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commit a08af810cdc29d2ca930e8a869d3d01744c392d8 upstream.
Reported-by: Pascal Hambourg <pascal@plouf.fr.eu.org>
Signed-off-by: Chas Williams <chas@cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e924960dacdf85d118a98c7262edf2f99c3015cf upstream.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c2892f02712e9516d72841d5c019ed6916329794 upstream.
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit ebc63e531cc6a457595dd110b07ac530eae788c3 upstream.
After commit 3262c816a3d7fb1eaabce633caa317887ed549ae "[PATCH] knfsd:
split svc_serv into pools", svc_delete_xprt (then svc_delete_socket) no
longer removed its xpt_ready (then sk_ready) field from whatever list it
was on, noting that there was no point since the whole list was about to
be destroyed anyway.
That was mostly true, but forgot that a few svc_xprt_enqueue()'s might
still be hanging around playing with the about-to-be-destroyed list, and
could get themselves into trouble writing to freed memory if we left
this xprt on the list after freeing it.
(This is actually functionally identical to a patch made first by Ben
Greear, but with more comments.)
Cc: gnb@fmeh.org
Reported-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Tested-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 676b58c27475a9defccc025fea1cbd2b141ee539 upstream.
A panic was observed when the device is failed to resume properly,
and there are no running interfaces. ieee80211_reconfig tries
to restart STA timers on unassociated state.
Signed-off-by: Rajkumar Manoharan <rmanohar@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 0c03150e7ea8f7fcd03cfef29385e0010b22ee92 upstream.
A bridge topology with three systems:
+------+ +------+
| A(2) |--| B(1) |
+------+ +------+
\ /
+------+
| C(3) |
+------+
What is supposed to happen:
* bridge with the lowest ID is elected root (for example: B)
* C detects that A->C is higher cost path and puts in blocking state
What happens. Bridge with lowest id (B) is elected correctly as
root and things start out fine initially. But then config BPDU
doesn't get transmitted from A -> C. Because of that
the link from A-C is transistioned to the forwarding state.
The root cause of this is that the configuration messages
is generated with bogus message age, and dropped before
sending.
In the standardmessage_age is supposed to be:
the time since the generation of the Configuration BPDU by
the Root that instigated the generation of this Configuration BPDU.
Reimplement this by recording the timestamp (age + jiffies) when
recording config information. The old code incorrectly used the time
elapsed on the ageing timer which was incorrect.
See also:
https://bugzilla.vyatta.com/show_bug.cgi?id=7164
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit ec0dd267bf7d08cb30e321e45a75fd40edd7e528 upstream.
Because struct rpcbind_args *map was declared static, if two
threads entered this method at the same time, the values
assigned to map could be sent two two differen tasks.
This could cause all sorts of problems, include use-after-free
and double-free of memory.
Fix this by removing the static declaration so that the map
pointer is on the stack.
Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b55c59892e1f3b6c7d4b9ccffb4263e1486fb990 upstream.
Since rpc_killall_tasks may modify the rpc_task's tk_action field
without any locking, we need to be careful when dereferencing it.
Reported-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Tested-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 9cfaa8def1c795a512bc04f2aec333b03724ca2e ]
Consider this scenario: When the size of the first received udp packet
is bigger than the receive buffer, MSG_TRUNC bit is set in msg->msg_flags.
However, if checksum error happens and this is a blocking socket, it will
goto try_again loop to receive the next packet. But if the size of the
next udp packet is smaller than receive buffer, MSG_TRUNC flag should not
be set, but because MSG_TRUNC bit is not cleared in msg->msg_flags before
receive the next packet, MSG_TRUNC is still set, which is wrong.
Fix this problem by clearing MSG_TRUNC flag when starting over for a
new packet.
Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang <xufeng.zhang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 32c90254ed4a0c698caa0794ebb4de63fcc69631 ]
udpv6_recvmsg() function is not using the correct variable to determine
whether or not the socket is in non-blocking operation, this will lead
to unexpected behavior when a UDP checksum error occurs.
