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commit d25a01257e422a4bdeb426f69529d57c73b235fe upstream.
When the TIPC module is unloaded, we have identified a race condition
that allows a node reference counter to go to zero and the node instance
being freed before the node timer is finished with accessing it. This
leads to occasional crashes, especially in multi-namespace environments.
The scenario goes as follows:
CPU0:(node_stop) CPU1:(node_timeout) // ref == 2
1: if(!mod_timer())
2: if (del_timer())
3: tipc_node_put() // ref -> 1
4: tipc_node_put() // ref -> 0
5: kfree_rcu(node);
6: tipc_node_get(node)
7: // BOOM!
We now clean up this functionality as follows:
1) We remove the node pointer from the node lookup table before we
attempt deactivating the timer. This way, we reduce the risk that
tipc_node_find() may obtain a valid pointer to an instance marked
for deletion; a harmless but undesirable situation.
2) We use del_timer_sync() instead of del_timer() to safely deactivate
the node timer without any risk that it might be reactivated by the
timeout handler. There is no risk of deadlock here, since the two
functions never touch the same spinlocks.
3: We remove a pointless tipc_node_get() + tipc_node_put() from the
timeout handler.
Reported-by: Zhijiang Hu <huzhijiang@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3018e947d7fd536d57e2b550c33e456d921fff8c upstream.
AP/AP_VLAN modes don't accept any real 802.11 multicast data
frames, but since they do need to accept broadcast management
frames the same is currently permitted for data frames. This
opens a security problem because such frames would be decrypted
with the GTK, and could even contain unicast L3 frames.
Since the spec says that ToDS frames must always have the BSSID
as the RA (addr1), reject any other data frames.
The problem was originally reported in "Predicting, Decrypting,
and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys" at usenix
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/vanhoef
and brought to my attention by Jouni.
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
--
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commit 8ab18d71de8b07d2c4d6f984b718418c09ea45c5 upstream.
The check in vmci_transport_peer_detach_cb should only allow a
detach when the qp handle of the transport matches the one in
the detach message.
Testing: Before this change, a detach from a peer on a different
socket would cause an active stream socket to register a detach.
Reviewed-by: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jorgen Hansen <jhansen@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit dfcb9f4f99f1e9a49e43398a7bfbf56927544af1 upstream.
commit 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a
sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a
peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket.
As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without
locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row.
Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the
application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the
sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc
that was created only for that call.
This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation
if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't
exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors
the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg
calls).
Joint work with Xin Long.
Fixes: 2dcab5984841 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf")
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c2ed1880fd61a998e3ce40254a99a2ad000f1a7d upstream.
The protocol field is checked when deleting IPv4 routes, but ignored for
IPv6, which causes problems with routing daemons accidentally deleting
externally set routes (observed by multiple bird6 users).
This can be verified using `ip -6 route del <prefix> proto something`.
Signed-off-by: Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1cded9d2974fe4fe339fc0ccd6638b80d465ab2c upstream.
There are two problems with refcounting of auth_gss messages.
First, the reference on the pipe->pipe list (taken by a call
to rpc_queue_upcall()) is not counted. It seems to be
assumed that a message in pipe->pipe will always also be in
pipe->in_downcall, where it is correctly reference counted.
However there is no guaranty of this. I have a report of a
NULL dereferences in rpc_pipe_read() which suggests a msg
that has been freed is still on the pipe->pipe list.
One way I imagine this might happen is:
- message is queued for uid=U and auth->service=S1
- rpc.gssd reads this message and starts processing.
This removes the message from pipe->pipe
- message is queued for uid=U and auth->service=S2
- rpc.gssd replies to the first message. gss_pipe_downcall()
calls __gss_find_upcall(pipe, U, NULL) and it finds the
*second* message, as new messages are placed at the head
of ->in_downcall, and the service type is not checked.
- This second message is removed from ->in_downcall and freed
by gss_release_msg() (even though it is still on pipe->pipe)
- rpc.gssd tries to read another message, and dereferences a pointer
to this message that has just been freed.
I fix this by incrementing the reference count before calling
rpc_queue_upcall(), and decrementing it if that fails, or normally in
gss_pipe_destroy_msg().
It seems strange that the reply doesn't target the message more
precisely, but I don't know all the details. In any case, I think the
reference counting irregularity became a measureable bug when the
extra arg was added to __gss_find_upcall(), hence the Fixes: line
below.
The second problem is that if rpc_queue_upcall() fails, the new
message is not freed. gss_alloc_msg() set the ->count to 1,
gss_add_msg() increments this to 2, gss_unhash_msg() decrements to 1,
then the pointer is discarded so the memory never gets freed.
Fixes: 9130b8dbc6ac ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service")
Link: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1011250
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2b6867c2ce76c596676bec7d2d525af525fdc6e2 upstream.
Subtracting tp_sizeof_priv from tp_block_size and casting to int
to check whether one is less then the other doesn't always work
(both of them are unsigned ints).
Compare them as is instead.
Also cast tp_sizeof_priv to u64 before using BLK_PLUS_PRIV, as
it can overflow inside BLK_PLUS_PRIV otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 633ee407b9d15a75ac9740ba9d3338815e1fcb95 upstream.
