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[ Upstream commit 1d88ba1ebb2763aa86172cd7ca05dedbeccc0d35 ]
syzbot reported a rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU which is caused
by too small value set on rto_min with SCTP_RTOINFO sockopt. With this
value, hb_timer will get stuck there, as in its timer handler it starts
this timer again with this value, then goes to the timer handler again.
This problem is there since very beginning, and thanks to Eric for the
reproducer shared from a syzbot mail.
This patch fixes it by not allowing sctp_transport_timeout to return a
smaller value than HZ/5 for hb_timer, which is based on TCP's min rto.
Note that it doesn't fix this issue by limiting rto_min, as some users
are still using small rto and no proper value was found for it yet.
Reported-by: syzbot+3dcd59a1f907245f891f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 59d8d4434f429b4fa8a346fd889058bda427a837 ]
Now sctp only delays the authentication for the normal cookie-echo
chunk by setting chunk->auth_chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv(). But
for the duplicated one with auth, in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(), it does
authentication first based on the old asoc, which will definitely
fail due to the different auth info in the old asoc.
The duplicated cookie-echo chunk will create a new asoc with the
auth info from this chunk, and the authentication should also be
done with the new asoc's auth info for all of the collision 'A',
'B' and 'D'. Otherwise, the duplicated cookie-echo chunk with auth
will never pass the authentication and create the new connection.
This issue exists since very beginning, and this fix is to make
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() follow the way sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() does
for the normal cookie-echo chunk to delay the authentication.
While at it, remove the unused params from sctp_sf_authenticate()
and define sctp_auth_chunk_verify() used for all the places that
do the delayed authentication.
v1->v2:
fix the typo in changelog as Marcelo noticed.
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ce402f044e4e432c296f90eaabb8dbe8f3624391 ]
When auth is enabled for cookie-ack chunk, in sctp_inq_pop, sctp
processes auth chunk first, then continues to the next chunk in
this packet if chunk_end + chunk_hdr size < skb_tail_pointer().
Otherwise, it will go to the next packet or discard this chunk.
However, it missed the fact that cookie-ack chunk's size is equal
to chunk_hdr size, which couldn't match that check, and thus this
chunk would not get processed.
This patch fixes it by changing the check to chunk_end + chunk_hdr
size <= skb_tail_pointer().
Fixes: 26b87c788100 ("net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 46e16d4b956867013e0bbd7f2bad206f4aa55752 ]
When processing a duplicate cookie-echo chunk, for case 'D', sctp will
not process the param from this chunk. It means old asoc has nothing
to be updated, and the new temp asoc doesn't have the complete info.
So there's no reason to use the new asoc when creating the cookie-ack
chunk. Otherwise, like when auth is enabled for cookie-ack, the chunk
can not be set with auth, and it will definitely be dropped by peer.
This issue is there since very beginning, and we fix it by using the
old asoc instead.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6910e25de2257e2c82c7a2d126e3463cd8e50810 ]
In Commit 1f45f78f8e51 ("sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too"),
it held the chunk in sctp_ulpevent_make_rcvmsg to access it safely later
in recvmsg. However, it also added sctp_chunk_put in fail_mark err path,
which is only triggered before holding the chunk.
syzbot reported a use-after-free crash happened on this err path, where
it shouldn't call sctp_chunk_put.
This patch simply removes this call.
Fixes: 1f45f78f8e51 ("sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too")
Reported-by: syzbot+141d898c5f24489db4aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d625329b06e46bd20baf9ee40847d11982569204 ]
Since sctp ipv6 socket also supports v4 addrs, it's possible to
compare two v4 addrs in pf v6 .cmp_addr, sctp_inet6_cmp_addr.
However after Commit 1071ec9d453a ("sctp: do not check port in
sctp_inet6_cmp_addr"), it no longer calls af1->cmp_addr, which
in this case is sctp_v4_cmp_addr, but calls __sctp_v6_cmp_addr
where it handles them as two v6 addrs. It would cause a out of
bounds crash.
syzbot found this crash when trying to bind two v4 addrs to a
v6 socket.
This patch fixes it by adding the process for two v4 addrs in
sctp_inet6_cmp_addr.
Fixes: 1071ec9d453a ("sctp: do not check port in sctp_inet6_cmp_addr")
Reported-by: syzbot+cd494c1dd681d4d93ebb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1071ec9d453a38023579714b64a951a2fb982071 ]
pf->cmp_addr() is called before binding a v6 address to the sock. It
should not check ports, like in sctp_inet_cmp_addr.
But sctp_inet6_cmp_addr checks the addr by invoking af(6)->cmp_addr,
sctp_v6_cmp_addr where it also compares the ports.
This would cause that setsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD) could bind
multiple duplicated IPv6 addresses after Commit 40b4f0fd74e4 ("sctp:
lack the check for ports in sctp_v6_cmp_addr").
This patch is to remove af->cmp_addr called in sctp_inet6_cmp_addr,
but do the proper check for both v6 addrs and v4mapped addrs.
v1->v2:
- define __sctp_v6_cmp_addr to do the common address comparison
used for both pf and af v6 cmp_addr.
