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2019-05-08selinux: never allow relabeling on context mountsOndrej Mosnacek
commit a83d6ddaebe541570291205cb538e35ad4ff94f9 upstream. In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The 'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS. While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic. Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-05selinux: do not override context on context mountsOndrej Mosnacek
[ Upstream commit 53e0c2aa9a59a48e3798ef193d573ade85aa80f5 ] Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with SBLABEL_MNT flag unset. This is achived by returning -EOPNOTSUPP for this case in selinux_inode_setsecurtity() (because that function should not be called in such case anyway) and translating this error to 0 in selinux_inode_notifysecctx(). This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the 'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as having the manually-set context and not the mount-specified one. Steps to reproduce: # mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified # chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads # umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified # mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified Result before: # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads Result after: # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-01-26selinux: always allow mounting submountsOndrej Mosnacek
[ Upstream commit 2cbdcb882f97a45f7475c67ac6257bbc16277dfe ] If a superblock has the MS_SUBMOUNT flag set, we should always allow mounting it. These mounts are done automatically by the kernel either as part of mounting some parent mount (e.g. debugfs always mounts tracefs under "tracing" for compatibility) or they are mounted automatically as needed on subdirectory accesses (e.g. NFS crossmnt mounts). Since such automounts are either an implicit consequence of the parent mount (which is already checked) or they can happen during regular accesses (where it doesn't make sense to check against the current task's context), the mount permission check should be skipped for them. Without this patch, attempts to access contents of an automounted directory can cause unexpected SELinux denials. In the current kernel tree, the MS_SUBMOUNT flag is set only via vfs_submount(), which is called only from the following places: - AFS, when automounting special "symlinks" referencing other cells - CIFS, when automounting "referrals" - NFS, when automounting subtrees - debugfs, when automounting tracefs In all cases the submounts are meant to be transparent to the user and it makes sense that if mounting the master is allowed, then so should be the automounts. Note that CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability checking is already skipped for (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT) in: - sget_userns() in fs/super.c: if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - sget() in fs/super.c: /* Ensure the requestor has permissions over the target filesystem */ if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); Verified internally on patched RHEL 7.6 with a reproducer using NFS+httpd and selinux-tesuite. Fixes: 93faccbbfa95 ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-04-13selinux: do not check open permission on socketsStephen Smalley
[ Upstream commit ccb544781d34afdb73a9a73ae53035d824d193bf ] open permission is currently only defined for files in the kernel (COMMON_FILE_PERMS rather than COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS). Construction of an artificial test case that tries to open a socket via /proc/pid/fd will generate a recvfrom avc denial because recvfrom and open happen to map to the same permission bit in socket vs file classes. open of a socket via /proc/pid/fd is not supported by the kernel regardless and will ultimately return ENXIO. But we hit the permission check first and can thus produce these odd/misleading denials. Omit the open check when operating on a socket. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-08selinux: Remove redundant check for unknown labeling behaviorMatthias Kaehlcke
commit 270e8573145a26de924e2dc644596332d400445b upstream. The check is already performed in ocontext_read() when the policy is loaded. Removing the array also fixes the following warning when building with clang: security/selinux/hooks.c:338:20: error: variable 'labeling_behaviors' is not needed and will not be emitted [-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration] Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-22selinux: check for address length in selinux_socket_bind()Alexander Potapenko
[ Upstream commit e2f586bd83177d22072b275edd4b8b872daba924 ] KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer, a new error detection tool) reports use of uninitialized memory in selinux_socket_bind(): ================================================================== BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory inter: 0 CPU: 3 PID: 1074 Comm: packet2 Tainted: G B 4.8.0-rc6+ #1916 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000000 ffff8800882ffb08 ffffffff825759c8 ffff8800882ffa48 ffffffff818bf551 ffffffff85bab870 0000000000000092 ffffffff85bab550 0000000000000000 0000000000000092 00000000bb0009bb 0000000000000002 Call Trace: [< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [<ffffffff825759c8>] dump_stack+0x238/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:51 [<ffffffff818bdee6>] kmsan_report+0x276/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1008 [<ffffffff818bf0fb>] __msan_warning+0x5b/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:424 [<ffffffff822dae71>] selinux_socket_bind+0xf41/0x1080 security/selinux/hooks.c:4288 [<ffffffff8229357c>] security_socket_bind+0x1ec/0x240 security/security.c:1240 [<ffffffff84265d98>] SYSC_bind+0x358/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1366 [<ffffffff84265a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356 [<ffffffff81005678>] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292 [<ffffffff8518217c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:? chained origin: 00000000ba6009bb [<ffffffff810bb7a7>] save_stack_trace+0x27/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:67 [< inline >] kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322 [< inline >] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:337 [<ffffffff818bd2b8>] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x118/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:530 [<ffffffff818bf033>] __msan_set_alloca_origin4+0xc3/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:380 [<ffffffff84265b69>] SYSC_bind+0x129/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1356 [<ffffffff84265a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356 [<ffffffff81005678>] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292 [<ffffffff8518217c>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:? origin description: ----address@SYSC_bind (origin=00000000b8c00900) ================================================================== (the line numbers are relative to 4.8-rc6, but the bug persists upstream) , when I run the following program as root: ======================================================= #include <string.