sock_alloc_inode() allocates socket+inode and socket_wq with
GFP_KERNEL, which is not allowed on the writeback path:
Workqueue: ceph-msgr con_work [libceph]
ffff8810871cb018 0000000000000046 0000000000000000 ffff881085d40000
0000000000012b00 ffff881025cad428 ffff8810871cbfd8 0000000000012b00
ffff880102fc1000 ffff881085d40000 ffff8810871cb038 ffff8810871cb148
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff816dd629>] schedule+0x29/0x70
[<ffffffff816e066d>] schedule_timeout+0x1bd/0x200
[<ffffffff81093ffc>] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x2c/0x120
[<ffffffff81094266>] ? ttwu_do_activate.constprop.135+0x66/0x70
[<ffffffff816deb5f>] wait_for_completion+0xbf/0x180
[<ffffffff81097cd0>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x390/0x390
[<ffffffff81086335>] flush_work+0x165/0x250
[<ffffffff81082940>] ? worker_detach_from_pool+0xd0/0xd0
[<ffffffffa03b65b1>] xlog_cil_force_lsn+0x81/0x200 [xfs]
[<ffffffff816d6b42>] ? __slab_free+0xee/0x234
[<ffffffffa03b4b1d>] _xfs_log_force_lsn+0x4d/0x2c0 [xfs]
[<ffffffff811adc1e>] ? lookup_page_cgroup_used+0xe/0x30
[<ffffffffa039a723>] ? xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa03b4dcf>] xfs_log_force_lsn+0x3f/0xf0 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa039a723>] ? xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa03a62c6>] xfs_iunpin_wait+0xc6/0x1a0 [xfs]
[<ffffffff810aa250>] ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x40/0x40
[<ffffffffa039a723>] xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa039ac07>] xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x257/0x3d0 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa039bb13>] xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x33/0x40 [xfs]
[<ffffffffa03ab745>] xfs_fs_free_cached_objects+0x15/0x20 [xfs]
[<ffffffff811c0c18>] super_cache_scan+0x178/0x180
[<ffffffff8115912e>] shrink_slab_node+0x14e/0x340
[<ffffffff811afc3b>] ? mem_cgroup_iter+0x16b/0x450
[<ffffffff8115af70>] shrink_slab+0x100/0x140
[<ffffffff8115e425>] do_try_to_free_pages+0x335/0x490
[<ffffffff8115e7f9>] try_to_free_pages+0xb9/0x1f0
[<ffffffff816d56e4>] ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0x69/0x1be
[<ffffffff81150cba>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x69a/0xb40
[<ffffffff8119743e>] alloc_pages_current+0x9e/0x110
[<ffffffff811a0ac5>] new_slab+0x2c5/0x390
[<ffffffff816d71c4>] __slab_alloc+0x33b/0x459
[<ffffffff815b906d>] ? sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0
[<ffffffff8164bda1>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x71/0xc0
[<ffffffff815b906d>] ? sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0
[<ffffffff811a21f2>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1a2/0x1b0
[<ffffffff815b906d>] sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0
[<ffffffff811d8566>] alloc_inode+0x26/0xa0
[<ffffffff811da04a>] new_inode_pseudo+0x1a/0x70
[<ffffffff815b933e>] sock_alloc+0x1e/0x80
[<ffffffff815ba855>] __sock_create+0x95/0x220
[<ffffffff815baa04>] sock_create_kern+0x24/0x30
[<ffffffffa04794d9>] con_work+0xef9/0x2050 [libceph]
[<ffffffffa04aa9ec>] ? rbd_img_request_submit+0x4c/0x60 [rbd]
[<ffffffff81084c19>] process_one_work+0x159/0x4f0
[<ffffffff8108561b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x530
[<ffffffff81085500>] ? create_worker+0x1d0/0x1d0
[<ffffffff8108b6f9>] kthread+0xc9/0xe0
[<ffffffff8108b630>] ? flush_kthread_worker+0x90/0x90
[<ffffffff816e1b98>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90
[<ffffffff8108b630>] ? flush_kthread_worker+0x90/0x90
Use memalloc_noio_{save,restore}() to temporarily force GFP_NOIO here.
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/19309
Reported-by: Sergey Jerusalimov <wintchester@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df upstream.
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 677e806da4d916052585301785d847c3b3e6186a upstream.
When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we
validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid
and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated
buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a
XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied
buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do
not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated
memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by
netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for
priviledge escalation.
We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in
xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user
is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which
includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window
remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained
replay_window.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c282222a45cb9503cbfbebfdb60491f06ae84b49 upstream.
Dmitry reports following splat:
INFO: trying to register non-static key.
the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation.
turning off the locking correctness validator.
CPU: 0 PID: 13059 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170207 #1
[..]
spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:304 [inline]
xfrm_policy_flush+0x32/0x470 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:963
xfrm_policy_fini+0xbf/0x560 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3041
xfrm_net_init+0x79f/0x9e0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3091
ops_init+0x10a/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:115
setup_net+0x2ed/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:291
copy_net_ns+0x26c/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:396
create_new_namespaces+0x409/0x860 kernel/nsproxy.c:106
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x1e0 kernel/nsproxy.c:205
SYSC_unshare kernel/fork.c:2281 [inline]
Problem is that when we get error during xfrm_net_init we will call
xfrm_policy_fini which will acquire xfrm_policy_lock before it was
initialized. Just move it around so locks get set up first.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: 283bc9f35bbbcb0e9 ("xfrm: Namespacify xfrm state/policy locks")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ea90e0dc8cecba6359b481e24d9c37160f6f524f upstream.
Sowmini pointed out Dmitry's RTNL deadlock report to me, and it turns out
to be perfectly accurate - there are various error paths that miss unlock
of the RTNL.
To fix those, change the locking a bit to not be conditional in all those
nl80211_prepare_*_dump() functions, but make those require the RTNL to
start with, and fix the buggy error paths. This also let me use sparse
(by appropriately overriding the rtnl_lock/rtnl_unlock functions) to
validate the changes.
Reported-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b581a5854eee4b7851dedb0f8c2ceb54fb902c06 upstream.
Since ceph.git commit 4e28f9e63644 ("osd/OSDMap: clear osd_info,
osd_xinfo on osd deletion"), weight is set to IN when OSD is deleted.
This changes the result of applying an incremental for clients, not
just OSDs. Because CRUSH computations are obviously affected,
pre-4e28f9e63644 servers disagree with post-4e28f9e63644 clients on
object placement, resulting in misdirected requests.
Mirrors ceph.git commit a6009d1039a55e2c77f431662b3d6cc5a8e8e63f.
Fixes: 930c53286977 ("libceph: apply new_state before new_up_client on incrementals")
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/19122
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 15bb7745e94a665caf42bfaabf0ce062845b533b ]
icsk_ack.lrcvtime has a 0 value at socket creation time.
tcpi_last_data_recv can have bogus value if no payload is ever received.
This patch initializes icsk_ack.lrcvtime for active sessions
in tcp_finish_connect(), and for passive sessions in
tcp_create_openreq_child()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a97e50cc4cb67e1e7bff56f6b41cda62ca832336 ]
In sk_clone_lock(), we create a new socket and inherit most of the
parent's members via sock_copy() which memcpy()'s various sections.
Now, in case the parent socket had a BPF socket filter attached,
then newsk->sk_filter points to the same instance as the original
sk->sk_filter.
sk_filter_charge() is then called on the newsk->sk_filter to take a
reference and should that fail due to hitting max optmem, we bail
out and release the newsk instance.
The issue is that commit 278571baca2a ("net: filter: simplify socket
charging") wrongly combined the dismantle path with the failure path
of xfrm_sk_clone_policy(). This means, even when charging failed, we
call sk_free_unlock_clone() on the newsk, which then still points to
the same sk_filter as the original sk.
