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2012-10-11consitify do_mount() argumentsAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-10-02Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline attacks - Integrity: add digital signature verification - Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions) - IBM vTPM support on ppc64 - Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM - Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels" Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits) Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools ima: change flags container data type Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label Smack: remove task_wait() hook. ima: audit log hashes ima: generic IMA action flag handling ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure audit: export audit_log_task_info tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390 ima: digital signature verification support ima: add support for different security.ima data types ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls ima: add inode_post_setattr call ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock ima: allocating iint improvements ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules ima: integrity appraisal extension vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file ...
2012-09-21userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgidsEric W. Biederman
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-09-07ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and callsMimi Zohar
Based on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security' xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'. Changelog v1: - Unless IMA-APPRAISE is configured, use stub ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() functions. (Moved ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() to ima_appraise.c) Changelog: - take i_mutex to fix locking (Dmitry Kasatkin) - ima_reset_appraise_flags should only be called when modifying or removing the 'security.ima' xattr. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege. (Incorporated fix from Roberto Sassu) - Even if allowed to update security.ima, reset the appraisal flags, forcing re-appraisal. - Replace CAP_MAC_ADMIN with CAP_SYS_ADMIN - static inline ima_inode_setxattr()/ima_inode_removexattr() stubs - ima_protect_xattr should be static Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
2012-09-05security: allow Yama to be unconditionally stackedKees Cook
Unconditionally call Yama when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED is selected, no matter what LSM module is primary. Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having multiple distributions (or LSM authors) carrying these patches, just allow Yama to be called unconditionally when selected by the new CONFIG. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-07-03security: Fix nommu build.Paul Mundt
The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP: security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot': security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function) security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up. Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-07-02security: Fix nommu build.Paul Mundt
The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP: security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot': security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function) security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up. Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-06-01take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helperAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-06-01take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_semAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-31split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file()Al Viro
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-04-09SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_openEric Paris
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-02-14security: trim security.hAl Viro
Trim security.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-02-14mm: collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single functionAl Viro
Collapse security_vm_enough_memory() variants into a single function. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-02-10security: create task_free security callbackKees Cook
The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-01-14Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable() ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert() Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv(): - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()") - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add userspace configuration API") causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the issue.
2012-01-06switch security_path_chmod() to struct path *Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-05security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()Eric Paris
Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective capabilities from the skb that was being received. Today we instead get the capabilities from the current task. This has rendered the entire purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the capable() call. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-05capabilities: remove all _real_ interfacesEric Paris
The name security_real_capable and security_real_capable_noaudit just don't make much sense to me. Convert them to use security_capable and security_capable_noaudit. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2012-01-05capabilities: introduce security_capable_noauditEric Paris
Exactly like security_capable except don't audit any denials. This is for places where the kernel may make decisions about what to do if a task has a given capability, but which failing that capability is not a sign of a security policy violation. An example is checking if a task has CAP_SYS_ADMIN to lower it's likelyhood of being killed by the oom killer. This check is not a security violation if it is denied. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2012-01-05capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capableEric Paris
security_capable takes ns, cred, cap. But the LSM capable() hook takes cred, ns, cap. The capability helper functions also take cred, ns, cap. Rather than flip argument order just to flip it back, leave them alone. Heck, this should be a little faster since argument will be in the right place! Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-05capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirelyEric Paris
The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the current task. Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security decision. This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is appropriate. In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor. I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely unrelated to this patch. This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it. The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be wrong and needs further investigation. Again this is NOT a change, it may have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-01-03switch ->path_mknod() to umode_tAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch ->path_mkdir() to umode_tAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch security_path_chmod() to umode_tAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch ->mknod() to umode_tAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch ->create() to umode_tAl Viro
vfs_create() ignores everything outside of 16bit subset of its mode argument; switching it to umode_t is obviously equivalent and it's the only caller of the method Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03switch vfs_mkdir() and ->mkdir() to umode_tAl Viro
vfs_mkdir() gets int, but immediately drops everything that might not fit into umode_t and that's the only caller of ->mkdir()... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-03security: Fix security_old_inode_init_security() when CONFIG_SECURITY is not setJan Kara
Commit 1e39f384bb01 ("evm: fix build problems") makes the stub version of security_old_inode_init_security() return 0 when CONFIG_SECURITY is not set. But that makes callers such as reiserfs_security_init() assume that security_old_inode_init_security() has set name, value, and len arguments properly - but security_old_inode_init_security() left them uninitialized which then results in interesting failures. Revert security_old_inode_init_security() to the old behavior of returning EOPNOTSUPP since both callers (reiserfs and ocfs2) handle this just fine. [ Also fixed the S_PRIVATE(inode) case of the actual non-stub security_old_inode_init_security() function to return EOPNOTSUPP for the same reason, as pointed out by Mimi Zohar. It got incorrectly changed to match the new function in commit fb88c2b6cbb1: "evm: fix security/security_old_init_security return code". - Linus ] Reported-by: Jorge Bastos <mysql.jorge@decimal.pt> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-10-25Merge branch 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds
* 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits) TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek. Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option. Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access Smack: compilation fix Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte Smack: domain transition protections (v3) Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) Smack: Clean up comments Smack: Repair processing of fcntl Smack: Rule list lookup performance Smack: check permissions from user space (v2) TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector. TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock. TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning. TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock. TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector. TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings. target: check hex2bin result encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result ...
