2012/q4/292>
But the check is not actually needed: max_addresses protects the
kernel to install too many ipv6 addresses on an interface and guards
addrconf_prefix_rcv to install further addresses as soon as this limit
is reached. We only generate temporary addresses in direct response of
a new address showing up. As soon as we filled up the maximum number of
addresses of an interface, we stop installing more addresses and thus
also stop generating more temp addresses.
Even if the attacker tries to generate a lot of temporary addresses
by announcing a prefix and removing it again (lifetime == 0) we won't
install more temp addresses, because the temporary addresses do count
to the maximum number of addresses, thus we would stop installing new
autoconfigured addresses when the limit is reached.
This patch fixes CVE-2013-0343 (but other layer-2 attacks are still
possible).
Thanks to Ding Tianhong to bring this topic up again.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Cc: George Kargiotakis <kargig@void.gr>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Acked-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3e3be275851bc6fc90bfdcd732cd95563acd982b ]
In case a subtree did not match we currently stop backtracking and return
NULL (root table from fib_lookup). This could yield in invalid routing
table lookups when using subtrees.
Instead continue to backtrack until a valid subtree or node is found
and return this match.
Also remove unneeded NULL check.
Reported-by: Teco Boot <teco@inf-net.nl>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: David Lamparter <equinox@diac24.net>
Cc: <boutier@pps.univ-paris-diderot.fr>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 905a6f96a1b18e490a75f810d733ced93c39b0e5 ]
Otherwise we end up dereferencing the already freed net->ipv6.mrt pointer
which leads to a panic (from Srivatsa S. Bhat):
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff882018552020
IP: [<ffffffffa0366b02>] ip6mr_sk_done+0x32/0xb0 [ipv6]
PGD 290a067 PUD 207ffe0067 PMD 207ff1d067 PTE 8000002018552060
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: ebtable_nat ebtables nfs fscache nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle iptable_filter ip_tables nfsd lockd nfs_acl exportfs auth_rpcgss autofs4 sunrpc 8021q garp bridge stp llc ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter
+ip6_tables ipv6 vfat fat vhost_net macvtap macvlan vhost tun kvm_intel kvm uinput iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support cdc_ether usbnet mii microcode i2c_i801 i2c_core lpc_ich mfd_core shpchp ioatdma dca mlx4_core be2net wmi acpi_cpufreq mperf ext4 jbd2 mbcache dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u33:0 Not tainted 3.11.0-rc1-ea45e-a #4
Hardware name: IBM -[8737R2A]-/00Y2738, BIOS -[B2E120RUS-1.20]- 11/30/2012
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
task: ffff8810393641c0 ti: ffff881039366000 task.ti: ffff881039366000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0366b02>] [<ffffffffa0366b02>] ip6mr_sk_done+0x32/0xb0 [ipv6]
RSP: 0018:ffff881039367bd8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff881039367fd8 RBX: ffff882018552000 RCX: dead000000200200
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff881039367b68 RDI: ffff881039367b68
RBP: ffff881039367bf8 R08: ffff881039367b68 R09: 2222222222222222
R10: 2222222222222222 R11: 2222222222222222 R12: ffff882015a7a040
R13: ffff882014eb89c0 R14: ffff8820289e2800 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88103fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff882018552020 CR3: 0000000001c0b000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
Stack:
ffff881039367c18 ffff882014eb89c0 ffff882015e28c00 0000000000000000
ffff881039367c18 ffffffffa034d9d1 ffff8820289e2800 ffff882014eb89c0