Thus, sk_free_unlock_clone() calls into __sk_destruct() eventually
where it tests for present sk_filter and calls sk_filter_uncharge()
on it, which potentially lets sk_omem_alloc wrap around and releases
the eBPF prog and sk_filter structure from the (still intact) parent.
Fix it by making sure that when sk_filter_charge() failed, we reset
newsk->sk_filter back to NULL before passing to sk_free_unlock_clone(),
so that we don't mess with the parents sk_filter.
Only if xfrm_sk_clone_policy() fails, we did reach the point where
either the parent's filter was NULL and as a result newsk's as well
or where we previously had a successful sk_filter_charge(), thus for
that case, we do need sk_filter_uncharge() to release the prior taken
reference on sk_filter.
Fixes: 278571baca2a ("net: filter: simplify socket charging")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c64c0b3cac4c5b8cb093727d2c19743ea3965c0b ]
Alexander reported a KMSAN splat caused by reads of uninitialized
field (tb_id_in) from user provided struct fib_result_nl
It turns out nl_fib_input() sanity tests on user input is a bit
wrong :
User can pretend nlh->nlmsg_len is big enough, but provide
at sendmsg() time a too small buffer.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7df9c24625b9981779afb8fcdbe2bb4765e61147 ]
Dmitry has reported that a BUG_ON() condition in unix_notinflight()
may be triggered by a simple code that forwards unix socket in an
SCM_RIGHTS message.
That is caused by incorrect unix socket GC implementation in unix_gc().
The GC first collects list of candidates, then (a) decrements their
"children's" inflight counter, (b) checks which inflight counters are
now 0, and then (c) increments all inflight counters back.
(a) and (c) are done by calling scan_children() with inc_inflight or
dec_inflight as the second argument.
Commit 6209344f5a37 ("net: unix: fix inflight counting bug in garbage
collector") changed scan_children() such that it no longer considers
sockets that do not have UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE flag. It also added a block
of code that that unsets this flag _before_ invoking
scan_children(, dec_iflight, ). This may lead to incorrect inflight
counters for some sockets.
This change fixes this bug by changing order of operations:
UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE is now unset only after all inflight counters are
restored to the original state.
kernel BUG at net/unix/garbage.c:149!
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8717ebf4>] [<ffffffff8717ebf4>]
unix_notinflight+0x3b4/0x490 net/unix/garbage.c:149
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8716cfbf>] unix_detach_fds.isra.19+0xff/0x170 net/unix/af_unix.c:1487
[<ffffffff8716f6a9>] unix_destruct_scm+0xf9/0x210 net/unix/af_unix.c:1496
[<ffffffff86a90a01>] skb_release_head_state+0x101/0x200 net/core/skbuff.c:655
[<ffffffff86a9808a>] skb_release_all+0x1a/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:668
[<ffffffff86a980ea>] __kfree_skb+0x1a/0x30 net/core/skbuff.c:684
[<ffffffff86a98284>] kfree_skb+0x184/0x570 net/core/skbuff.c:705
[<ffffffff871789d5>] unix_release_sock+0x5b5/0xbd0 net/unix/af_unix.c:559
[<ffffffff87179039>] unix_release+0x49/0x90 net/unix/af_unix.c:836
[<ffffffff86a694b2>] sock_release+0x92/0x1f0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff86a6962b>] sock_close+0x1b/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff81a76b8e>] __fput+0x34e/0x910 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff81a771da>] ____fput+0x1a/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff81483ab0>] task_work_run+0x1a0/0x280 kernel/task_work.c:116
[< inline >] exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff8141287a>] do_exit+0x183a/0x2640 kernel/exit.c:828
[<ffffffff8141383e>] do_group_exit+0x14e/0x420 kernel/exit.c:931
[<ffffffff814429d3>] get_signal+0x663/0x1880 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff81239b45>] do_signal+0xc5/0x2190 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:807
[<ffffffff8100666a>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1ea/0x2d0
arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81009693>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x4d3/0x570
arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff881478e6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/3/6/252
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ulanov <andreyu@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: 6209344 ("net: unix: fix inflight counting bug in garbage collector")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 22a0e18eac7a9e986fec76c60fa4a2926d1291e2 ]
I mistakenly added the code to release sk->sk_frag in
sk_common_release() instead of sk_destruct()
TCP sockets using sk->sk_allocation == GFP_ATOMIC do no call
sk_common_release() at close time, thus leaking one (order-3) page.
iSCSI is using such sockets.
Fixes: 5640f7685831 ("net: use a per task frag allocator")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3d20f1f7bd575d147ffa75621fa560eea0aec690 ]
When dealing with ipv6 source tunnel key address attribute
(OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV6_SRC) we are wrongly setting the tunnel
dst ip, fix that.
Fixes: 6b26ba3a7d95 ('openvswitch: netlink attributes for IPv6 tunneling')
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Reported-by: Paul Blakey <paulb@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Joe Stringer <joe@ovn.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit edb9d1bff4bbe19b8ae0e71b1f38732591a9eeb2 ]
When tc actions are loaded as a module and no actions have been installed,
flushing them would result in actions removed from the memory, but modules
reference count not being decremented, so that the modules would not be
unloaded.
Following is example with GACT action:
% sudo modprobe act_gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
%
% sudo tc actions ls action gact
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 1
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 2
% sudo rmmod act_gact
rmmod: ERROR: Module act_gact is in use
....
After the fix:
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
%
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 1
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 2
% sudo tc actions add action pass index 3
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 3
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
%
% sudo tc actions flush action gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
act_gact 16384 0
% sudo rmmod act_gact
% lsmod
Module Size Used by
%
Fixes: f97017cdefef ("net-sched: Fix actions flushing")
Signed-off-by: Roman Mashak <mrv@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 72ef9c4125c7b257e3a714d62d778ab46583d6a3 ]
This patch fixes a memory leak, which happens if the connection request
is not fulfilled between parsing the DCCP options and handling the SYN
(because e.g. the backlog is full), because we forgot to free the
list of ack vectors.
Reported-by: Jianwen Ji <jiji@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 45caeaa5ac0b4b11784ac6f932c0ad4c6b67cda0 ]
As Eric Dumazet pointed out this also needs to be fixed in IPv6.
v2: Contains the IPv6 tcp/Ipv6 dccp patches as well.
We have seen a few incidents lately where a dst_enty has been freed
with a dangling TCP socket reference (sk->sk_dst_cache) pointing to that
dst_entry. If the conditions/timings are right a crash then ensues when the
freed dst_entry is referenced later on. A Common crashing back trace is:
#8 [] page_fault at ffffffff8163e648
[exception RIP: __tcp_ack_snd_check+74]
.
