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2019-12-05apparmor: delete the dentry in aafs_remove() to avoid a leakChris Coulson
[ Upstream commit 201218e4d3dfa1346e30997f48725acce3f26d01 ] Although the apparmorfs dentries are always dropped from the dentry cache when the usage count drops to zero, there is no guarantee that this will happen in aafs_remove(), as another thread might still be using it. In this scenario, this means that the dentry will temporarily continue to appear in the results of lookups, even after the call to aafs_remove(). In the case of removal of a profile - it also causes simple_rmdir() on the profile directory to fail, as the directory won't be empty until the usage counts of all child dentries have decreased to zero. This results in the dentry for the profile directory leaking and appearing empty in the file system tree forever. Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-10-11ima: always return negative code for errorSascha Hauer
[ Upstream commit f5e1040196dbfe14c77ce3dfe3b7b08d2d961e88 ] integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is a short read then this positive value is returned from ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value. Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error, so translate a short read into -EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-10-07smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lockEric Biggers
commit e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0 upstream. inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4. Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem transaction to complete. Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-10-07Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is setJann Horn
commit 3675f052b43ba51b99b85b073c7070e083f3e6fb upstream. There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds(): If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other ->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it): - task A: create task B with fork() - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some conditions - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which destroys the ptrace relationship) Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-10-07security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in ↵Jia-Ju Bai
smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb() [ Upstream commit 3f4287e7d98a2954f20bf96c567fdffcd2b63eb9 ] In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL: if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases. But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used: ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL. To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb. These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us. Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-09-21keys: Fix missing null pointer check in request_key_auth_describe()Hillf Danton
[ Upstream commit d41a3effbb53b1bcea41e328d16a4d046a508381 ] If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur: BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0 LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 Call Trace: [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable) [...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0 [...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540 [...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110 [...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70 [...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0 [...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130 [...] system_call+0x5c/0x70 Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key. Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side. [DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check in the read routine] Fixes: 04c567d9313e ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key") Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-08-06selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()Ondrej Mosnacek
commit 45385237f65aeee73641f1ef737d7273905a233f upstream. Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in the error path. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-25apparmor: enforce nullbyte at end of tag stringJann Horn
commit 8404d7a674c49278607d19726e0acc0cae299357 upstream. A packed AppArmor policy contains null-terminated tag strings that are read by unpack_nameX(). However, unpack_nameX() uses string functions on them without ensuring that they are actually null-terminated, potentially leading to out-of-bounds accesses. Make sure that the tag string is null-terminated before passing it to strcmp(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-09ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctlyRoberto Sassu
commit 8cdc23a3d9ec0944000ad43bad588e36afdc38cd upstream. Show the '^' character when a policy rule has flag IMA_INMASK. Fixes: 80eae209d63ac ("IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-25apparmorfs: fix use-after-free on symlink traversalAl Viro
[ Upstream commit f51dcd0f621caac5380ce90fbbeafc32ce4517ae ] symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay. Switch apparmorfs to ->destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink body in the callback. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-05-25securityfs: fix use-after-free on symlink traversalAl Viro
[ Upstream commit 46c874419652bbefdfed17420fd6e88d8a31d9ec ] symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay. Switch securityfs to ->destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink body in the callback. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-05-16ima: open a new file instance if no read permissionsGoldwyn Rodrigues
[ Upstream commit a408e4a86b36bf98ad15b9ada531cf0e5118ac67 ] Open a new file instance as opposed to changing file->f_mode when the file is not readable. This is done to accomodate overlayfs stacked file operations change. The real struct file is hidden behind the overlays struct file. So, any file->f_mode manipulations are not reflected on the real struct file. Open the file again in read mode if original file cannot be read, read and calculate the hash. Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-4.19) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
2019-05-08selinux: never allow relabeling on context mountsOndrej Mosnacek
commit a83d6ddaebe541570291205cb538e35ad4ff94f9 upstream. In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The 'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS. While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic. Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-04selinux: use kernel linux/socket.h for genheaders and mdpPaulo Alcantara
commit dfbd199a7cfe3e3cd8531e1353cdbd7175bfbc5e upstream. When compiling genheaders and mdp from a newer host kernel, the following error happens: In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:18: ./security/selinux/include/classmap.h:238:2: error: #error New address family defined, please update secclass_map. #error New address family defined, please update secclass_map. ^~~~~ make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.host:107: scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders] Error 1 make[2]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux/genheaders] Error 2 make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux] Error 2 make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs.... Instead of relying on the host definition, include linux/socket.h in classmap.h to have PF_MAX. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <paulo@paulo.ac> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: manually merge in mdp.c, subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-27device_cgroup: fix RCU imbalance in error caseJann Horn