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <netinet/in.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { struct sockaddr addr; int size = 0; if (argc > 1) { size = atoi(argv[1]); } memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); int fd = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_IP); bind(fd, &addr, size); return 0; } ======================================================= (for different values of |size| other error reports are printed). This happens because bind() unconditionally copies |size| bytes of |addr| to the kernel, leaving the rest uninitialized. Then security_socket_bind() reads the IP address bytes, including the uninitialized ones, to determine the port, or e.g. pass them further to sel_netnode_find(), which uses them to calculate a hash. Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> [PM: fixed some whitespace damage] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-02-14selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattrStephen Smalley
commit 0c461cb727d146c9ef2d3e86214f498b78b7d125 upstream. SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write(): switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error. Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute, requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo without -n to clear, as in the following example: $ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate $ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 $ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate $ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell. There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we should just get rid of it. UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-10-20mm: Change vm_is_stack_for_task() to vm_is_stack_for_current()Andy Lutomirski
Asking for a non-current task's stack can't be done without races unless the task is frozen in kernel mode. As far as I know, vm_is_stack_for_task() never had a safe non-current use case. The __unused annotation is because some KSTK_ESP implementations ignore their parameter, which IMO is further justification for this patch. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4c3f68f426e6c061ca98b4fc7ef85ffbb0a25b0c.1475257877.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-10Merge branch 'work.xattr' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs xattr updates from Al Viro: "xattr stuff from Andreas This completes the switch to xattr_handler ->get()/->set() from ->getxattr/->setxattr/->removexattr" * 'work.xattr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: vfs: Remove {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations xattr: Stop calling {get,set,remove}xattr inode operations vfs: Check for the IOP_XATTR flag in listxattr xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers libfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for empty directory handling vfs: Use IOP_XATTR flag for bad-inode handling vfs: Add IOP_XATTR inode operations flag vfs: Move xattr_resolve_name to the front of fs/xattr.c ecryptfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers sockfs: Get rid of getxattr iop sockfs: getxattr: Fail with -EOPNOTSUPP for invalid attribute names kernfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers hfs: Switch to generic xattr handlers jffs2: Remove jffs2_{get,set,remove}xattr macros xattr: Remove unnecessary NULL attribute name check
2016-10-07xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpersAndreas Gruenbacher
Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call those operations. Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR flag instead. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-09-19lsm,audit,selinux: Introduce a new audit data type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILEVivek Goyal
Right now LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH type contains "struct path" in union "u" of common_audit_data. This information is used to print path of file at the same time it is also used to get to dentry and inode. And this inode information is used to get to superblock and device and print device information. This does not work well for layered filesystems like overlay where dentry contained in path is overlay dentry and not the real dentry of underlying file system. That means inode retrieved from dentry is also overlay inode and not the real inode. SELinux helpers like file_path_has_perm() are doing checks on inode retrieved from file_inode(). This returns the real inode and not the overlay inode. That means we are doing check on real inode but for audit purposes we are printing details of overlay inode and that can be confusing while debugging. Hence, introduce a new type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE which carries file information and inode retrieved is real inode using file_inode(). That way right avc denied information is given to user. For example, following is one example avc before the patch. type=AVC msg=audit(1473360868.399:214): avc: denied { read open } for pid=1765 comm="cat" path="/root/.../overlay/container1/merged/readfile" dev="overlay" ino=21443 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 It looks as follows after the patch. type=AVC msg=audit(1473360017.388:282): avc: denied { read open } for pid=2530 comm="cat" path="/root/.../overlay/container1/merged/readfile" dev="dm-0" ino=2377915 scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20 tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 Notice that now dev information points to "dm-0" device instead of "overlay" device. This makes it clear that check failed on underlying inode and not on the overlay inode. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> [PM: slight tweaks to the description to make checkpatch.pl happy] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-08-10selinux: Implement dentry_create_files_as() hookVivek Goyal
Calculate what would be the label of newly created file and set that secid in the passed creds. Context of the task which is actually creating file is retrieved from set of creds passed in. (old->security). Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-08-08selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label()Vivek Goyal
Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can decide where to fetch security pointer from. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-08-08selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up_xattr() hookVivek Goyal
When a file is copied up in overlay, we have already created file on upper/ with right label and there is no need to copy up selinux label/xattr from lower file to upper file. In fact in case of context mount, we don't want to copy up label as newly created file got its label from context= option. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-08-08selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up() hookVivek Goyal
A file is being copied up for overlay file system. Prepare a new set of creds and set create_sid appropriately so that new file is created with appropriate label. Overlay inode has right label for both context and non-context mount cases. In case of non-context mount, overlay inode will have the label of lower file and in case of context mount, overlay inode will have the label from context= mount option. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-08-08security: Use IS_ENABLED() instead of checking for built-in or moduleJavier Martinez Canillas
The IS_ENABLED() macro checks if a Kconfig symbol has been enabled either built-in or as a module, use that macro instead of open coding the same. Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javier@osg.samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-08-06Merge branch 'work.const-qstr' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull qstr constification updates from Al Viro: "Fairly self-contained bunch - surprising lot of places passes struct qstr * as an argument when const struct qstr * would suffice; it complicates analysis for no good reason. I'd prefer to feed that separately from the assorted fixes (those are in #for-linus and with somewhat trickier topology)" * 'work.const-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: qstr: constify instances in adfs qstr: constify instances in lustre qstr: constify instances in f2fs qstr: constify instances in ext2 qstr: constify instances in vfat qstr: constify instances in procfs qstr: constify instances in fuse qstr constify instances in fs/dcache.c qstr: constify instances in nfs qstr: constify instances in ocfs2 qstr: constify instances in autofs4 qstr: constify instances in hfs qstr: constify instances in hfsplus qstr: constify instances in logfs qstr: constify dentry_init_security
2016-07-29Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - TPM core and driver updates/fixes - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO) - Lots of Apparmor fixes - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change syscall #" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits) apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family) tpm: Factor out common startup code tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr() apparmor: do not expose kernel stack apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds ...
2016-07-20qstr: constify dentry_init_securityAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-07-07Merge branch 'stable-4.8' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris
into next
2016-06-27netlabel: Pass a family parameter to netlbl_skbuff_err().Huw Davies
This makes it possible to route the error to the appropriate labelling engine. CALIPSO is far less verbose than CIPSO when encountering a bogus packet, so there is no need for a CALIPSO error handler. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-06-27calipso: Allow the lsm to label the skbuff directly.Huw Davies
In some cases, the lsm needs to add the label to the skbuff directly. A NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT IPv6 hook is added to selinux to match the IPv4 behaviour. This allows selinux to label the skbuffs that it requires. Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-06-24selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespacesSeth Forshee
Security labels from unprivileged mounts in user namespaces must be ignored. Force superblocks from user namespaces whose labeling behavior is to use xattrs to use mountpoint labeling instead. For the mountpoint label, default to converting the current task context into a form suitable for file objects, but also allow the policy writer to specify a different label through policy transition rules. Pieced together from code snippets provided by Stephen Smalley. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-06-24fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuidAndy Lutomirski
If a process gets access to a mount from a different user namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem. Prevent this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not owned by current_user_ns() or an ancestor as nosuid. This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be mounted in non-root user namespaces. This does not remove the need for MNT_LOCK_NOSUID. The setuid, setgid, and file capability bits can no longer be abused if code in a user namespace were to clear nosuid on an untrusted filesystem, but this patch, by itself, is insufficient to protect the system from abuse of files that, when execed, would increase MAC privilege. As a more concrete explanation, any task that can manipulate a vfsmount associated with a given user namespace already has capabilities in that namespace and all of its descendents. If they can cause a malicious setuid, setgid, or file-caps executable to appear in that mount, then that executable will only allow them to elevate privileges in exactly the set of namespaces in which they are already privileges. On the other hand, if they can cause a malicious executable to appear with a dangerous MAC label, running it could change the caller's security context in a way that should not have been possible, even inside the namespace in which the task is confined. As a hardening measure, this would have made CVE-2014-5207 much more difficult to exploit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-05-19Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified cryptographically via dm-verity). This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing). - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key. Lots of general fixes and updates. - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits) LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting seccomp: Fix comment typo ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory fs: fix over-zealous use of "const" selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration Yama: consolidate error reporting string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it selinux: Change bool variable name to index. KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command ...