.
#9 [] tcp_rcv_established at ffffffff81580b64
#10 [] tcp_v4_do_rcv at ffffffff8158b54a
#11 [] tcp_v4_rcv at ffffffff8158cd02
#12 [] ip_local_deliver_finish at ffffffff815668f4
#13 [] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff81566bd9
#14 [] ip_rcv_finish at ffffffff8156656d
#15 [] ip_rcv at ffffffff81566f06
#16 [] __netif_receive_skb_core at ffffffff8152b3a2
#17 [] __netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b608
#18 [] netif_receive_skb at ffffffff8152b690
#19 [] vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete at ffffffffa015eeaf [vmxnet3]
#20 [] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only at ffffffffa015f32a [vmxnet3]
#21 [] net_rx_action at ffffffff8152bac2
#22 [] __do_softirq at ffffffff81084b4f
#23 [] call_softirq at ffffffff8164845c
#24 [] do_softirq at ffffffff81016fc5
#25 [] irq_exit at ffffffff81084ee5
#26 [] do_IRQ at ffffffff81648ff8
Of course it may happen with other NIC drivers as well.
It's found the freed dst_entry here:
224 static bool tcp_in_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk)↩
225 {↩
226 ▹ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);↩
227 ▹ const struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);↩
228 ↩
229 ▹ return (dst && dst_metric(dst, RTAX_QUICKACK)) ||↩
230 ▹ ▹ (icsk->icsk_ack.quick && !icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong);↩
231 }↩
But there are other backtraces attributed to the same freed dst_entry in
netfilter code as well.
All the vmcores showed 2 significant clues:
- Remote hosts behind the default gateway had always been redirected to a
different gateway. A rtable/dst_entry will be added for that host. Making
more dst_entrys with lower reference counts. Making this more probable.
- All vmcores showed a postitive LockDroppedIcmps value, e.g:
LockDroppedIcmps 267
A closer look at the tcp_v4_err() handler revealed that do_redirect() will run
regardless of whether user space has the socket locked. This can result in a
race condition where the same dst_entry cached in sk->sk_dst_entry can be
decremented twice for the same socket via:
do_redirect()->__sk_dst_check()-> dst_release().
Which leads to the dst_entry being prematurely freed with another socket
pointing to it via sk->sk_dst_cache and a subsequent crash.
To fix this skip do_redirect() if usespace has the socket locked. Instead let
the redirect take place later when user space does not have the socket
locked.
The dccp/IPv6 code is very similar in this respect, so fixing it there too.
As Eric Garver pointed out the following commit now invalidates routes. Which
can set the dst->obsolete flag so that ipv4_dst_check() returns null and
triggers the dst_release().
Fixes: ceb3320610d6 ("ipv4: Kill routes during PMTU/redirect updates.")
Cc: Eric Garver <egarver@redhat.com>
Cc: Hannes Sowa <hsowa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a13b2082ece95247779b9995c4e91b4246bed023 ]
Andreas reports kernel oops during rmmod of the br_netfilter module.
Hannes debugged the oops down to a NULL rt6info->rt6i_indev.
Problem is that br_netfilter has the nasty concept of adding a fake
rtable to skb->dst; this happens in a br_netfilter prerouting hook.
A second hook (in bridge LOCAL_IN) is supposed to remove these again
before the skb is handed up the stack.
However, on module unload hooks get unregistered which means an
skb could traverse the prerouting hook that attaches the fake_rtable,
while the 'fake rtable remove' hook gets removed from the hooklist
immediately after.
Fixes: 34666d467cbf1e2e3c7 ("netfilter: bridge: move br_netfilter out of the core")
Reported-by: Andreas Karis <akaris@redhat.com>
Debugged-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 79e49503efe53a8c51d8b695bedc8a346c5e4a87 ]
ip6_fragment, in case skb has a fraglist, checks if the
skb is cloned. If it is, it will move to the 'slow path' and allocates
new skbs for each fragment.
However, right before entering the slowpath loop, it updates the
nexthdr value of the last ipv6 extension header to NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT,
to account for the fragment header that will be inserted in the new
ipv6-fragment skbs.
In case original skb is cloned this munges nexthdr value of another
skb. Avoid this by doing the nexthdr update for each of the new fragment
skbs separately.
This was observed with tcpdump on a bridge device where netfilter ipv6
reassembly is active: tcpdump shows malformed fragment headers as
the l4 header (icmpv6, tcp, etc). is decoded as a fragment header.
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Andreas Karis <akaris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 67e194007be08d071294456274dd53e0a04fdf90 ]
Commit 27596472473a ("ipv6: fix ECMP route replacement") introduced a
loop that removes all siblings of an ECMP route that is being
replaced. However, this loop doesn't stop when it has replaced
siblings, and keeps removing other routes with a higher metric.
We also end up triggering the WARN_ON after the loop, because after
this nsiblings < 0.
Instead, stop the loop when we have taken care of all routes with the
same metric as the route being replaced.
Reproducer:
===========
#!/bin/sh
ip netns add ns1
ip netns add ns2
ip -net ns1 link set lo up
for x in 0 1 2 ; do
ip link add veth$x netns ns2 type veth peer name eth$x netns ns1
ip -net ns1 link set eth$x up
ip -net ns2 link set veth$x up
done
ip -net ns1 -6 r a 2000::/64 nexthop via fe80::0 dev eth0 \
nexthop via fe80::1 dev eth1 nexthop via fe80::2 dev eth2
ip -net ns1 -6 r a 2000::/64 via fe80::42 dev eth0 metric 256
ip -net ns1 -6 r a 2000::/64 via fe80::43 dev eth0 metric 2048
echo "before replace, 3 routes"
ip -net ns1 -6 r | grep -v '^fe80\|^ff00'
echo
ip -net ns1 -6 r c 2000::/64 nexthop via fe80::4 dev eth0 \
nexthop via fe80::5 dev eth1 nexthop via fe80::6 dev eth2
echo "after replace, only 2 routes, metric 2048 is gone"
ip -net ns1 -6 r | grep -v '^fe80\|^ff00'
Fixes: 27596472473a ("ipv6: fix ECMP route replacement")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e37791ec1ad785b59022ae211f63a16189bacebf ]
When the mpls_router module is unloaded, mpls routes are deleted but
notifications are not sent to userspace leaving userspace caches
out of sync. Add the call to mpls_notify_route in mpls_net_exit as
routes are freed.