commit 0fcc4c8c044e117ac126ab6df4138ea9a67fa2a9 upstream. When dev_exception_add() returns an error (due to a failed memory allocation), make sure that we move the RCU preemption count back to where it was before we were called. We dropped the RCU read lock inside the loop body, so we can't just "break". sparse complains about this, too: $ make -s C=2 security/device_cgroup.o ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:647:9: warning: context imbalance in 'propagate_exception' - unexpected unlock Fixes: d591fb56618f ("device_cgroup: simplify cgroup tree walk in propagate_exception()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-05selinux: do not override context on context mountsOndrej Mosnacek
[ Upstream commit 53e0c2aa9a59a48e3798ef193d573ade85aa80f5 ] Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with SBLABEL_MNT flag unset. This is achived by returning -EOPNOTSUPP for this case in selinux_inode_setsecurtity() (because that function should not be called in such case anyway) and translating this error to 0 in selinux_inode_notifysecctx(). This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the 'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as having the manually-set context and not the mount-specified one. Steps to reproduce: # mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified # chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads # umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified # mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified Result before: # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads Result after: # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified total 0 -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-03-23security/selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS on reused superblockJ. Bruce Fields
commit 3815a245b50124f0865415dcb606a034e97494d4 upstream. In the case when we're reusing a superblock, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts() fails to set set_kern_flags, with the result that nfs_clone_sb_security() incorrectly clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL. The result is that if you mount the same NFS filesystem twice, NFS security labels are turned off, even if they would work fine if you mounted the filesystem only once. ("fixes" may be not exactly the right tag, it may be more like "fixed-other-cases-but-missed-this-one".) Cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0b4d3452b8b4 "security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts..." Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-03-23keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth keyDavid Howells
[ Upstream commit 822ad64d7e46a8e2c8b8a796738d7b657cbb146d ] In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned. Fix this by the following changes: (1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead. (2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the payload available outside of security/keys/. (3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons record and operation name. Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked. Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-03-19missing barriers in some of unix_sock ->addr and ->path accessesAl Viro
[ Upstream commit ae3b564179bfd06f32d051b9e5d72ce4b2a07c37 ] Several u->addr and u->path users are not holding any locks in common with unix_bind(). unix_state_lock() is useless for those purposes. u->addr is assign-once and *(u->addr) is fully set up by the time we set u->addr (all under unix_table_lock). u->path is also set in the same critical area, also before setting u->addr, and any unix_sock with ->path filled will have non-NULL ->addr. So setting ->addr with smp_store_release() is all we need for those "lockless" users - just have them fetch ->addr with smp_load_acquire() and don't even bother looking at ->path if they see NULL ->addr. Users of ->addr and ->path fall into several classes now: 1) ones that do smp_load_acquire(u->addr) and access *(u->addr) and u->path only if smp_load_acquire() has returned non-NULL. 2) places holding unix_table_lock. These are guaranteed that *(u->addr) is seen fully initialized. If unix_sock is in one of the "bound" chains, so's ->path. 3) unix_sock_destructor() using ->addr is safe. All places that set u->addr are guaranteed to have seen all stores *(u->addr) while holding a reference to u and unix_sock_destructor() is called when (atomic) refcount hits zero. 4) unix_release_sock() using ->path is safe. unix_bind() is serialized wrt unix_release() (normally - by struct file refcount), and for the instances that had ->path set by unix_bind() unix_release_sock() comes from unix_release(), so they are fine. Instances that had it set in unix_stream_connect() either end up attached to a socket (in unix_accept()), in which case the call chain to unix_release_sock() and serialization are the same as in the previous case, or they never get accept'ed and unix_release_sock() is called when the listener is shut down and its queue gets purged. In that case the listener's queue lock provides the barriers needed - unix_stream_connect() shoves our unix_sock into listener's queue under that lock right after having set ->path and eventual unix_release_sock() caller picks them from that queue under the same lock right before calling unix_release_sock(). 5) unix_find_other() use of ->path is pointless, but safe - it happens with successful lookup by (abstract) name, so ->path.dentry is guaranteed to be NULL there. earlier-variant-reviewed-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-03-13apparmor: Fix aa_label_build() error handling for failed mergesJohn Johansen
[ Upstream commit d6d478aee003e19ef90321176552a8ad2929a47f ] aa_label_merge() can return NULL for memory allocations failures make sure to handle and set the correct error in this case. Reported-by: Peng Hao <peng.hao2@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-02-27KEYS: always initialize keyring_index_key::desc_lenEric Biggers
commit ede0fa98a900e657d1fcd80b50920efc896c1a4c upstream. syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin() called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the length of the key description was never calculated. The problem is that we rely on ->desc_len being initialized by search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings(). But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens. Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the description is set, like we already do in some places. The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and no session keyring has been installed. If it doesn't work, try removing pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting. #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <keyutils.h> int main(void) { int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING); keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE); setreuid(5000, 5000); request_key("user", "desc", "", id); } Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-02-27KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactlyEric Biggers