Consider a non-blocking udp receive scenario: when udpv6_recvmsg() is
called by sock_common_recvmsg(), MSG_DONTWAIT bit of flags variable in
udpv6_recvmsg() is cleared by "flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT" in this call:
err = sk->sk_prot->recvmsg(iocb, sk, msg, size, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT, &addr_len);
i.e. with udpv6_recvmsg() getting these values:
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT
int flags = flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT
So, when udp checksum error occurs, the execution will go to
csum_copy_err, and then the problem happens:
csum_copy_err:
...............
if (flags & MSG_DONTWAIT)
return -EAGAIN;
goto try_again;
...............
But it will always go to try_again as MSG_DONTWAIT has been cleared
from flags at call time -- only noblock contains the original value
of MSG_DONTWAIT, so the test should be:
if (noblock)
return -EAGAIN;
This is also consistent with what the ipv4/udp code does.
Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang <xufeng.zhang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit d0733d2e29b652b2e7b1438ececa732e4eed98eb ]
Check against mistakenly passing in IPv6 addresses (which would result
in an INADDR_ANY bind) or similar incompatible sockaddrs.
Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Cc: Reinhard Max <max@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 13fcb7bd322164c67926ffe272846d4860196dc6 ]
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit 6c4a5cb219520c7bc937ee186ca53f03733bd09f ]
A mis-configured filter can spam the logs with lots of stack traces.
Rate-limit the warnings and add printout of the bogus filter information.
Original-patch-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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[ Upstream commit eeb1497277d6b1a0a34ed36b97e18f2bd7d6de0d ]
A malicious user or buggy application can inject code and trigger an
infinite loop in inet_diag_bc_audit()
Also make sure each instruction is aligned on 4 bytes boundary, to avoid
unaligned accesses.
Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 5afa9133cfe67f1bfead6049a9640c9262a7101c upstream.
Fix a couple of instances where we were exiting the RPC client on
arbitrary signals. We should only do so on fatal signals.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1ed2f73d90fb49bcf5704aee7e9084adb882bfc5 upstream.
The mask indicates the bits one wants to zero out, so it needs to be
inverted before applying to the original TOS field.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Luis Vazquez Cao <fernando@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 4319cc0cf5bb894b7368008cdf6dd20eb8868018 upstream.
The IPv6 header is not zeroed out in alloc_skb so we must initialize
it properly unless we want to see IPv6 packets with random TOS fields
floating around. The current implementation resets the flow label
but this could be changed if deemed necessary.
We stumbled upon this issue when trying to apply a mangle rule to
the RST packet generated by the REJECT target module.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Luis Vazquez Cao <fernando@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03 upstream.
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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single fragment
commit 9e2dcf72023d1447f09c47d77c99b0c49659e5ce upstream.
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <uweber@astaro.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fe19a96b10032035a35779f42ad59e35d6dd8ffd upstream.
The TCP connection state code depends on the state_change() callback
being called when the SYN_SENT state is set. However the networking layer
doesn't actually call us back in that case.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit e7a46b4d0839c2a3aa2e0ae0b145f293f6738498 upstream.
It's currently exposed only through /proc which, besides requiring
screen-scraping, doesn't allow userspace to distinguish between two
identical ATM adapters with different ATM indexes. The ATM device index
is required when using PPPoATM on a system with multiple ATM adapters.
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Tested-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a294865978b701e4d0d90135672749531b9a900d upstream.
A length of zero (after subtracting two for the type and len fields) for
the DCCPO_{CHANGE,CONFIRM}_{L,R} options will cause an underflow due to
the subtraction. The subsequent code may read past the end of the
options value buffer when parsing. I'm unsure of what the consequences
of this might be, but it's probably not good.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 10022a6c66e199d8f61d9044543f38785713cbbd upstream.
v2: added space after 'if' according code style.
We can get here with a NULL socket argument passed from userspace,
so we need to handle it accordingly.
Thanks to Dave Jones pointing at this issue in net/can/bcm.c
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c6914a6f261aca0c9f715f883a353ae7ff51fe83 upstream.