Fixes: 0189197f44160 ("mpls: Basic routing support")
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 52491c7607c5527138095edf44c53169dc1ddb82 ]
tcf_connmark_init does not check in its configuration if TCA_CONNMARK_PARMS
is set, resulting in a null pointer dereference when trying to access it.
[501099.043007] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
[501099.043039] IP: [<ffffffffc10c60fb>] tcf_connmark_init+0x8b/0x180 [act_connmark]
...
[501099.044334] Call Trace:
[501099.044345] [<ffffffffa47270e8>] ? tcf_action_init_1+0x198/0x1b0
[501099.044363] [<ffffffffa47271b0>] ? tcf_action_init+0xb0/0x120
[501099.044380] [<ffffffffa47250a4>] ? tcf_exts_validate+0xc4/0x110
[501099.044398] [<ffffffffc0f5fa97>] ? u32_set_parms+0xa7/0x270 [cls_u32]
[501099.044417] [<ffffffffc0f60bf0>] ? u32_change+0x680/0x87b [cls_u32]
[501099.044436] [<ffffffffa4725d1d>] ? tc_ctl_tfilter+0x4dd/0x8a0
[501099.044454] [<ffffffffa44a23a1>] ? security_capable+0x41/0x60
[501099.044471] [<ffffffffa470ca01>] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xe1/0x220
[501099.044490] [<ffffffffa470c920>] ? rtnl_newlink+0x870/0x870
[501099.044507] [<ffffffffa472cc61>] ? netlink_rcv_skb+0xa1/0xc0
[501099.044524] [<ffffffffa47073f4>] ? rtnetlink_rcv+0x24/0x30
[501099.044541] [<ffffffffa472c634>] ? netlink_unicast+0x184/0x230
[501099.044558] [<ffffffffa472c9d8>] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x2f8/0x3b0
[501099.044576] [<ffffffffa46d8880>] ? sock_sendmsg+0x30/0x40
[501099.044592] [<ffffffffa46d8e03>] ? SYSC_sendto+0xd3/0x150
[501099.044608] [<ffffffffa425fda1>] ? __do_page_fault+0x2d1/0x510
[501099.044626] [<ffffffffa47fbd7b>] ? system_call_fast_compare_end+0xc/0x9b
Fixes: 22a5dc0e5e3e ("net: sched: Introduce connmark action")
Signed-off-by: Étienne Noss <etienne.noss@wifirst.fr>
Signed-off-by: Victorien Molle <victorien.molle@wifirst.fr>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 62f8f4d9066c1c6f2474845d1ca7e2891f2ae3fd ]
Dmitry reported crashes in DCCP stack [1]
Problem here is that when I got rid of listener spinlock, I missed the
fact that DCCP stores a complex state in struct dccp_request_sock,
while TCP does not.
Since multiple cpus could access it at the same time, we need to add
protection.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dccp_feat_activate_values+0x967/0xab0
net/dccp/feat.c:1541 at addr ffff88003713be68
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor2/8457
CPU: 2 PID: 8457 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7+ #127
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
dump_stack+0x292/0x398 lib/dump_stack.c:51
kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:162
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:200 [inline]
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:289 [inline]
kasan_report.part.1+0x20e/0x4e0 mm/kasan/report.c:311
kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:332 [inline]
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x29/0x30 mm/kasan/report.c:332
dccp_feat_activate_values+0x967/0xab0 net/dccp/feat.c:1541
dccp_create_openreq_child+0x464/0x610 net/dccp/minisocks.c:121
dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x1f6/0x1960 net/dccp/ipv6.c:457
dccp_check_req+0x335/0x5a0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:186
dccp_v6_rcv+0x69e/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:711
ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190
__netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228
process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267
__do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284
do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:902
</IRQ>
do_softirq.part.17+0x1e8/0x230 kernel/softirq.c:328
do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:176 [inline]
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x1f2/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:181
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:31 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:971 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xbb0/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:123
ip6_finish_output+0x302/0x960 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:148
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline]
ip6_output+0x1cb/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:162
ip6_xmit+0xcdf/0x20d0 include/net/dst.h:501
inet6_csk_xmit+0x320/0x5f0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:179
dccp_transmit_skb+0xb09/0x1120 net/dccp/output.c:141
dccp_xmit_packet+0x215/0x760 net/dccp/output.c:280
dccp_write_xmit+0x168/0x1d0 net/dccp/output.c:362
dccp_sendmsg+0x79c/0xb10 net/dccp/proto.c:796
inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645
SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687
SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
RIP: 0033:0x4458b9
RSP: 002b:00007f8ceb77bb58 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000017 RCX: 00000000004458b9
RDX: 0000000000000023 RSI: 0000000020e60000 RDI: 0000000000000017
RBP: 00000000006e1b90 R08: 00000000200f9fe1 R09: 0000000000000020
R10: 0000000000008010 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 00000000007080a8
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f8ceb77c9c0 R15: 00007f8ceb77c700
Object at ffff88003713be50, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64
Allocated:
PID = 8446
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:605
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x82/0x270 mm/slub.c:2738
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:490 [inline]
dccp_feat_entry_new+0x214/0x410 net/dccp/feat.c:467
dccp_feat_push_change+0x38/0x220 net/dccp/feat.c:487
__feat_register_sp+0x223/0x2f0 net/dccp/feat.c:741
dccp_feat_propagate_ccid+0x22b/0x2b0 net/dccp/feat.c:949
dccp_feat_server_ccid_dependencies+0x1b3/0x250 net/dccp/feat.c:1012
dccp_make_response+0x1f1/0xc90 net/dccp/output.c:423
dccp_v6_send_response+0x4ec/0xc20 net/dccp/ipv6.c:217
dccp_v6_conn_request+0xaba/0x11b0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:377
dccp_rcv_state_process+0x51e/0x1650 net/dccp/input.c:606
dccp_v6_do_rcv+0x213/0x350 net/dccp/ipv6.c:632
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:893 [inline]
__sk_receive_skb+0x36f/0xcc0 net/core/sock.c:479
dccp_v6_rcv+0xba5/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:742
ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190
__netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228
process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267
__do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284
Freed:
PID = 15
save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:57
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:502
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:514 [inline]
kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:578
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1355 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1377 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2954 [inline]
kfree+0xe8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:3874
dccp_feat_entry_destructor.part.4+0x48/0x60 net/dccp/feat.c:418
dccp_feat_entry_destructor net/dccp/feat.c:416 [inline]
dccp_feat_list_pop net/dccp/feat.c:541 [inline]
dccp_feat_activate_values+0x57f/0xab0 net/dccp/feat.c:1543
dccp_create_openreq_child+0x464/0x610 net/dccp/minisocks.c:121
dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x1f6/0x1960 net/dccp/ipv6.c:457
dccp_check_req+0x335/0x5a0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:186
dccp_v6_rcv+0x69e/0x1d00 net/dccp/ipv6.c:711
ip6_input_finish+0x46d/0x17a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ip6_input+0xdb/0x590 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322
dst_input include/net/dst.h:507 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x289/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:257 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x12ec/0x23d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x1ae5/0x3400 net/core/dev.c:4190
__netif_receive_skb+0x2a/0x170 net/core/dev.c:4228
process_backlog+0xe5/0x6c0 net/core/dev.c:4839
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5202 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xe70/0x1900 net/core/dev.c:5267
__do_softirq+0x2fb/0xb7d kernel/softirq.c:284
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88003713bd00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88003713bd80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88003713be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
Fixes: 079096f103fa ("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash table")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9ac25fc063751379cb77434fef9f3b088cd3e2f7 ]
TX skbs do not necessarily hold a reference on skb->sk->sk_refcnt
By the time TX completion happens, sk_refcnt might be already 0.