ffff881039367c58 ffffffff815bdecb ffffffff815bddf2 ffff882014eb89c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa034d9d1>] rawv6_close+0x21/0x40 [ipv6]
[<ffffffff815bdecb>] inet_release+0xfb/0x220
[<ffffffff815bddf2>] ? inet_release+0x22/0x220
[<ffffffffa032686f>] inet6_release+0x3f/0x50 [ipv6]
[<ffffffff8151c1d9>] sock_release+0x29/0xa0
[<ffffffff81525520>] sk_release_kernel+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffffa034f14b>] icmpv6_sk_exit+0x3b/0x80 [ipv6]
[<ffffffff8152fff9>] ops_exit_list+0x39/0x60
[<ffffffff815306fb>] cleanup_net+0xfb/0x1a0
[<ffffffff81075e3a>] process_one_work+0x1da/0x610
[<ffffffff81075dc9>] ? process_one_work+0x169/0x610
[<ffffffff81076390>] worker_thread+0x120/0x3a0
[<ffffffff81076270>] ? process_one_work+0x610/0x610
[<ffffffff8107da2e>] kthread+0xee/0x100
[<ffffffff8107d940>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
[<ffffffff8162a99c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[<ffffffff8107d940>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
Code: 20 48 89 5d e8 4c 89 65 f0 4c 89 6d f8 66 66 66 66 90 4c 8b 67 30 49 89 fd e8 db 3c 1e e1 49 8b 9c 24 90 08 00 00 48 85 db 74 06 <4c> 39 6b 20 74 20 bb f3 ff ff ff e8 8e 3c 1e e1 89 d8 4c 8b 65
RIP [<ffffffffa0366b02>] ip6mr_sk_done+0x32/0xb0 [ipv6]
RSP <ffff881039367bd8>
CR2: ffff882018552020
Reported-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 307f2fb95e9b96b3577916e73d92e104f8f26494 ]
Static routes in this case are non-expiring routes which did not get
configured by autoconf or by icmpv6 redirects.
To make sure we actually get an ecmp route while searching for the first
one in this fib6_node's leafs, also make sure it matches the ecmp route
assumptions.
v2:
a) Removed RTF_EXPIRE check in dst.from chain. The check of RTF_ADDRCONF
already ensures that this route, even if added again without
RTF_EXPIRES (in case of a RA announcement with infinite timeout),
does not cause the rt6i_nsiblings logic to go wrong if a later RA
updates the expiration time later.
v3:
a) Allow RTF_EXPIRES routes to enter the ecmp route set. We have to do so,
because an pmtu event could update the RTF_EXPIRES flag and we would
not count this route, if another route joins this set. We now filter
only for RTF_GATEWAY|RTF_ADDRCONF|RTF_DYNAMIC, which are flags that
don't get changed after rt6_info construction.
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit afc154e978de1eb11c555bc8bcec1552f75ebc43 ]
This is a follow-up patch to 3630d40067a21d4dfbadc6002bb469ce26ac5d52
("ipv6: rt6_check_neigh should successfully verify neigh if no NUD
information are available").
Since the removal of rt->n in rt6_info we can end up with a dst ==
NULL in rt6_check_neigh. In case the kernel is not compiled with
CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF we should also select a route with unkown
NUD state but we must not avoid doing round robin selection on routes
with the same target. So introduce and pass down a boolean ``do_rr'' to
indicate when we should update rt->rr_ptr. As soon as no route is valid
we do backtracking and do a lookup on a higher level in the fib trie.
v2:
a) Improved rt6_check_neigh logic (no need to create neighbour there)
and documented return values.
v3:
a) Introduce enum rt6_nud_state to get rid of the magic numbers
(thanks to David Miller).
b) Update and shorten commit message a bit to actualy reflect
the source.
Reported-by: Pierre Emeriaud <petrus.lt@gmail.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1eb4f758286884e7566627164bca4c4a16952a83 ]
We could end up expiring a route which is part of an ecmp route set. Doing
so would invalidate the rt->rt6i_nsiblings calculations and could provoke
the following panic:
[ 80.144667] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 80.145172] kernel BUG at net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:733!