2016-05-17Merge branch 'work.const-path' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull 'struct path' constification update from Al Viro: "'struct path' is passed by reference to a bunch of Linux security methods; in theory, there's nothing to stop them from modifying the damn thing and LSM community being what it is, sooner or later some enterprising soul is going to decide that it's a good idea. Let's remove the temptation and constify all of those..." * 'work.const-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: constify ima_d_path() constify security_sb_pivotroot() constify security_path_chroot() constify security_path_{link,rename} apparmor: remove useless checks for NULL ->mnt constify security_path_{mkdir,mknod,symlink} constify security_path_{unlink,rmdir} apparmor: constify common_perm_...() apparmor: constify aa_path_link() apparmor: new helper - common_path_perm() constify chmod_common/security_path_chmod constify security_sb_mount() constify chown_common/security_path_chown tomoyo: constify assorted struct path * apparmor_path_truncate(): path->mnt is never NULL constify vfs_truncate() constify security_path_truncate() [apparmor] constify struct path * in a bunch of helpers
2016-04-26selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacksStephen Smalley
The execstack check was only being applied on the main process stack. Thread stacks allocated via mmap were only subject to the execmem permission check. Augment the check to apply to the current thread stack as well. Note that this does NOT prevent making a different thread's stack executable. Suggested-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-26selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checksStephen Smalley
Distinguish capability checks against a target associated with the init user namespace versus capability checks against a target associated with a non-init user namespace by defining and using separate security classes for the latter. This is needed to support e.g. Chrome usage of user namespaces for the Chrome sandbox without needing to allow Chrome to also exercise capabilities on targets in the init user namespace. Suggested-by: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-19selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode labelPaul Moore
There is no point in trying to revalidate an inode's security label if the security server is not yet initialized. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-19selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possiblePaul Moore
Since looking up an inode's label can result in revalidation, delay the lookup as long as possible to limit the performance impact. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-19selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting itPaul Moore
There is no point in attempting to revalidate an inode's security label when we are in the process of setting it. Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-11->getxattr(): pass dentry and inode as separate argumentsAl Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-04-10don't bother with ->d_inode->i_sb - it's always equal to ->d_sbAl Viro
... and neither can ever be NULL Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-04-05selinux: restrict kernel module loadingJeff Vander Stoep
Utilize existing kernel_read_file hook on kernel module load. Add module_load permission to the system class. Enforces restrictions on kernel module origin when calling the finit_module syscall. The hook checks that source type has permission module_load for the target type. Example for finit_module: allow foo bar_file:system module_load; Similarly restrictions are enforced on kernel module loading when calling the init_module syscall. The hook checks that source type has permission module_load with itself as the target object because the kernel module is sourced from the calling process. Example for init_module: allow foo foo:system module_load; Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> [PM: fixed return value of selinux_kernel_read_file()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-05selinux: consolidate the ptrace parent lookup codePaul Moore
We lookup the tracing parent in two places, using effectively the same code, let's consolidate it. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-05selinux: simply inode label states to INVALID and INITIALIZEDPaul Moore
There really is no need for LABEL_MISSING as we really only care if the inode's label is INVALID or INITIALIZED. Also adjust the revalidate code to reload the label whenever the label is not INITIALIZED so we are less sensitive to label state in the future. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-04-05selinux: don't revalidate inodes in selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()Paul Moore
We don't have to worry about socket inodes being invalidated so use inode_security_novalidate() to fetch the inode's security blob. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-03-28constify security_sb_mount()Al Viro
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-03-17Merge tag 'tty-4.6-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty Pull tty/serial updates from Greg KH: "Here's the big tty/serial driver pull request for 4.6-rc1. Lots of changes in here, Peter has been on a tear again, with lots of refactoring and bugs fixes, many thanks to the great work he has been doing. Lots of driver updates and fixes as well, full details in the shortlog. All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported issues" * tag 'tty-4.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty: (220 commits) serial: 8250: describe CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_RSA serial: samsung: optimize UART rx fifo access routine serial: pl011: add mark/space parity support serial: sa1100: make sa1100_register_uart_fns a function tty: serial: 8250: add MOXA Smartio MUE boards support serial: 8250: convert drivers to use up_to_u8250p() serial: 8250/mediatek: fix building with SERIAL_8250=m serial: 8250/ingenic: fix building with SERIAL_8250=m serial: 8250/uniphier: fix modular build Revert "drivers/tty/serial: make 8250/8250_ingenic.c explicitly non-modular" Revert "drivers/tty/serial: make 8250/8250_mtk.c explicitly non-modular" serial: mvebu-uart: initial support for Armada-3700 serial port serial: mctrl_gpio: Add missing module license serial: ifx6x60: avoid uninitialized variable use tty/serial: at91: fix bad offset for UART timeout register tty/serial: at91: restore dynamic driver binding serial: 8250: Add hardware dependency to RT288X option TTY, devpts: document pty count limiting tty: goldfish: support platform_device with id -1 drivers: tty: goldfish: Add device tree bindings ...