sock_hold()/sock_put() would then corrupt critical state, like
sk_wmem_alloc and lead to leaks or use after free.
Fixes: 62bccb8cdb69 ("net-timestamp: Make the clone operation stand-alone from phy timestamping")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit dd4f10722aeb10f4f582948839f066bebe44e5fb ]
TX skbs do not necessarily hold a reference on skb->sk->sk_refcnt
By the time TX completion happens, sk_refcnt might be already 0.
sock_hold()/sock_put() would then corrupt critical state, like
sk_wmem_alloc.
Fixes: bf7fa551e0ce ("mac80211: Resolve sk_refcnt/sk_wmem_alloc issue in wifi ack path")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 02b2faaf0af1d85585f6d6980e286d53612acfc2 ]
Dmitry Vyukov reported a divide by 0 triggered by syzkaller, exploiting
tcp_disconnect() path that was never really considered and/or used
before syzkaller ;)
I was not able to reproduce the bug, but it seems issues here are the
three possible actions that assumed they would never trigger on a
listener.
1) tcp_write_timer_handler
2) tcp_delack_timer_handler
3) MTU reduction
Only IPv6 MTU reduction was properly testing TCP_CLOSE and TCP_LISTEN
states from tcp_v6_mtu_reduced()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d5afb6f9b6bb2c57bd0c05e76e12489dc0d037d9 ]
The code where sk_clone() came from created a new socket and locked it,
but then, on the error path didn't unlock it.
This problem stayed there for a long while, till b0691c8ee7c2 ("net:
Unlock sock before calling sk_free()") fixed it, but unfortunately the
callers of sk_clone() (now sk_clone_locked()) were not audited and the
one in dccp_create_openreq_child() remained.
Now in the age of the syskaller fuzzer, this was finally uncovered, as
reported by Dmitry:
---- 8< ----
I've got the following report while running syzkaller fuzzer on
86292b33d4b7 ("Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)")
[ BUG: held lock freed! ]
4.10.0+ #234 Not tainted
-------------------------
syz-executor6/6898 is freeing memory
ffff88006286cac0-ffff88006286d3b7, with a lock still held there!
(slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock
include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
(slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>]
sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504
5 locks held by syz-executor6/6898:
#0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>] lock_sock
include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline]
#0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>]
inet_stream_connect+0x44/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:681
#1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83bc1c2a>]
inet6_csk_xmit+0x12a/0x5d0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:126
#2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_unlink
include/linux/skbuff.h:1767 [inline]
#2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_dequeue
include/linux/skbuff.h:1783 [inline]
#2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>]
process_backlog+0x264/0x730 net/core/dev.c:4835
#3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83aeb5c0>]
ip6_input_finish+0x0/0x1700 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:59
#4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock
include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline]
#4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>]
sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504
Fix it just like was done by b0691c8ee7c2 ("net: Unlock sock before calling
sk_free()").
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170301153510.GE15145@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 13baa00ad01bb3a9f893e3a08cbc2d072fc0c15d ]
It is now very clear that silly TCP listeners might play with
enabling/disabling timestamping while new children are added
to their accept queue.
Meaning net_enable_timestamp() can be called from BH context
while current state of the static key is not enabled.
Lets play safe and allow all contexts.
The work queue is scheduled only under the problematic cases,
which are the static key enable/disable transition, to not slow down
critical paths.
This extends and improves what we did in commit 5fa8bbda38c6 ("net: use
a work queue to defer net_disable_timestamp() work")
Fixes: b90e5794c5bd ("net: dont call jump_label_dec from irq context")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 540e2894f7905538740aaf122bd8e0548e1c34a4 ]
KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer, a new error detection tool) reports use of
uninitialized memory in packet_bind_spkt():
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory
CPU: 0 PID: 1074 Comm: packet Not tainted 4.8.0-rc6+ #1891
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
0000000000000000 ffff88006b6dfc08 ffffffff82559ae8 ffff88006b6dfb48
ffffffff818a7c91 ffffffff85b9c870 0000000000000092 ffffffff85b9c550
0000000000000000 0000000000000092 00000000ec400911 0000000000000002
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82559ae8>] dump_stack+0x238/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff818a6626>] kmsan_report+0x276/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1003
[<ffffffff818a783b>] __msan_warning+0x5b/0xb0
mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:424
[< inline >] strlen lib/string.c:484
[<ffffffff8259b58d>] strlcpy+0x9d/0x200 lib/string.c:144
[<ffffffff84b2eca4>] packet_bind_spkt+0x144/0x230
net/packet/af_packet.c:3132
[<ffffffff84242e4d>] SYSC_bind+0x40d/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1370
[<ffffffff84242a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff8515991b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
chained origin: 00000000eba00911
[<ffffffff810bb787>] save_stack_trace+0x27/0x50
arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:67
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:334
[<ffffffff818a59f8>] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x118/0x1e0
mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:527
[<ffffffff818a7773>] __msan_set_alloca_origin4+0xc3/0x130
mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:380
[<ffffffff84242b69>] SYSC_bind+0x129/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff84242a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff8515991b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
origin description: ----address@SYSC_bind (origin=00000000eb400911)
==================================================================
(the line numbers are relative to 4.8-rc6, but the bug persists
upstream)
, when I run the following program as root:
=====================================
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netpacket/packet.h>
#include <net/ethernet.h>
int main() {
struct sockaddr addr;
memset(&addr, 0xff, sizeof(addr));
addr.sa_family = AF_PACKET;
int fd = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
bind(fd, &addr, sizeof(addr));
return 0;
}
=====================================
This happens because addr.sa_data copied from the userspace is not
zero-terminated, and copying it with strlcpy() in packet_bind_spkt()
results in calling strlen() on the kernel copy of that non-terminated
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 51fb60eb162ab84c5edf2ae9c63cf0b878e5547e ]
l2tp_ip_backlog_recv may not return -1 if the packet gets dropped.