We can get here with a NULL socket argument passed from userspace,
so we need to handle it accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit a05d2ad1c1f391c7f514a1d1e09b5417968a7d07 upstream.
This fixes the following oops discovered by Dan Aloni:
> Anyway, the following is the output of the Oops that I got on the
> Ubuntu kernel on which I first detected the problem
> (2.6.37-12-generic). The Oops that followed will be more useful, I
> guess.
>[ 5594.669852] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference
> at (null)
> [ 5594.681606] IP: [<ffffffff81550b7b>] unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x1fb/0x420
> [ 5594.687576] PGD 2a05d067 PUD 2b951067 PMD 0
> [ 5594.693720] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
> [ 5594.699888] last sysfs file:
The bug was that unix domain sockets use a pseduo packet for
connecting and accept uses that psudo packet to get the socket.
In the buggy seqpacket case we were allowing unconnected
sockets to call recvmsg and try to receive the pseudo packet.
That is always wrong and as of commit 7361c36c5 the pseudo
packet had become enough different from a normal packet
that the kernel started oopsing.
Do for seqpacket_recv what was done for seqpacket_send in 2.5
and only allow it on connected seqpacket sockets.
Tested-by: Dan Aloni <dan@aloni.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 26cde9f7e2747b6d254b704594eed87ab959afa5 upstream.
It has been reported that the new UFO software fallback path
fails under certain conditions with NFS. I tracked the problem
down to the generation of UFO packets that are smaller than the
MTU. The software fallback path simply discards these packets.
This patch fixes the problem by not generating such packets on
the UFO path.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1b1f693d7ad6d193862dcb1118540a030c5e761f upstream.
As reported by Thomas Pollet, the rdma page counting can overflow. We
get the rdma sizes in 64-bit unsigned entities, but then limit it to
UINT_MAX bytes and shift them down to pages (so with a possible "+1" for
an unaligned address).
So each individual page count fits comfortably in an 'unsigned int' (not
even close to overflowing into signed), but as they are added up, they
might end up resulting in a signed return value. Which would be wrong.
Catch the case of tot_pages turning negative, and return the appropriate
error code.
Reported-by: Thomas Pollet <thomas.pollet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Grover <andy.grover@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[v2: nr is unsigned in the old code]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Brad Figg <brad.figg@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 5b919f833d9d60588d026ad82d17f17e8872c7a9 upstream.
Commit fe10ae53384e48c51996941b7720ee16995cbcb7 adds a memset() to clear
the structure being sent back to userspace, but accidentally used the
wrong size.
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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This reverts commit b291661643c93044e6d4a228d3268649ccf30a0c (originally
commit 1b1f693d7ad6d193862dcb1118540a030c5e761f upstream).
I messed it up in backporting it to the .33-stable kernel, so revert it
for now and try it again the next review cycle.
Cc: Thomas Pollet <thomas.pollet@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Grover <andy.grover@oracle.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 1b1f693d7ad6d193862dcb1118540a030c5e761f upstream.
As reported by Thomas Pollet, the rdma page counting can overflow. We
get the rdma sizes in 64-bit unsigned entities, but then limit it to
UINT_MAX bytes and shift them down to pages (so with a possible "+1" for
an unaligned address).
So each individual page count fits comfortably in an 'unsigned int' (not
even close to overflowing into signed), but as they are added up, they
might end up resulting in a signed return value. Which would be wrong.
Catch the case of tot_pages turning negative, and return the appropriate
error code.
Reported-by: Thomas Pollet <thomas.pollet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Grover <andy.grover@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83 upstream.
Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its
inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive
information.
CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fdac1e0697356ac212259f2147aa60c72e334861 upstream.
If the user-provided len is less than the expected offset, the
IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES getsockopt will do a copy_to_user() with a very large
size value. While this isn't be a security issue on x86 because it will
get caught by the access_ok() check, it may leak large amounts of kernel
heap on other architectures. In any event, this patch fixes it.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 4e085e76cbe558b79b54cbab772f61185879bc64 upstream.
Unconditional use of skb->dev won't work here,
try to fetch the econet device via skb_dst()->dev
instead.