Fixes: 40b4f0fd74e4 ("sctp: lack the check for ports in sctp_v6_cmp_addr")
Reported-by: Jianwen Ji <jiji@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 81e98370293afcb58340ce8bd71af7b97f925c26 ]
Check must happen before call to ipv6_addr_v4mapped()
syzbot report was :
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_sockaddr_af net/sctp/socket.c:359 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_do_bind+0x60f/0xdc0 net/sctp/socket.c:384
CPU: 0 PID: 3576 Comm: syzkaller968804 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #82
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
__msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676
sctp_sockaddr_af net/sctp/socket.c:359 [inline]
sctp_do_bind+0x60f/0xdc0 net/sctp/socket.c:384
sctp_bind+0x149/0x190 net/sctp/socket.c:332
inet6_bind+0x1fd/0x1820 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:293
SYSC_bind+0x3f2/0x4b0 net/socket.c:1474
SyS_bind+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:1460
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x43fd49
RSP: 002b:00007ffe99df3d28 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 000000000043fd49
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401670
R13: 0000000000401700 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Local variable description: ----address@SYSC_bind
Variable was created at:
SYSC_bind+0x6f/0x4b0 net/socket.c:1461
SyS_bind+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:1460
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6780db244d6b1537d139dea0ec8aad10cf9e4adb ]
syzbot produced a nice report [1]
Issue here is that a recvmmsg() managed to leak 8 bytes of kernel memory
to user space, because sin_zero (padding field) was not properly cleared.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:227
CPU: 1 PID: 3586 Comm: syzkaller481044 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #82
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x164/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1176
kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:227
___sys_recvmsg+0x4e2/0x810 net/socket.c:2211
__sys_recvmmsg+0x54e/0xdb0 net/socket.c:2313
SYSC_recvmmsg+0x29b/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2394
SyS_recvmmsg+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:2378
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x4401c9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc56f73098 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 00000000004401c9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020003ac0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000020003bc0 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000401af0
R13: 0000000000401b80 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Local variable description: ----addr@___sys_recvmsg
Variable was created at:
___sys_recvmsg+0xd5/0x810 net/socket.c:2172
__sys_recvmmsg+0x54e/0xdb0 net/socket.c:2313
Bytes 8-15 of 16 are uninitialized
==================================================================
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 3586 Comm: syzkaller481044 Tainted: G B 4.16.0+ #82
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
panic+0x39d/0x940 kernel/panic.c:183
kmsan_report+0x238/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1083
kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x164/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1176
kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:227
___sys_recvmsg+0x4e2/0x810 net/socket.c:2211
__sys_recvmmsg+0x54e/0xdb0 net/socket.c:2313
SYSC_recvmmsg+0x29b/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2394
SyS_recvmmsg+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:2378
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6dfe4b97e08ec3d1a593fdaca099f0ef0a3a19e6 ]
Dmitry got the following recursive locking report while running syzkaller
fuzzer, the Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1729 [inline]
check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1773 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2251 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0xef2/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340
lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755
lock_sock_nested+0xcb/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2536
lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline]
sctp_close+0xcd/0x9d0 net/sctp/socket.c:1497
inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:425
inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:432
sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:597
__sock_create+0x38b/0x870 net/socket.c:1226
sock_create+0x7f/0xa0 net/socket.c:1237
sctp_do_peeloff+0x1a2/0x440 net/sctp/socket.c:4879
sctp_getsockopt_peeloff net/sctp/socket.c:4914 [inline]
sctp_getsockopt+0x111a/0x67e0 net/sctp/socket.c:6628
sock_common_getsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2690
SYSC_getsockopt net/socket.c:1817 [inline]
SyS_getsockopt+0x240/0x380 net/socket.c:1799
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
This warning is caused by the lock held by sctp_getsockopt() is on one
socket, while the other lock that sctp_close() is getting later is on
the newly created (which failed) socket during peeloff operation.
This patch is to avoid this warning by use lock_sock with subclass
SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING as Wang Cong and Marcelo's suggestion.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Suggested-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 07f2c7ab6f8d0a7e7c5764c4e6cc9c52951b9d9c ]
When SCTP makes INIT or INIT_ACK packet the total chunk length
can exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN which leads to kernel panic when
transmitting these packets, e.g. the crash on sending INIT_ACK:
[ 597.804948] skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:00000000ffae06e4 len:120168
put:120156 head:000000007aa47635 data:00000000d991c2de
tail:0x1d640 end:0xfec0 dev:<NULL>
...
[ 597.976970] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 598.033408] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104!
[ 600.314841] Call Trace:
[ 600.345829] <IRQ>
[ 600.371639] ? sctp_packet_transmit+0x2095/0x26d0 [sctp]
[ 600.436934] skb_put+0x16c/0x200
[ 600.477295] sctp_packet_transmit+0x2095/0x26d0 [sctp]
[ 600.540630] ? sctp_packet_config+0x890/0x890 [sctp]
[ 600.601781] ? __sctp_packet_append_chunk+0x3b4/0xd00 [sctp]
[ 600.671356] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x3f/0x90 [sctp]
[ 600.731482] sctp_outq_flush+0x663/0x30d0 [sctp]
[ 600.788565] ? sctp_make_init+0xbf0/0xbf0 [sctp]
[ 600.845555] ? sctp_check_transmitted+0x18f0/0x18f0 [sctp]
[ 600.912945] ? sctp_outq_tail+0x631/0x9d0 [sctp]
[ 600.969936] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x3be1/0x5cb0 [sctp]
[ 601.041593] ? sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x85f/0xc30 [sctp]
[ 601.104837] ? sctp_generate_t1_cookie_event+0x20/0x20 [sctp]
[ 601.175436] ? sctp_eat_data+0x1710/0x1710 [sctp]
[ 601.233575] sctp_do_sm+0x182/0x560 [sctp]
[ 601.284328] ? sctp_has_association+0x70/0x70 [sctp]
[ 601.345586] ? sctp_rcv+0xef4/0x32f0 [sctp]
[ 601.397478] ? sctp6_rcv+0xa/0x20 [sctp]
...
Here the chunk size for INIT_ACK packet becomes too big, mostly
because of the state cookie (INIT packet has large size with
many address parameters), plus additional server parameters.
Later this chunk causes the panic in skb_put_data():
skb_packet_transmit()
sctp_packet_pack()
skb_put_data(nskb, chunk->skb->data, chunk->skb->len);
'nskb' (head skb) was previously allocated with packet->size
from u16 'chunk->chunk_hdr->length'.