2016-02-19selinux: Don't sleep inside inode_getsecid hookAndreas Gruenbacher
The inode_getsecid hook is called from contexts in which sleeping is not allowed, so we cannot revalidate inode security labels from there. Use the non-validating version of inode_security() instead. Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2016-01-27tty: Make tty_files_lock per-ttyPeter Hurley
Access to tty->tty_files list is always per-tty, never for all ttys simultaneously. Replace global tty_files_lock spinlock with per-tty ->files_lock. Initialize when the ->tty_files list is inited, in alloc_tty_struct(). Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-01-08selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fixAndreas Gruenbacher
Commit 5d226df4 has introduced a performance regression of about 10% in the UnixBench pipe benchmark. It turns out that the call to inode_security in selinux_file_permission can be moved below the zero-mask test and that inode_security_revalidate can be removed entirely, which brings us back to roughly the original performance. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2015-12-24selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()Vladis Dronov
Any process is able to send netlink messages with invalid types. Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam. The warning is supposed to help to find misbehaving programs, so print the triggering command name and pid. Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> [PM: subject line tweak to make checkpatch.pl happy] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-12-24selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labelsAndreas Gruenbacher
When fetching an inode's security label, check if it is still valid, and try reloading it if it is not. Reloading will fail when we are in RCU context which doesn't allow sleeping, or when we can't find a dentry for the inode. (Reloading happens via iop->getxattr which takes a dentry parameter.) When reloading fails, continue using the old, invalid label. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-12-24security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labelsAndreas Gruenbacher
Add a hook to invalidate an inode's security label when the cached information becomes invalid. Add the new hook in selinux: set a flag when a security label becomes invalid. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-12-24selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_securityAndreas Gruenbacher
Add functions dentry_security and inode_security for accessing inode->i_security. These functions initially don't do much, but they will later be used to revalidate the security labels when necessary. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-12-24security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-constAndreas Gruenbacher
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecid hook non-const so that we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-12-24security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-constAndreas Gruenbacher
Make the inode argument of the inode_getsecurity hook non-const so that we can use it to revalidate invalid security labels. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-12-24selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_securityAndreas Gruenbacher
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-11-10Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netLinus Torvalds
Pull networking fixes from David Miller: 1) Fix null deref in xt_TEE netfilter module, from Eric Dumazet. 2) Several spots need to get to the original listner for SYN-ACK packets, most spots got this ok but some were not. Whilst covering the remaining cases, create a helper to do this. From Eric Dumazet. 3) Missiing check of return value from alloc_netdev() in CAIF SPI code, from Rasmus Villemoes. 4) Don't sleep while != TASK_RUNNING in macvtap, from Vlad Yasevich. 5) Use after free in mvneta driver, from Justin Maggard. 6) Fix race on dst->flags access in dst_release(), from Eric Dumazet. 7) Add missing ZLIB_INFLATE dependency for new qed driver. From Arnd Bergmann. 8) Fix multicast getsockopt deadlock, from WANG Cong. 9) Fix deadlock in btusb, from Kuba Pawlak. 10) Some ipv6_add_dev() failure paths were not cleaning up the SNMP6 counter state. From Sabrina Dubroca. 11) Fix packet_bind() race, which can cause lost notifications, from Francesco Ruggeri. 12) Fix MAC restoration in qlcnic driver during bonding mode changes, from Jarod Wilson. 13) Revert bridging forward delay change which broke libvirt and other userspace things, from Vlad Yasevich. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits) Revert "bridge: Allow forward delay to be cfgd when STP enabled" bpf_trace: Make dependent on PERF_EVENTS qed: select ZLIB_INFLATE net: fix a race in dst_release() net: mvneta: Fix memory use after free. net: Documentation: Fix default value tcp_limit_output_bytes macvtap: Resolve possible __might_sleep warning in macvtap_do_read() mvneta: add FIXED_PHY dependency net: caif: check return value of alloc_netdev net: hisilicon: NET_VENDOR_HISILICON should depend on HAS_DMA drivers: net: xgene: fix RGMII 10/100Mb mode netfilter: nft_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper net_sched: em_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper sched: cls_flow: use skb_to_full_sk() helper netfilter: xt_owner: use skb_to_full_sk() helper smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() bpf: doc: correct arch list for supported eBPF JIT dwc_eth_qos: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put" bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure ...
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