2011-10-18bluetooth: Properly clone LSM attributes to newly created child connectionsPaul Moore
The Bluetooth stack has internal connection handlers for all of the various Bluetooth protocols, and unfortunately, they are currently lacking the LSM hooks found in the core network stack's connection handlers. I say unfortunately, because this can cause problems for users who have have an LSM enabled and are using certain Bluetooth devices. See one problem report below: * http://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=741703 In order to keep things simple at this point in time, this patch fixes the problem by cloning the parent socket's LSM attributes to the newly created child socket. If we decide we need a more elaborate LSM marking mechanism for Bluetooth (I somewhat doubt this) we can always revisit this decision in the future. Reported-by: James M. Cape <jcape@ignore-your.tv> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-09-14evm: fix security/security_old_init_security return codeMimi Zohar
security_inode_init_security previously returned -EOPNOTSUPP, for S_PRIVATE inodes, and relied on the callers to change it to 0. As the callers do not change the return code anymore, return 0, intead of -EOPNOTSUPP. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-09-09security: sparse fix: Move security_fixup_op to security.hJames Morris
Fix sparse warning by moving declaraion to global header. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-08-09Merge branch 'next-evm' of ↵James Morris
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/ima-2.6 into next Conflicts: fs/attr.c Resolve conflict manually. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-07-20->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to exec_permission()Al Viro
pass mask instead; kill security_inode_exec_permission() since we can use security_inode_permission() instead. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-07-20->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to ->inode_permission()Al Viro
pass that via mask instead. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-07-18evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid security.evmMimi Zohar
Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode. Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-07-18evm: call evm_inode_init_security from security_inode_init_securityMimi Zohar
Changelog v7: - moved the initialization call to security_inode_init_security, renaming evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security - increase size of xattr array for EVM xattr Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-07-18security: imbed evm calls in security hooksMimi Zohar
Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr() protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode. (Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.) Changelog: - Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled. - xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *' Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2011-07-18integrity: move ima inode integrity data managementMimi Zohar
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models. Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static There should be no other functional changes. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
2011-07-18security: new security_inode_init_security API adds function callbackMimi Zohar
This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes. This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be optimized to write multiple xattrs at once. For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
2011-04-22SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modulesAndi Kleen
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-23userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespaceSerge E. Hallyn
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-03-16Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6Linus Torvalds
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits) bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag bonding: wrap slave state work net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler be2net: Bump up the version number be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables xen network backend driver bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward() be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve netxen: support for GbE port settings ... Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c with the staging updates.
2011-03-16Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits) AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open. Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking" selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking ...
2011-03-15Merge branch 'timers-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (62 commits) posix-clocks: Check write permissions in posix syscalls hrtimer: Remove empty hrtimer_init_hres_timer() hrtimer: Update hrtimer->state documentation hrtimer: Update base[CLOCK_BOOTTIME].offset correctly timers: Export CLOCK_BOOTTIME via the posix timers interface timers: Add CLOCK_BOOTTIME hrtimer base time: Extend get_xtime_and_monotonic_offset() to also return sleep time: Introduce get_monotonic_boottime and ktime_get_boottime hrtimers: extend hrtimer base code to handle more then 2 clockids ntp: Remove redundant and incorrect parameter check mn10300: Switch do_timer() to xtimer_update() posix clocks: Introduce dynamic clocks posix-timers: Cleanup namespace posix-timers: Add support for fd based clocks x86: Add clock_adjtime for x86 posix-timers: Introduce a syscall for clock tuning. time: Splitout compat timex accessors ntp: Add ADJ_SETOFFSET mode bit time: Introduce timekeeping_inject_offset posix-timer: Update comment ... Fix up new system-call-related conflicts in arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S (name_to_handle_at()/open_by_handle_at() vs clock_adjtime()), and some due to movement of get_jiffies_64() in: kernel/time.c
2011-03-12net: Put flowi_* prefix on AF independent members of struct flowiDavid S. Miller
I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes first, much like struct sock_common. This is the first step to move in that direction. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-03-08Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris
2011-03-08Merge branch 'master'; commit 'v2.6.38-rc7' into nextJames Morris
2011-03-03LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSMEric Paris
The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-02-22xfrm: Mark flowi arg to security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() const.David S. Miller
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>