As suggested by Marcelo we should check the chunk's length in
_sctp_make_chunk() before trying to allocate skb for it and
discard a chunk if its size bigger than SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leinter@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 957d761cf91cdbb175ad7d8f5472336a4d54dbf2 ]
When going through the bind address list in sctp_v6_get_dst() and
the previously found address is better ('matchlen > bmatchlen'),
the code continues to the next iteration without releasing currently
held destination.
Fix it by releasing 'bdst' before continue to the next iteration, and
instead of introducing one more '!IS_ERR(bdst)' check for dst_release(),
move the already existed one right after ip6_dst_lookup_flow(), i.e. we
shouldn't proceed further if we get an error for the route lookup.
Fixes: dbc2b5e9a09e ("sctp: fix src address selection if using secondary addresses for ipv6")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4a31a6b19f9ddf498c81f5c9b089742b7472a6f8 ]
Fix dst reference count leak in sctp_v4_get_dst() introduced in commit
410f03831 ("sctp: add routing output fallback"):
When walking the address_list, successive ip_route_output_key() calls
may return the same rt->dst with the reference incremented on each call.
The code would not decrement the dst refcount when the dst pointer was
identical from the previous iteration, causing the dst refcnt leak.
Testcase:
ip netns add TEST
ip netns exec TEST ip link set lo up
ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip link add dummy1 type dummy
ip link add dummy2 type dummy
ip link set dev dummy0 netns TEST
ip link set dev dummy1 netns TEST
ip link set dev dummy2 netns TEST
ip netns exec TEST ip addr add 192.168.1.1/24 dev dummy0
ip netns exec TEST ip link set dummy0 up
ip netns exec TEST ip addr add 192.168.1.2/24 dev dummy1
ip netns exec TEST ip link set dummy1 up
ip netns exec TEST ip addr add 192.168.1.3/24 dev dummy2
ip netns exec TEST ip link set dummy2 up
ip netns exec TEST sctp_test -H 192.168.1.2 -P 20002 -h 192.168.1.1 -p 20000 -s -B 192.168.1.3
ip netns del TEST
In 4.4 and 4.9 kernels this results to:
[ 354.179591] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1
[ 364.419674] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1
[ 374.663664] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1
[ 384.903717] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1
[ 395.143724] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1
[ 405.383645] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1
...
Fixes: 410f03831 ("sctp: add routing output fallback")
Fixes: 0ca50d12f ("sctp: fix src address selection if using secondary addresses")
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c76f97c99ae6d26d14c7f0e50e074382bfbc9f98 ]
Some sockopt handling functions were calculating the length of the
buffer to be written to userspace and then calculating it again when
actually writing the buffer, which could lead to some write not using
an up-to-date length.
This patch updates such places to just make use of the len variable.
Also, replace some sizeof(type) to sizeof(var).
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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prsctp_prune
[ Upstream commit d30fc5126efb0c33b7adf5966d3051db2c3d7721 ]
Now outstanding_bytes is only increased when appending chunks into one
packet and sending it at 1st time, while decreased when it is about to
move into retransmit queue. It means outstanding_bytes value is already
decreased for all chunks in retransmit queue.
However sctp_prsctp_prune_sent is a common function to check the chunks
in both transmitted and retransmit queue, it decrease outstanding_bytes
when moving a chunk into abandoned queue from either of them.
It could cause outstanding_bytes underflow, as it also decreases it's
value for the chunks in retransmit queue.
This patch fixes it by only updating outstanding_bytes for transmitted
queue when pruning queues for prsctp prio policy, the same fix is also
needed in sctp_check_transmitted.
Fixes: 8dbdf1f5b09c ("sctp: implement prsctp PRIO policy")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ecca8f88da5c4260cc2bccfefd2a24976704c366 upstream.
Now in sctp_setsockopt_maxseg user_frag or frag_point can be set with
val >= 8 and val <= SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. But both checks are incorrect.
val >= 8 means frag_point can even be less than SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT.
Then in sctp_datamsg_from_user(), when it's value is greater than cookie
echo len and trying to bundle with cookie echo chunk, the first_len will
overflow.
The worse case is when it's value is equal as cookie echo len, first_len
becomes 0, it will go into a dead loop for fragment later on. In Hangbin
syzkaller testing env, oom was even triggered due to consecutive memory
allocation in that loop.
Besides, SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN is the max size of the whole chunk, it should
deduct the data header for frag_point or user_frag check.
This patch does a proper check with SCTP_DEFAULT_MINSEGMENT subtracting
the sctphdr and datahdr, SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN subtracting datahdr when
setting frag_point via sockopt. It also improves sctp_setsockopt_maxseg
codes.
Suggested-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 121d57af308d0cf943f08f4738d24d3966c38cd9 ]
Validate gso_type during segmentation as SKB_GSO_DODGY sources
may pass packets where the gso_type does not match the contents.
Syzkaller was able to enter the SCTP gso handler with a packet of
gso_type SKB_GSO_TCPV4.
On entry of transport layer gso handlers, verify that the gso_type
matches the transport protocol.
Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<001a1137452496ffc305617e5fe0@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+fee64147a25aecd48055@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a0ff660058b88d12625a783ce9e5c1371c87951f ]
After commit cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk after waking up from
wait_buf sleep"), it may change to lock another sk if the asoc has been
peeled off in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf.
However, the asoc's new sk could be already closed elsewhere, as it's in
the sendmsg context of the old sk that can't avoid the new sk's closing.
If the sk's last one refcnt is held by this asoc, later on after putting
this asoc, the new sk will be freed, while under it's own lock.
This patch is to revert that commit, but fix the old issue by returning
error under the old sk's lock.
Fixes: cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk after waking up from wait_buf sleep")
Reported-by: syzbot+ac6ea7baa4432811eb50@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c5006b8aa74599ce19104b31d322d2ea9ff887cc ]
The check in sctp_sockaddr_af is not robust enough to forbid binding a
v4mapped v6 addr on a v4 socket.