The return value is passed up to ip_local_deliver_finish, which treats
negative values as an IP protocol number for resubmission.
Signed-off-by: Paul Hüber <phueber@kernsp.in>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6e28099d38c0e50d62c1afc054e37e573adf3d21 ]
Restore the lost masking of TOS in input route code to
allow ip rules to match it properly.
Problem [1] noticed by Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com>
[1] http://marc.info/?t=137331755300040&r=1&w=2
Fixes: 89aef8921bfb ("ipv4: Delete routing cache.")
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7dcdf941cdc96692ab99fd790c8cc68945514851 ]
Align vti6 with vti by returning GRE_KEY flag. This enables iproute2
to display tunnel keys on "ip -6 tunnel show"
Signed-off-by: David Forster <dforster@brocade.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d1b4c689d4130bcfd3532680b64db562300716b6 upstream.
mmapped netlink has a number of unresolved issues:
- TX zerocopy support had to be disabled more than a year ago via
commit 4682a0358639b29cf ("netlink: Always copy on mmap TX.")
because the content of the mmapped area can change after netlink
attribute validation but before message processing.
- RX support was implemented mainly to speed up nfqueue dumping packet
payload to userspace. However, since commit ae08ce0021087a5d812d2
("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: zero copy support") we avoid one copy
with the socket-based interface too (via the skb_zerocopy helper).
The other problem is that skbs attached to mmaped netlink socket
behave different from normal skbs:
- they don't have a shinfo area, so all functions that use skb_shinfo()
(e.g. skb_clone) cannot be used.
- reserving headroom prevents userspace from seeing the content as
it expects message to start at skb->head.
See for instance
commit aa3a022094fa ("netlink: not trim skb for mmaped socket when dump").
- skbs handed e.g. to netlink_ack must have non-NULL skb->sk, else we
crash because it needs the sk to check if a tx ring is attached.
Also not obvious, leads to non-intuitive bug fixes such as 7c7bdf359
("netfilter: nfnetlink: use original skbuff when acking batches").
mmaped netlink also didn't play nicely with the skb_zerocopy helper
used by nfqueue and openvswitch. Daniel Borkmann fixed this via
commit 6bb0fef489f6 ("netlink, mmap: fix edge-case leakages in nf queue
zero-copy")' but at the cost of also needing to provide remaining
length to the allocation function.
nfqueue also has problems when used with mmaped rx netlink:
- mmaped netlink doesn't allow use of nfqueue batch verdict messages.
Problem is that in the mmap case, the allocation time also determines
the ordering in which the frame will be seen by userspace (A
allocating before B means that A is located in earlier ring slot,
but this also means that B might get a lower sequence number then A
since seqno is decided later. To fix this we would need to extend the
spinlocked region to also cover the allocation and message setup which
isn't desirable.
- nfqueue can now be configured to queue large (GSO) skbs to userspace.
Queing GSO packets is faster than having to force a software segmentation
in the kernel, so this is a desirable option. However, with a mmap based
ring one has to use 64kb per ring slot element, else mmap has to fall back
to the socket path (NL_MMAP_STATUS_COPY) for all large packets.
To use the mmap interface, userspace not only has to probe for mmap netlink
support, it also has to implement a recv/socket receive path in order to
handle messages that exceed the size of an rx ring element.
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA <chamaken@gmail.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Shi Yuejie <shiyuejie@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a9e9200d8661c1a0be8c39f93deb383dc940de35 upstream.
The issue was found when entering suspend and resume.
It triggers a warning in:
mac80211/key.c: ieee80211_enable_keys()
...
WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
...
It points out sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec isn't cleaned up successfully
in a delayed_work during suspend. Add a flush_delayed_work to fix it.
Signed-off-by: Matt Chen <matt.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e623a9e9dec29ae811d11f83d0074ba254aba374 ]
Commit 34b88a68f26a ("net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path"),
changed the exit path of recvmmsg to always return the datagrams
variable and modified the error paths to set the variable to the error
code returned by recvmsg if necessary.
However in the case sock_error returned an error, the error code was
then ignored, and recvmmsg returned 0.
Change the error path of recvmmsg to correctly return the error code
of sock_error.
The bug was triggered by using recvmmsg on a CAN interface which was
not up. Linux 4.6 and later return 0 in this case while earlier
releases returned -ENETDOWN.
Fixes: 34b88a68f26a ("net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Jayat <maxime.jayat@mobile-devices.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ca4ef4574f1ee5252e2cd365f8f5d5bafd048f32 ]
The skbs processed by ip_cmsg_recv() are not guaranteed to
be linear e.g. when sending UDP packets over loopback with
MSGMORE.
Using csum_partial() on [potentially] the whole skb len
is dangerous; instead be on the safe side and use skb_checksum().
Thanks to syzkaller team to detect the issue and provide the
reproducer.
v1 -> v2:
- move the variable declaration in a tighter scope
Fixes: ad6f939ab193 ("ip: Add offset parameter to ip_cmsg_recv")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4c03b862b12f980456f9de92db6d508a4999b788 ]
A nested lock depth was added to the hasbin_delete() code but it
doesn't actually work some well and results in tons of lockdep splats.
Fix the code instead to properly drop the lock around the operation
and just keep peeking the head of the hashbin queue.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5edabca9d4cff7f1f2b68f0bac55ef99d9798ba4 ]
In the current DCCP implementation an skb for a DCCP_PKT_REQUEST packet
is forcibly freed via __kfree_skb in dccp_rcv_state_process if
dccp_v6_conn_request successfully returns.
However, if IPV6_RECVPKTINFO is set on a socket, the address of the skb
is saved to ireq->pktopts and the ref count for skb is incremented in
dccp_v6_conn_request, so skb is still in use. Nevertheless, it gets freed
in dccp_rcv_state_process.
Fix by calling consume_skb instead of doing goto discard and therefore
calling __kfree_skb.