[ 80.145172] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 80.145172] Modules linked in: 8021q nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ipt_MASQUERADE ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables
+snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_timer virtio_balloon snd soundcore i2c_piix4 i2c_core virtio_net virtio_blk
[ 80.145172] CPU: 1 PID: 786 Comm: ping6 Not tainted 3.10.0+ #118
[ 80.145172] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 80.145172] task: ffff880117fa0000 ti: ffff880118770000 task.ti: ffff880118770000
[ 80.145172] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815f3b5d>] [<ffffffff815f3b5d>] fib6_add+0x75d/0x830
[ 80.145172] RSP: 0018:ffff880118771798 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 80.145172] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88011350e480
[ 80.145172] RDX: ffff88011350e238 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff88011350f738
[ 80.145172] RBP: ffff880118771848 R08: ffff880117903280 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 80.145172] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88011350f680
[ 80.145172] R13: ffff880117903280 R14: ffff880118771890 R15: ffff88011350ef90
[ 80.145172] FS: 00007f02b5127740(0000) GS:ffff88011fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 80.145172] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 80.145172] CR2: 00007f981322a000 CR3: 00000001181b1000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 80.145172] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 80.145172] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 80.145172] Stack:
[ 80.145172] 0000000000000001 ffff880100000000 ffff880100000000 ffff880117903280
[ 80.145172] 0000000000000000 ffff880119a4cf00 0000000000000400 00000000000007fa
[ 80.145172] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff88011350f680
[ 80.145172] Call Trace:
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815eeceb>] ? rt6_bind_peer+0x4b/0x90
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815ed985>] __ip6_ins_rt+0x45/0x70
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815eee35>] ip6_ins_rt+0x35/0x40
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815ef1e4>] ip6_pol_route.isra.44+0x3a4/0x4b0
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815ef34a>] ip6_pol_route_output+0x2a/0x30
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81616077>] fib6_rule_action+0xd7/0x210
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815ef320>] ? ip6_pol_route_input+0x30/0x30
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81553026>] fib_rules_lookup+0xc6/0x140
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81616374>] fib6_rule_lookup+0x44/0x80
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815ef320>] ? ip6_pol_route_input+0x30/0x30
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815edea3>] ip6_route_output+0x73/0xb0
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815dfdf3>] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x2c3/0x2e0
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff813007b1>] ? list_del+0x11/0x40
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81082a4c>] ? remove_wait_queue+0x3c/0x50
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815dfe4d>] ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x3d/0xa0
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815fda77>] rawv6_sendmsg+0x267/0xc20
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815a8a83>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff8128eb93>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff815218d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81524a68>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff8109825c>] ? update_curr+0xec/0x170
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff81041d09>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff810afd1e>] ? __getnstimeofday+0x3e/0xd0
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff8152509e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10
[ 80.145172] [<ffffffff8164efd9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 80.145172] Code: fe ff ff 41 f6 45 2a 06 0f 85 ca fe ff ff 49 8b 7e 08 4c 89 ee e8 94 ef ff ff e9 b9 fe ff ff 48 8b 82 28 05 00 00 e9 01 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 49 8b 54 24 30 0d 00 00 40 00 89 83 14 01 00 00 48 89 53
[ 80.145172] RIP [<ffffffff815f3b5d>] fib6_add+0x75d/0x830
[ 80.145172] RSP <ffff880118771798>
[ 80.387413] ---[ end trace 02f20b7a8b81ed95 ]---
[ 80.390154] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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are available
[ Upstream commit 3630d40067a21d4dfbadc6002bb469ce26ac5d52 ]
After the removal of rt->n we do not create a neighbour entry at route
insertion time (rt6_bind_neighbour is gone). As long as no neighbour is
created because of "useful traffic" we skip this routing entry because
rt6_check_neigh cannot pick up a valid neighbour (neigh == NULL) and
thus returns false.
This change was introduced by commit
887c95cc1da53f66a5890fdeab13414613010097 ("ipv6: Complete neighbour
entry removal from dst_entry.")
To quote RFC4191:
"If the host has no information about the router's reachability, then
the host assumes the router is reachable."
and also:
"A host MUST NOT probe a router's reachability in the absence of useful
traffic that the host would have sent to the router if it were reachable."
So, just assume the router is reachable and let's rt6_probe do the
rest. We don't need to create a neighbour on route insertion time.
If we don't compile with CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF (RFC4191 support)
a neighbour is only valid if its nud_state is NUD_VALID. I did not find
any references that we should probe the router on route insertion time
via the other RFCs. So skip this route in that case.
v2:
a) use IS_ENABLED instead of #ifdefs (thanks to Sergei Shtylyov)
Reported-by: Pierre Emeriaud <petrus.lt@gmail.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 75a493e60ac4bbe2e977e7129d6d8cbb0dd236be ]
If the socket had an IPV6_MTU value set, ip6_append_data_mtu lost track
of this when appending the second frame on a corked socket. This results
in the following splat:
[37598.993962] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[37598.994008] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2064!