The worse thing is that v4 socket's bind_verify would not convert this
v4mapped v6 addr to a v4 addr. syzbot even reported a crash as the v4
socket bound a v6 addr.
This patch is to fix it by doing the common sa.sa_family check first,
then AF_INET check for v4mapped v6 addrs.
Fixes: 7dab83de50c7 ("sctp: Support ipv6only AF_INET6 sockets.")
Reported-by: syzbot+7b7b518b1228d2743963@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8cb38a602478e9f806571f6920b0a3298aabf042 ]
The patch(180d8cd942ce) replaces all uses of struct sock fields'
memory_pressure, memory_allocated, sockets_allocated, and sysctl_mem
to accessor macros. But the sockets_allocated field of sctp sock is
not replaced at all. Then replace it now for unifying the code.
Fixes: 180d8cd942ce ("foundations of per-cgroup memory pressure controlling.")
Cc: Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Tonghao Zhang <zhangtonghao@didichuxing.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 23bb09cfbe04076ef647da3889a5a5ab6cbe6f15 ]
This patch is to fix the issue that sctp_prsctp_prune_sent forgot
to update q->out_qlen when removing a chunk from unsent queue.
Fixes: 8dbdf1f5b09c ("sctp: implement prsctp PRIO policy")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cea0cc80a6777beb6eb643d4ad53690e1ad1d4ff ]
Commit dfcb9f4f99f1 ("sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads
sleeping on it") fixed the race between peeloff and wait sndbuf by
checking waitqueue_active(&asoc->wait) in sctp_do_peeloff().
But it actually doesn't work, as even if waitqueue_active returns false
the waiting sndbuf thread may still not yet hold sk lock. After asoc is
peeled off, sk is not asoc->base.sk any more, then to hold the old sk
lock couldn't make assoc safe to access.
This patch is to fix this by changing to hold the new sk lock if sk is
not asoc->base.sk, meanwhile, also set the sk in sctp_sendmsg with the
new sk.
With this fix, there is no more race between peeloff and waitbuf, the
check 'waitqueue_active' in sctp_do_peeloff can be removed.
Thanks Marcelo and Neil for making this clear.
v1->v2:
fix it by changing to lock the new sock instead of adding a flag in asoc.
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ca3af4dd28cff4e7216e213ba3b671fbf9f84758 ]
Now in sctp_sendmsg sctp_wait_for_sndbuf could schedule out without
holding sock sk. It means the current asoc can be freed elsewhere,
like when receiving an abort packet.
If the asoc is just created in sctp_sendmsg and sctp_wait_for_sndbuf
returns err, the asoc will be freed again due to new_asoc is not nil.
An use-after-free issue would be triggered by this.
This patch is to fix it by setting new_asoc with nil if the asoc is
already dead when cpu schedules back, so that it will not be freed
again in sctp_sendmsg.
v1->v2:
set new_asoc as nil in sctp_sendmsg instead of sctp_wait_for_sndbuf.
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0e73fc9a56f22f2eec4d2b2910c649f7af67b74d ]
The comparison on the timeout can lead to an array overrun
read on sctp_timer_tbl because of an off-by-one error. Fix
this by using < instead of <= and also compare to the array
size rather than SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_MAX.
Fixes CoverityScan CID#1397639 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7c8a61d9ee1df0fb4747879fa67a99614eb62fec ]
Alexandar Potapenko while testing the kernel with KMSAN and syzkaller
discovered that in some configurations sctp would leak 4 bytes of
kernel stack.
Working with his reproducer I discovered that those 4 bytes that
are leaked is the scope id of an ipv6 address returned by recvmsg.
With a little code inspection and a shrewd guess I discovered that
sctp_inet6_skb_msgname only initializes the scope_id field for link
local ipv6 addresses to the interface index the link local address
pertains to instead of initializing the scope_id field for all ipv6
addresses.
That is almost reasonable as scope_id's are meaniningful only for link
local addresses. Set the scope_id in all other cases to 0 which is
not a valid interface index to make it clear there is nothing useful
in the scope_id field.
There should be no danger of breaking userspace as the stack leak
guaranteed that previously meaningless random data was being returned.
Fixes: 372f525b495c ("SCTP: Resync with LKSCTP tree.")
History-tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit df80cd9b28b9ebaa284a41df611dbf3a2d05ca74 ]
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d04adf1b355181e737b6b1e23d801b07f0b7c4c0 ]
Now when migrating sock to another one in sctp_sock_migrate(), it only
resets owner sk for the data in receive queues, not the chunks on out
queues.
It would cause that data chunks length on the sock is not consistent
with sk sk_wmem_alloc. When closing the sock or freeing these chunks,
the old sk would never be freed, and the new sock may crash due to
the overflow sk_wmem_alloc.
syzbot found this issue with this series:
r0 = socket$inet_sctp()
sendto$inet(r0)
listen(r0)
accept4(r0)
close(r0)
Although listen() should have returned error when one TCP-style socket
is in connecting (I may fix this one in another patch), it could also
be reproduced by peeling off an assoc.
This issue is there since very beginning.
This patch is to reset owner sk for the chunks on out queues so that
sk sk_wmem_alloc has correct value after accept one sock or peeloff
an assoc to one sock.
Note that when resetting owner sk for chunks on outqueue, it has to
sctp_clear_owner_w/skb_orphan chunks before changing assoc->base.sk
first and then sctp_set_owner_w them after changing assoc->base.sk,
due to that sctp_wfree and it's callees are using assoc->base.sk.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b71d21c274eff20a9db8158882b545b141b73ab8 ]
Commit 9b9742022888 ("sctp: support ipv6 nonlocal bind")
introduced support for the above options as v4 sctp did,
so patched sctp_v6_available().