Suggested by Eric Dumazet.
Reported-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Tested-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
[jmm: Slightly adapted for 2.6.32]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 22e76c849d505d87c5ecf3d3e6742a65f0ff4860 upstream.
We were using nlmsg_find_attr() to look up the bytecode by attribute when
auditing, but then just using the first attribute when actually running
bytecode. So, if we received a message with two attribute elements, where only
the second had type INET_DIAG_REQ_BYTECODE, we would validate and run different
bytecode strings.
Fix this by consistently using nlmsg_find_attr everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 88f8a5e3e7defccd3925cabb1ee4d3994e5cdb52 upstream.
Structure sockaddr_tipc is copied to userland with padding bytes after
"id" field in union field "name" unitialized. It leads to leaking of
contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 67286640f638f5ad41a946b9a3dc75327950248f upstream.
packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of
sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied
to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of strlcpy().
The same with packet_getname(): it doesn't initialize sll_pkttype field of
sockaddr_ll. Set it to zero.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit fe10ae53384e48c51996941b7720ee16995cbcb7 upstream.
Sometimes ax25_getname() doesn't initialize all members of fsa_digipeater
field of fsa struct, also the struct has padding bytes between
sax25_call and sax25_ndigis fields. This structure is then copied to
userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segooon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6d152e23ad1a7a5b40fef1f42e017d66e6115159 upstream.
Like Herbert's change from a few days ago:
66c46d741e2e60f0e8b625b80edb0ab820c46d7a gro: Reset dev pointer on reuse
this may not be necessary at this point, but we should still clean up
the skb->skb_iif. If not we may end up with an invalid valid for
skb->skb_iif when the skb is reused and the check is done in
__netif_receive_skb.
Signed-off-by: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 66c46d741e2e60f0e8b625b80edb0ab820c46d7a upstream.
On older kernels the VLAN code may zero skb->dev before dropping
it and causing it to be reused by GRO.
Unfortunately we didn't reset skb->dev in that case which causes
the next GRO user to get a bogus skb->dev pointer.
This particular problem no longer happens with the current upstream
kernel due to changes in VLAN processing.
However, for correctness we should still reset the skb->dev pointer
in the GRO reuse function in case a future user does the same thing.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Brandon Philips <bphilips@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit b4232a22776aa5d063f890d21ca69870dbbe431b upstream.
Static analyzer of clang found a dead store which appears to be a bug in
reading count of items in SEQOF field, only the lower byte of word is
stored. This may lead to corrupted read and communication shutdown.
The bug has been in the module since it's first inclusion into linux
kernel.
[Patrick: the bug is real, but without practical consequence since the
largest amount of sequence-of members we parse is 30.]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 67c5c6cb8129c595f21e88254a3fc6b3b841ae8e upstream.
struct aunhdr has 4 padding bytes between 'pad' and 'handle' fields on
x86_64. These bytes are not initialized in the variable 'ah' before
sending 'ah' to the network. This leads to 4 bytes kernel stack
infoleak.
This bug was introduced before the git epoch.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: Phil Blundell <philb@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream.
Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 961ed183a9fd080cf306c659b8736007e44065a5 upstream.
'buffer' string is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether it is
zero terminated. This may lead to overflow inside of simple_strtoul().
Changli Gao suggested to copy not more than user supplied 'size' bytes.
It was introduced before the git epoch. Files "ipt_CLUSTERIP/*" are
root writable only by default, however, on some setups permissions might be
relaxed to e.g. network admin user.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143 upstream.
Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second is
introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a upstream.
Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the
second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1). To trigger the bug
one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit 43629f8f5ea32a998d06d1bb41eefa0e821ff573 upstream.
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "device"
field is NULL terminated. This potentially leads to BUG() inside of
alloc_netdev_mqs() and/or information leak by creating a device with a name
made of contents of kernel stack.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit d846f71195d57b0bbb143382647c2c6638b04c5a upstream.
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit c4c896e1471aec3b004a693c689f60be3b17ac86 upstream.
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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commit be20250c13f88375345ad99950190685eda51eb8 upstream.
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
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