[37598.994008] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[37598.994008] Modules linked in: tcp_lp uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core videodev media vfat fat usb_storage fuse ebtable_nat xt_CHECKSUM bridge stp llc ipt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat
+nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i cxgb3 mdio libcxgbi ib_iser rdma_cm ib_addr iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi
+scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm bnep iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwldvm mac80211 snd_hda_intel acpi_cpufreq mperf coretemp snd_hda_codec microcode cdc_wdm cdc_acm
[37598.994008] snd_hwdep cdc_ether snd_seq snd_seq_device usbnet mii joydev btusb snd_pcm bluetooth i2c_i801 e1000e lpc_ich mfd_core ptp iwlwifi pps_core snd_page_alloc mei cfg80211 snd_timer thinkpad_acpi snd tpm_tis soundcore rfkill tpm tpm_bios vhost_net tun macvtap macvlan kvm_intel kvm uinput binfmt_misc
+dm_crypt i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core wmi video
[37598.994008] CPU 0
[37598.994008] Pid: 27320, comm: t2 Not tainted 3.9.6-200.fc18.x86_64 #1 LENOVO 27744PG/27744PG
[37598.994008] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815443a5>] [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP: 0018:ffff88003670da18 EFLAGS: 00010202
[37598.994008] RAX: ffff88018105c018 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000000006c0
[37598.994008] RDX: ffff88018105a6c0 RSI: ffff88018105a000 RDI: ffff8801e1b0aa00
[37598.994008] RBP: ffff88003670da78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88018105c040
[37598.994008] R10: ffff8801e1b0aa00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000fff8
[37598.994008] R13: 00000000000004fc R14: 00000000ffff0504 R15: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] FS: 00007f28eea59740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[37598.994008] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[37598.994008] CR2: 0000003d935789e0 CR3: 00000000365cb000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
[37598.994008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[37598.994008] Process t2 (pid: 27320, threadinfo ffff88003670c000, task ffff88022c162ee0)
[37598.994008] Stack:
[37598.994008] ffff88022e098a00 ffff88020f973fc0 0000000000000008 00000000000004c8
[37598.994008] ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 ffff88003670da78 ffff8801e1b0a200
[37598.994008] 0000000000000018 00000000000004c8 ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4
[37598.994008] Call Trace:
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815fc21f>] ip6_append_data+0xccf/0xfe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8158d9f0>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81661f66>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x16/0x40
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8161548d>] udpv6_sendmsg+0x1ed/0xc10
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2845>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815c3693>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2973>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153a450>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810135d1>] ? __switch_to+0x181/0x4a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153d97d>] sys_sendto+0x12d/0x180
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810dfb64>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x94/0xf0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81020ed1>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x231/0x240
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8166a7e7>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[37598.994008] Code: fe 07 00 00 48 c7 c7 04 28 a6 81 89 45 a0 4c 89 4d b8 44 89 5d a8 e8 1b ac b1 ff 44 8b 5d a8 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 45 a0 e9 cf fe ff ff <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 48
[37598.994008] RIP [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP <ffff88003670da18>
[37599.007323] ---[ end trace d69f6a17f8ac8eee ]---
While there, also check if path mtu discovery is activated for this
socket. The logic was adapted from ip6_append_data when first writing
on the corked socket.
This bug was introduced with commit
0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 ("ipv6: fix incorrect ipsec
fragment").
v2:
a) Replace IPV6_PMTU_DISC_DO with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE.
b) Don't pass ipv6_pinfo to ip6_append_data_mtu (suggestion by Gao
feng, thanks!).
c) Change mtu to unsigned int, else we get a warning about
non-matching types because of the min()-macro type-check.