In the v4 implementation it's enough, because
sctp_inet_bind_verify() just returns with sctp_v4_available().
However sctp_inet6_bind_verify() has an extra check before that
for link-local scope_id, which won't respect the above options.
Added the checks before calling ipv6_chk_addr(), but
not before the validation of scope_id.
before (w/ both options):
./v6test fe80::10 sctp
bind failed, errno: 99 (Cannot assign requested address)
./v6test fe80::10 tcp
bind success, errno: 0 (Success)
after (w/ both options):
./v6test fe80::10 sctp
bind success, errno: 0 (Success)
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Toth <laszlth@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1cc276cec9ec574d41cf47dfc0f51406b6f26ab4 ]
Now sctp processes icmp redirect packet in sctp_icmp_redirect where
it calls sctp_transport_dst_check in which tp->dst can be released.
The problem is before calling sctp_transport_dst_check, it doesn't
check sock_owned_by_user, which means tp->dst could be freed while
a process is accessing it with owning the socket.
An use-after-free issue could be triggered by this.
This patch is to fix it by checking sock_owned_by_user before calling
sctp_transport_dst_check in sctp_icmp_redirect, so that it would not
release tp->dst if users still hold sock lock.
Besides, the same issue fixed in commit 45caeaa5ac0b ("dccp/tcp: fix
routing redirect race") on sctp also needs this check.
Fixes: 55be7a9c6074 ("ipv4: Add redirect support to all protocol icmp error handlers")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7906b00f5cd1cd484fced7fcda892176e3202c8a ]
Commit fb586f25300f ("sctp: delay calls to sk_data_ready() as much as
possible") minimized the number of wake ups that are triggered in case
the association receives a packet with multiple data chunks on it and/or
when io_events are enabled and then commit 0970f5b36659 ("sctp: signal
sk_data_ready earlier on data chunks reception") moved the wake up to as
soon as possible. It thus relies on the state machine running later to
clean the flag that the event was already generated.
The issue is that there are 2 call paths that calls
sctp_ulpq_tail_event() outside of the state machine, causing the flag to
linger and possibly omitting a needed wake up in the sequence.
One of the call paths is when enabling SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENTS via
setsockopt(SCTP_EVENTS), as noticed by Harald Welte. The other is when
partial reliability triggers removal of chunks from the send queue when
the application calls sendmsg().
This commit fixes it by not setting the flag in case the socket is not
owned by the user, as it won't be cleaned later. This works for
user-initiated calls and also for rx path processing.
Fixes: fb586f25300f ("sctp: delay calls to sk_data_ready() as much as possible")
Reported-by: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ee6c88bb754e3d363e568da78086adfedb692447 ]
inet_diag_msg_sctp{,l}addr_fill() and sctp_get_sctp_info() copy
sizeof(sockaddr_storage) bytes to fill in sockaddr structs used
to export diagnostic information to userspace.
However, the memory allocated to store sockaddr information is
smaller than that and depends on the address family, so we leak
up to 100 uninitialized bytes to userspace. Just use the size of
the source structs instead, in all the three cases this is what
userspace expects. Zero out the remaining memory.
Unused bytes (i.e. when IPv4 addresses are used) in source
structs sctp_sockaddr_entry and sctp_transport are already
cleared by sctp_add_bind_addr() and sctp_transport_new(),
respectively.
Noticed while testing KASAN-enabled kernel with 'ss':
[ 2326.885243] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag] at addr ffff881be8779800
[ 2326.896800] Read of size 128 by task ss/9527
[ 2326.901564] CPU: 0 PID: 9527 Comm: ss Not tainted 4.11.0-22.el7a.x86_64 #1
[ 2326.909236] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
[ 2326.917585] Call Trace:
[ 2326.920312] dump_stack+0x63/0x8d
[ 2326.924014] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70
[ 2326.928295] kasan_report+0x288/0x540
[ 2326.932380] ? inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag]
[ 2326.938500] ? skb_put+0x8b/0xd0
[ 2326.942098] ? memset+0x31/0x40
[ 2326.945599] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 2326.950362] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 2326.953669] inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag]
[ 2326.959596] ? inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill+0x460/0x460 [sctp_diag]
[ 2326.966495] ? __lock_sock+0x102/0x150
[ 2326.970671] ? sock_def_wakeup+0x60/0x60
[ 2326.975048] ? remove_wait_queue+0xc0/0xc0
[ 2326.979619] sctp_diag_dump+0x44a/0x760 [sctp_diag]
[ 2326.985063] ? sctp_ep_dump+0x280/0x280 [sctp_diag]
[ 2326.990504] ? memset+0x31/0x40
[ 2326.994007] ? mutex_lock+0x12/0x40
[ 2326.997900] __inet_diag_dump+0x57/0xb0 [inet_diag]
[ 2327.003340] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150
[ 2327.007715] inet_diag_dump+0x4d/0x80 [inet_diag]
[ 2327.012979] netlink_dump+0x1e6/0x490
[ 2327.017064] __netlink_dump_start+0x28e/0x2c0
[ 2327.021924] inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x189/0x1a0 [inet_diag]
[ 2327.028045] ? inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x1b0/0x1b0 [inet_diag]
[ 2327.034651] ? inet_diag_dump_compat+0x190/0x190 [inet_diag]
[ 2327.040965] ? __netlink_lookup+0x1b9/0x260
[ 2327.045631] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x1e0
[ 2327.050199] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14b/0x180
[ 2327.054574] ? sock_diag_bind+0x60/0x60
[ 2327.058850] sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40
[ 2327.062837] netlink_unicast+0x2e7/0x3b0
[ 2327.067212] ? netlink_attachskb+0x330/0x330
[ 2327.071975] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 2327.076544] netlink_sendmsg+0x5be/0x730
[ 2327.080918] ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 2327.085486] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
[ 2327.090057] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x24/0x30
[ 2327.095109] ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0
[ 2327.099678] sock_sendmsg+0x74/0x80
[ 2327.103567] ___sys_sendmsg+0x520/0x530
[ 2327.107844] ? __get_locked_pte+0x178/0x200
[ 2327.112510] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x270/0x270
[ 2327.117660] ? vm_insert_page+0x360/0x360
[ 2327.122133] ? vm_insert_pfn_prot+0xb4/0x150
[ 2327.126895] ? vm_insert_pfn+0x32/0x40
[ 2327.131077] ? vvar_fault+0x71/0xd0
[ 2327.134968] ? special_mapping_fault+0x69/0x110
[ 2327.140022] ? __do_fault+0x42/0x120
[ 2327.144008] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x17a0
[ 2327.148965] ? __fget_light+0xa7/0xc0
[ 2327.153049] __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150
[ 2327.157133] ? __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150
[ 2327.161409] ? SyS_shutdown+0x140/0x140
[ 2327.165688] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd0/0xd0
[ 2327.170646] ? __do_page_fault+0x55d/0x620
[ 2327.175216] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150
[ 2327.179591] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20
[ 2327.183384] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
[ 2327.187471] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
[ 2327.192622] RIP: 0033:0x7f41d18fa3b0
[ 2327.196608] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3b731218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[ 2327.205055] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc3b731380 RCX: 00007f41d18fa3b0