Similar fixes for TCP:
fb7e2399ec17f1004c0e0ccfd17439f8759ede01 [TCP]: skb is unexpectedly freed.
0aea76d35c9651d55bbaf746e7914e5f9ae5a25d tcp: SYN packets are now
simply consumed
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2bd624b4611ffee36422782d16e1c944d1351e98 ]
Commit 6664498280cf ("packet: call fanout_release, while UNREGISTERING a
netdev"), unfortunately, introduced the following issues.
1. calling mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex) (fanout_release()) from inside
rcu_read-side critical section. rcu_read_lock disables preemption, most often,
which prohibits calling sleeping functions.
[ ] include/linux/rcupdate.h:560 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section!
[ ]
[ ] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
[ ] 4 locks held by ovs-vswitchd/1969:
[ ] #0: (cb_lock){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8158a6c9>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40
[ ] #1: (ovs_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa04878ca>] ovs_vport_cmd_del+0x4a/0x100 [openvswitch]
[ ] #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81564157>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
[ ] #3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff81614165>] packet_notifier+0x5/0x3f0
[ ]
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4
[ ] [<ffffffff810c9077>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x107/0x110
[ ] [<ffffffff810a2da7>] ___might_sleep+0x57/0x210
[ ] [<ffffffff810a2fd0>] __might_sleep+0x70/0x90
[ ] [<ffffffff8162e80c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x3a0
[ ] [<ffffffff810de93f>] ? vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[ ] [<ffffffff81186e88>] ? printk+0x4d/0x4f
[ ] [<ffffffff816106dd>] fanout_release+0x1d/0xe0
[ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0
2. calling mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex) inside spin_lock(&po->bind_lock).
"sleeping function called from invalid context"
[ ] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620
[ ] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1969, name: ovs-vswitchd
[ ] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4
[ ] [<ffffffff810a2f52>] ___might_sleep+0x202/0x210
[ ] [<ffffffff810a2fd0>] __might_sleep+0x70/0x90
[ ] [<ffffffff8162e80c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x3a0
[ ] [<ffffffff816106dd>] fanout_release+0x1d/0xe0
[ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0
3. calling dev_remove_pack(&fanout->prot_hook), from inside
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock) or rcu_read-side critical-section. dev_remove_pack()
-> synchronize_net(), which might sleep.
[ ] BUG: scheduling while atomic: ovs-vswitchd/1969/0x00000002
[ ] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4
[ ] [<ffffffff81186274>] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x73
[ ] [<ffffffff8162b8cb>] __schedule+0x6b/0xd10
[ ] [<ffffffff8162c5db>] schedule+0x6b/0x80
[ ] [<ffffffff81630b1d>] schedule_timeout+0x38d/0x410
[ ] [<ffffffff810ea3fd>] synchronize_sched_expedited+0x53d/0x810
[ ] [<ffffffff810ea6de>] synchronize_rcu_expedited+0xe/0x10
[ ] [<ffffffff8154eab5>] synchronize_net+0x35/0x50
[ ] [<ffffffff8154eae3>] dev_remove_pack+0x13/0x20
[ ] [<ffffffff8161077e>] fanout_release+0xbe/0xe0
[ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0
4. fanout_release() races with calls from different CPU.
To fix the above problems, remove the call to fanout_release() under
rcu_read_lock(). Instead, call __dev_remove_pack(&fanout->prot_hook) and
netdev_run_todo will be happy that &dev->ptype_specific list is empty. In order
to achieve this, I moved dev_{add,remove}_pack() out of fanout_{add,release} to
__fanout_{link,unlink}. So, call to {,__}unregister_prot_hook() will make sure
fanout->prot_hook is removed as well.
Fixes: 6664498280cf ("packet: call fanout_release, while UNREGISTERING a netdev")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Anoob Soman <anoob.soman@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d199fab63c11998a602205f7ee7ff7c05c97164b ]
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8b74d439e1697110c5e5c600643e823eb1dd0762 ]
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 72fb96e7bdbbdd4421b0726992496531060f3636 ]
udp_ioctl(), as its name suggests, is used by UDP protocols,
but is also used by L2TP :(
L2TP should use its own handler, because it really does not
look the same.
SIOCINQ for instance should not assume UDP checksum or headers.
Thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team for providing the report
and a nice reproducer.
While crashes only happen on recent kernels (after commit
7c13f97ffde6 ("udp: do fwd memory scheduling on dequeue")), this
probably needs to be backported to older kernels.
Fixes: 7c13f97ffde6 ("udp: do fwd memory scheduling on dequeue")
Fixes: 85584672012e ("udp: Fix udp_poll() and ioctl()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 73d2c6678e6c3af7e7a42b1e78cd0211782ade32 ]
Andrey reported a kernel crash:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 PID: 3880 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc6+ #124
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff880060048040 task.stack: ffff880069be8000
RIP: 0010:ping_v4_push_pending_frames net/ipv4/ping.c:647 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ping_v4_sendmsg+0x1acd/0x23f0 net/ipv4/ping.c:837
RSP: 0018:ffff880069bef8b8 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff880069befb90 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff880069befa30 RDI: 00000000000000c2
RBP: ffff880069befbb8 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880069befab0
R13: ffff88006c624a80 R14: ffff880069befa70 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f6f7c716700(0000) GS:ffff88006de00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004a6f28 CR3: 000000003a134000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645
SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687
SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
This is because we miss a check for NULL pointer for skb_peek() when
the queue is empty. Other places already have the same check.
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 57031eb794906eea4e1c7b31dc1e2429c0af0c66 ]
Link layer protocols may unconditionally pull headers, as Ethernet
does in eth_type_trans. Ensure that the entire link layer header
always lies in the skb linear segment. tpacket_snd has such a check.
Extend this to packet_snd.
Variable length link layer headers complicate the computation
somewhat. Here skb->len may be smaller than dev->hard_header_len.
Round up the linear length to be at least as long as the smallest of
the two.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 217e6fa24ce28ec87fca8da93c9016cb78028612 ]
The stack must not pass packets to device drivers that are shorter
than the minimum link layer header length.
Previously, packet sockets would drop packets smaller than or equal
to dev->hard_header_len, but this has false positives. Zero length
payload is used over Ethernet. Other link layer protocols support
variable length headers. Support for validation of these protocols
removed the min length check for all protocols.
Introduce an explicit dev->min_header_len parameter and drop all
packets below this value. Initially, set it to non-zero only for
Ethernet and loopback. Other protocols can follow in a patch to
net-next.
Fixes: 9ed988cd5915 ("packet: validate variable length ll headers")
Reported-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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