Acked-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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pending data
[ Upstream commit 8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1 ]
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8965779d2c0e6ab246c82a405236b1fb2adae6b2, with
some bits from commit b7b1bfce0bb68bd8f6e62a28295922785cc63781
("ipv6: split duplicate address detection and router solicitation timer")
to get the __ipv6_get_lladdr() used by this patch. ]
dingtianhong reported the following deadlock detected by lockdep:
======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.4.24.05-0.1-default #1 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
ksoftirqd/0/3 is trying to acquire lock:
(&ndev->lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8147f804>] ipv6_get_lladdr+0x74/0x120
but task is already holding lock:
(&mc->mca_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8149d130>] mld_send_report+0x40/0x150
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&mc->mca_lock){+.+...}:
[<ffffffff810a8027>] validate_chain+0x637/0x730
[<ffffffff810a8417>] __lock_acquire+0x2f7/0x500
[<ffffffff810a8734>] lock_acquire+0x114/0x150
[<ffffffff814f691a>] rt_spin_lock+0x4a/0x60
[<ffffffff8149e4bb>] igmp6_group_added+0x3b/0x120
[<ffffffff8149e5d8>] ipv6_mc_up+0x38/0x60
[<ffffffff81480a4d>] ipv6_find_idev+0x3d/0x80
[<ffffffff81483175>] addrconf_notify+0x3d5/0x4b0
[<ffffffff814fae3f>] notifier_call_chain+0x3f/0x80
[<ffffffff81073471>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x11/0x20
[<ffffffff813d8722>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x32/0x60
[<ffffffff813d92d4>] __dev_notify_flags+0x34/0x80
[<ffffffff813d9360>] dev_change_flags+0x40/0x70
[<ffffffff813ea627>] do_setlink+0x237/0x8a0
[<ffffffff813ebb6c>] rtnl_newlink+0x3ec/0x600
[<ffffffff813eb4d0>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x160/0x310
[<ffffffff814040b9>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x89/0xb0
[<ffffffff813eb357>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x27/0x40
[<ffffffff81403e20>] netlink_unicast+0x140/0x180
[<ffffffff81404a9e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x33e/0x380
[<ffffffff813c4252>] sock_sendmsg+0x112/0x130
[<ffffffff813c537e>] __sys_sendmsg+0x44e/0x460
[<ffffffff813c5544>] sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x70
[<ffffffff814feab9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
-> #0 (&ndev->lock){+.+...}:
[<ffffffff810a798e>] check_prev_add+0x3de/0x440
[<ffffffff810a8027>] validate_chain+0x637/0x730
[<ffffffff810a8417>] __lock_acquire+0x2f7/0x500
[<ffffffff810a8734>] lock_acquire+0x114/0x150
[<ffffffff814f6c82>] rt_read_lock+0x42/0x60
[<ffffffff8147f804>] ipv6_get_lladdr+0x74/0x120
[<ffffffff8149b036>] mld_newpack+0xb6/0x160
[<ffffffff8149b18b>] add_grhead+0xab/0xc0
[<ffffffff8149d03b>] add_grec+0x3ab/0x460
[<ffffffff8149d14a>] mld_send_report+0x5a/0x150
[<ffffffff8149f99e>] igmp6_timer_handler+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff8105705a>] call_timer_fn+0xca/0x1d0
[<ffffffff81057b9f>] run_timer_softirq+0x1df/0x2e0
[<ffffffff8104e8c7>] handle_pending_softirqs+0xf7/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8104ea3b>] __do_softirq_common+0x7b/0xf0
[<ffffffff8104f07f>] __thread_do_softirq+0x1af/0x210
[<ffffffff8104f1c1>] run_ksoftirqd+0xe1/0x1f0
[<ffffffff8106c7de>] kthread+0xae/0xc0
[<ffffffff814fff74>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10
actually we can just hold idev->lock before taking pmc->mca_lock,
and avoid taking idev->lock again when iterating idev->addr_list,
since the upper callers of mld_newpack() already take
read_lock_bh(&idev->lock).
Reported-by: dingtianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Cc: dingtianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Tested-by: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Chen Weilong <chenweilong@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5c29fb12e8fb8a8105ea048cb160fd79a85a52bb ]
Because of commit 218774dc341f219bfcf940304a081b121a0e8099 ("ipv6: add
anti-spoofing checks for 6to4 and 6rd") the sit driver dropped packets
for 2002::/16 destinations and sources even when configured to work as a
tunnel with fixed endpoint. We may only apply the 6rd/6to4 anti-spoofing
checks if the device is not in pointopoint mode.
This was an oversight from me in the above commit, sorry. Thanks to
Roman Mamedov for reporting this!
Reported-by: Roman Mamedov <rm@romanrm.ru>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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