[ 2327.213017] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc3b731340 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 2327.220978] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000040
[ 2327.228939] R10: 00007ffc3b730f30 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
[ 2327.236901] R13: 00007ffc3b731340 R14: 00007ffc3b7313d0 R15: 0000000000000084
[ 2327.244865] Object at ffff881be87797e0, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64
[ 2327.251953] Allocated:
[ 2327.254581] PID = 9484
[ 2327.257215] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
[ 2327.261485] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 2327.265179] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 2327.269165] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe6/0x1d0
[ 2327.274138] sctp_add_bind_addr+0x58/0x180 [sctp]
[ 2327.279400] sctp_do_bind+0x208/0x310 [sctp]
[ 2327.284176] sctp_bind+0x61/0xa0 [sctp]
[ 2327.288455] inet_bind+0x5f/0x3a0
[ 2327.292151] SYSC_bind+0x1a4/0x1e0
[ 2327.295944] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
[ 2327.299349] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
[ 2327.303433] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[ 2327.308194] Freed:
[ 2327.310434] PID = 4131
[ 2327.313065] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
[ 2327.317344] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 2327.321040] kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0
[ 2327.325220] kfree+0x96/0x1a0
[ 2327.328530] dynamic_kobj_release+0x15/0x40
[ 2327.333195] kobject_release+0x99/0x1e0
[ 2327.337472] kobject_put+0x38/0x70
[ 2327.341266] free_notes_attrs+0x66/0x80
[ 2327.345545] mod_sysfs_teardown+0x1a5/0x270
[ 2327.350211] free_module+0x20/0x2a0
[ 2327.354099] SyS_delete_module+0x2cb/0x2f0
[ 2327.358667] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230
[ 2327.362750] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[ 2327.367510] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 2327.372855] ffff881be8779700: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
[ 2327.380914] ffff881be8779780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00
[ 2327.388972] >ffff881be8779800: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2327.397031] ^
[ 2327.401792] ffff881be8779880: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
[ 2327.409850] ffff881be8779900: 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00
[ 2327.417907] ==================================================================
This fixes CVE-2017-7558.
References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1480266
Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 15339e441ec46fbc3bf3486bb1ae4845b0f1bb8d ]
KMSAN reported use of uninitialized sctp_addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr and
sctp_addr->v6.sin6_scope_id in sctp_v6_cmp_addr() (see below).
Make sure all fields of an IPv6 address are initialized, which
guarantees that the IPv4 fields are also initialized.
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of uninitialized memory in sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x8d4/0x9f0
net/sctp/ipv6.c:517
CPU: 2 PID: 31056 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2944
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x172/0x1c0 lib/dump_stack.c:42
is_logbuf_locked mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:59 [inline]
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:938
native_save_fl arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:18 [inline]
arch_local_save_flags arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:72 [inline]
arch_local_irq_save arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:113 [inline]
__msan_warning_32+0x61/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:467
sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x8d4/0x9f0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:517
sctp_v6_get_dst+0x8c7/0x1630 net/sctp/ipv6.c:290
sctp_transport_route+0x101/0x570 net/sctp/transport.c:292
sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x66d/0x16f0 net/sctp/associola.c:651
sctp_sendmsg+0x35a5/0x4f90 net/sctp/socket.c:1871
inet_sendmsg+0x498/0x670 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:643 [inline]
SYSC_sendto+0x608/0x710 net/socket.c:1696
SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1664
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
RIP: 0033:0x44b479
RSP: 002b:00007f6213f21c08 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000000 RCX: 000000000044b479
RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000000020edd000 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00000000007080a8 R08: 0000000020b85fe4 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000040005 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000003760 R14: 00000000006e5820 R15: 0000000000ff8000
origin description: ----dst_saddr@sctp_v6_get_dst
local variable created at:
sk_fullsock include/net/sock.h:2321 [inline]
inet6_sk include/linux/ipv6.h:309 [inline]
sctp_v6_get_dst+0x91/0x1630 net/sctp/ipv6.c:241
sctp_transport_route+0x101/0x570 net/sctp/transport.c:292
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of uninitialized memory in sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x8d4/0x9f0
net/sctp/ipv6.c:517
CPU: 2 PID: 31056 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2944
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x172/0x1c0 lib/dump_stack.c:42
is_logbuf_locked mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:59 [inline]
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:938
native_save_fl arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:18 [inline]
arch_local_save_flags arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:72 [inline]
arch_local_irq_save arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:113 [inline]
__msan_warning_32+0x61/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:467
sctp_v6_cmp_addr+0x8d4/0x9f0 net/sctp/ipv6.c:517
sctp_v6_get_dst+0x8c7/0x1630 net/sctp/ipv6.c:290
sctp_transport_route+0x101/0x570 net/sctp/transport.c:292
sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x66d/0x16f0 net/sctp/associola.c:651
sctp_sendmsg+0x35a5/0x4f90 net/sctp/socket.c:1871
inet_sendmsg+0x498/0x670 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:643 [inline]
SYSC_sendto+0x608/0x710 net/socket.c:1696
SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1664
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94
RIP: 0033:0x44b479
RSP: 002b:00007f6213f21c08 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000000 RCX: 000000000044b479
RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000000020edd000 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00000000007080a8 R08: 0000000020b85fe4 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000040005 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000003760 R14: 00000000006e5820 R15: 0000000000ff8000
origin description: ----dst_saddr@sctp_v6_get_dst
local variable created at:
sk_fullsock include/net/sock.h:2321 [inline]
inet6_sk include/linux/ipv6.h:309 [inline]
sctp_v6_get_dst+0x91/0x1630 net/sctp/ipv6.c:241
sctp_transport_route+0x101/0x570 net/sctp/transport.c:292
==================================================================
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 912964eacb111551db73429719eb5fadcab0ff8a ]
Commit 6f29a1306131 ("sctp: sctp_addr_id2transport should verify the
addr before looking up assoc") invoked sctp_verify_addr to verify the
addr.
But it didn't check af variable beforehand, once users pass an address
with family = 0 through sockopt, sctp_get_af_specific will return NULL
and NULL pointer dereference will be caused by af->sockaddr_len.
This patch is to fix it by returning NULL if af variable is NULL.
Fixes: 6f29a1306131 ("sctp: sctp_addr_id2transport should verify the addr before looking up assoc")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 988c7322116970696211e902b468aefec95b6ec4 ]
In sctp_for_each_transport, pos is used to save how many objs it has
dumped. Now it gets the last obj by sctp_transport_get_idx, then gets
the next obj by sctp_transport_get_next.
The issue is that in the meanwhile if some objs in transport hashtable
are removed and the objs nums are less than pos, sctp_transport_get_idx
would return NULL and hti.walker.tbl is NULL as well. At this moment
it should stop hti, instead of continue getting the next obj. Or it
would cause a NULL pointer dereference in sctp_transport_get_next.
This patch is to pass pos + 1 into sctp_transport_get_idx to get the
next obj directly, even if pos > objs nums, it would return NULL and
stop hti.
Fixes: 626d16f50f39 ("sctp: export some apis or variables for sctp_diag and reuse some for proc")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 581409dacc9176b0de1f6c4ca8d66e13aa8e1b29 ]
Now sctp holds read_lock when foreach sctp_ep_hashtable without disabling
BH. If CPU schedules to another thread A at this moment, the thread A may
be trying to hold the write_lock with disabling BH.
As BH is disabled and CPU cannot schedule back to the thread holding the
read_lock, while the thread A keeps waiting for the read_lock. A dead
lock would be triggered by this.
This patch is to fix this dead lock by calling read_lock_bh instead to
disable BH when holding the read_lock in sctp_for_each_endpoint.
Fixes: 626d16f50f39 ("sctp: export some apis or variables for sctp_diag and reuse some for proc")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6f29a130613191d3c6335169febe002cba00edf5 ]
sctp_addr_id2transport is a function for sockopt to look up assoc by
address. As the address is from userspace, it can be a v4-mapped v6
address. But in sctp protocol stack, it always handles a v4-mapped
v6 address as a v4 address. So it's necessary to convert it to a v4
address before looking up assoc by address.
This patch is to fix it by calling sctp_verify_addr in which it can do
this conversion before calling sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc, just like
what sctp_sendmsg and __sctp_connect do for the address from users.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5207f3996338e1db71363fe381c81aaf1e54e4e3 ]
Now sctp gso puts segments into skb's frag_list, then processes these
segments in skb_segment. But skb_segment handles them only when gs is
enabled, as it's in the same branch with skb's frags.
Although almost all the NICs support sg other than some old ones, but
since commit 1e16aa3ddf86 ("net: gso: use feature flag argument in all
protocol gso handlers"), features &= skb->dev->hw_enc_features, and
xfrm_output_gso call skb_segment with features = 0, which means sctp
gso would call skb_segment with sg = 0, and skb_segment would not work
as expected.
This patch is to fix it by setting features param with NETIF_F_SG when
calling skb_segment so that it can go the right branch to process the
skb's frag_list.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 804ec7ebe8ea003999ca8d1bfc499edc6a9e07df ]
sometimes ICMP replies to INIT chunks are ignored by the client, even if
the encapsulated SCTP headers match an open socket. This happens when the
ICMP packet is carried by a paged skb: use skb_header_pointer() to read
packet contents beyond the SCTP header, so that chunk header and initiate
tag are validated correctly.
v2:
- don't use skb_header_pointer() to read the transport header, since
icmp_socket_deliver() already puts these 8 bytes in the linear area.
- change commit message to make specific reference to INIT chunks.
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fdcee2cbb8438702ea1b328fb6e0ac5e9a40c7f8 ]
SCTP needs fixes similar to 83eaddab4378 ("ipv6/dccp: do not inherit
ipv6_mc_list from parent"), otherwise bad things can happen.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dbc2b5e9a09e9a6664679a667ff81cff6e5f2641 ]
Commit 0ca50d12fe46 ("sctp: fix src address selection if using secondary
addresses") has fixed a src address selection issue when using secondary
addresses for ipv4.
Now sctp ipv6 also has the similar issue. When using a secondary address,
sctp_v6_get_dst tries to choose the saddr which has the most same bits
with the daddr by sctp_v6_addr_match_len. It may make some cases not work
as expected.
hostA:
[1] fd21:356b:459a:cf10::11 (eth1)
[2] fd21:356b:459a:cf20::11 (eth2)
hostB:
[a] fd21:356b:459a:cf30::2 (eth1)
[b] fd21:356b:459a:cf40::2 (eth2)
route from hostA to hostB:
fd21:356b:459a:cf30::/64 dev eth1 metric 1024 mtu 1500
The expected path should be:
fd21:356b:459a:cf10::11 <-> fd21:356b:459a:cf30::2
But addr[2] matches addr[a] more bits than addr[1] does, according to
sctp_v6_addr_match_len. It causes the path to be:
fd21:356b:459a:cf20::11 <-> fd21:356b:459a:cf30::2
This patch is to fix it with the same way as Marcelo's fix for sctp ipv4.
As no ip_dev_find for ipv6, this patch is to use ipv6_chk_addr to check
if the saddr is in a dev instead.
Note that for backwards compatibility, it will still do the addr_match_len
check here when no optimal is found.
Reported-by: Patrick Talbert <ptalbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 34b2789f1d9bf8dcca9b5cb553d076ca2cd898ee ]
Now sctp doesn't check sock's state before listening on it. It could
even cause changing a sock with any state to become a listening sock
when doing sctp_listen.
This patch is to fix it by checking sock's state in sctp_listen, so
that it will listen on the sock with right state.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dfcb9f4f99f1e9a49e43398a7bfbf56927544af1 upstream.
commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.
As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.
Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.
This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).
Joint work with Xin Long.
Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 92e55f412cffd016cc245a74278cb4d7b89bb3bc upstream.
Unlike ipv4, this control socket is shared by all cpus so we cannot use
it as scratchpad area to annotate the mark that we pass to ip6_xmit().
Add a new parameter to ip6_xmit() to indicate the mark. The SCTP socket
family caches the flowi6 structure in the sctp_transport structure, so
we cannot use to carry the mark unless we later on reset it back, which
I discarded since it looks ugly to me.
Fixes: bf99b4ded5f8 ("tcp: fix mark propagation with fwmark_reflect enabled")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2dcab598484185dea7ec22219c76dcdd59e3cb90 ]
Alexander Popov reported that an application may trigger a BUG_ON in
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf if the socket tx buffer is full, a thread is
waiting on it to queue more data and meanwhile another thread peels off
the association being used by the first thread.
This patch replaces the BUG_ON call with a proper error handling. It
will return -EPIPE to the original sendmsg call, similarly to what would
have been done if the association wasn't found in the first place.
Acked-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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null
[ Upstream commit 08abb79542c9e8c367d1d8e44fe1026868d3f0a7 ]
Prior to this patch, sctp_transport_lookup_process didn't rcu_read_unlock
when it failed to find a transport by sctp_addrs_lookup_transport.
This patch is to fix it by moving up rcu_read_unlock right before checking
transport and also to remove the out path.
Fixes: 1cceda784980 ("sctp: fix the issue sctp_diag uses lock_sock in rcu_read_lock")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Now when users shutdown a sock with SEND_SHUTDOWN in sctp, even if
this sock has no connection (assoc), sk state would be changed to
SCTP_SS_CLOSING, which is not as we expect.
Besides, after that if users try to listen on this sock, kernel
could even panic when it dereference sctp_sk(sk)->bind_hash in
sctp_inet_listen, as bind_hash is null when sock has no assoc.
This patch is to move sk state change after checking sk assocs
is not empty, and also merge these two if() conditions and reduce
indent level.
Fixes: d46e416c11c8 ("sctp: sctp should change socket state when shutdown is received")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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sctp_wait_for_connect() currently already holds the asoc to keep it
alive during the sleep, in case another thread release it. But Andrey
Konovalov and Dmitry Vyukov reported an use-after-free in such
situation.
Problem is that __sctp_connect() doesn't get a ref on the asoc and will
do a read on the asoc after calling sctp_wait_for_connect(), but by then
another thread may have closed it and the _put on sctp_wait_for_connect
will actually release it, causing the use-after-free.
Fix is, instead of doing the read after waiting for the connect, do it
before so, and avoid this issue as the socket is still locked by then.
There should be no issue on returning the asoc id in case of failure as
the application shouldn't trust on that number in such situations
anyway.
This issue doesn't exist in sctp_sendmsg() path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Prior to this patch, in rx path, before calling lock_sock, it needed to
hold assoc when got it by __sctp_lookup_association, in case other place
would free/put assoc.
But in __sctp_lookup_association, it lookup and hold transport, then got
assoc by transport->assoc, then hold assoc and put transport. It means
it didn't hold transport, yet it was returned and later on directly
assigned to chunk->transport.
Without the protection of sock lock, the transport may be freed/put by
other places, which would cause a use-after-free issue.
This patch is to fix this issue by holding transport instead of assoc.
As holding transport can make sure to access assoc is also safe, and
actually it looks up assoc by searching transport rhashtable, to hold
transport here makes more sense.
Note that the function will be renamed later on on another patch.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Prior to this patch, it used a local variable to save the transport that is
looked up by __sctp_lookup_association(), and didn't return it back. But in
sctp_rcv, it is used to initialize chunk->transport. So when hitting this,
even if it found the transport, it was still initializing chunk->transport
with null instead.
This patch is to return the transport back through transport pointer
that is from __sctp_rcv_lookup_harder().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In sctp_transport_lookup_process(), Commit 1cceda784980 ("sctp: fix
the issue sctp_diag uses lock_sock in rcu_read_lock") moved cb() out
of rcu lock, but it put transport and hold assoc instead, and ignore
that cb() still uses transport. It may cause a use-after-free issue.
This patch is to hold transport instead of assoc there.
Fixes: 1cceda784980 ("sctp: fix the issue sctp_diag uses lock_sock in rcu_read_lock")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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