commit a08bf91ce28ed3ae7b6fef35d843fef8dc8c2cd9 upstream. If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys. Likewise for 'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls. But these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page, Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached). Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly. Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-02-12smack: fix access permissions for keyringZoran Markovic
[ Upstream commit 5b841bfab695e3b8ae793172a9ff7990f99cc3e2 ] Function smack_key_permission() only issues smack requests for the following operations: - KEY_NEED_READ (issues MAY_READ) - KEY_NEED_WRITE (issues MAY_WRITE) - KEY_NEED_LINK (issues MAY_WRITE) - KEY_NEED_SETATTR (issues MAY_WRITE) A blank smack request is issued in all other cases, resulting in smack access being granted if there is any rule defined between subject and object, or denied with -EACCES otherwise. Request MAY_READ access for KEY_NEED_SEARCH and KEY_NEED_VIEW. Fix the logic in the unlikely case when both MAY_READ and MAY_WRITE are needed. Validate access permission field for valid contents. Signed-off-by: Zoran Markovic <zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-01-26selinux: always allow mounting submountsOndrej Mosnacek
[ Upstream commit 2cbdcb882f97a45f7475c67ac6257bbc16277dfe ] If a superblock has the MS_SUBMOUNT flag set, we should always allow mounting it. These mounts are done automatically by the kernel either as part of mounting some parent mount (e.g. debugfs always mounts tracefs under "tracing" for compatibility) or they are mounted automatically as needed on subdirectory accesses (e.g. NFS crossmnt mounts). Since such automounts are either an implicit consequence of the parent mount (which is already checked) or they can happen during regular accesses (where it doesn't make sense to check against the current task's context), the mount permission check should be skipped for them. Without this patch, attempts to access contents of an automounted directory can cause unexpected SELinux denials. In the current kernel tree, the MS_SUBMOUNT flag is set only via vfs_submount(), which is called only from the following places: - AFS, when automounting special "symlinks" referencing other cells - CIFS, when automounting "referrals" - NFS, when automounting subtrees - debugfs, when automounting tracefs In all cases the submounts are meant to be transparent to the user and it makes sense that if mounting the master is allowed, then so should be the automounts. Note that CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability checking is already skipped for (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT) in: - sget_userns() in fs/super.c: if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - sget() in fs/super.c: /* Ensure the requestor has permissions over the target filesystem */ if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); Verified internally on patched RHEL 7.6 with a reproducer using NFS+httpd and selinux-tesuite. Fixes: 93faccbbfa95 ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-01-23selinux: fix GPF on invalid policyStephen Smalley
commit 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 upstream. levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure sens_destroy handles that case correctly. Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-23LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on freeJames Morris
commit a5795fd38ee8194451ba3f281f075301a3696ce2 upstream. From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization that could result in this. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reported-by: syzbot+69ca07954461f189e808@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-23Yama: Check for pid death before checking ancestryKees Cook
commit 9474f4e7cd71a633fa1ef93b7daefd44bbdfd482 upstream. It's possible that a pid has died before we take the rcu lock, in which case we can't walk the ancestry list as it may be detached. Instead, check for death first before doing the walk. Reported-by: syzbot+a9ac39bf55329e206219@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 2d514487faf1 ("security: Yama LSM") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-01-13selinux: policydb - fix byte order and alignment issuesOndrej Mosnacek
commit 5df275cd4cf51c86d49009f1397132f284ba515e upstream. Do the LE conversions before doing the Infiniband-related range checks. The incorrect checks are otherwise causing a failure to load any policy with an ibendportcon rule on BE systems. This can be reproduced by running (on e.g. ppc64): cat >my_module.cil <<EOF (type test_ibendport_t) (roletype object_r test_ibendport_t) (ibendportcon mlx4_0 1 (system_u object_r test_ibendport_t ((s0) (s0)))) EOF semodule -i my_module.cil Also, fix loading/storing the 64-bit subnet prefix for OCON_IBPKEY to use a correctly aligned buffer. Finally, do not use the 'nodebuf' (u32) buffer where 'buf' (__le32) should be used instead. Tested internally on a ppc64 machine with a RHEL 7 kernel with this patch applied. Cc: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com> Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13+ Fixes: a806f7a1616f ("selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband support") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-01ima: re-initialize iint->atomic_flagsMimi Zohar
commit e2598077dc6a26c9644393e5c21f22a90dbdccdb upstream. Intermittently security.ima is not being written for new files. This patch re-initializes the new slab iint->atomic_flags field before freeing it. Fixes: commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-01ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lockDmitry Kasatkin
commit 0d73a55208e94fc9fb6deaeea61438cd3280d4c0 upstream. Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock, i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant iint->mutex was eliminated. Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex. More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file. As a result, when IMA attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take the i_rwsem again. To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem. Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr() hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on close or on open. Atomic flags are following: * IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown, chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to clear iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions again. * IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to clear iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise. * IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated. It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed. * IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file security.ima must not update to file has on file close. * IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy. Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in the VFS inode instead") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-01EVM: Add support for portable signature formatMatthew Garrett
commit 50b977481fce90aa5fbda55e330b9d722733e358 upstream. The EVM signature includes the inode number and (optionally) the filesystem UUID, making it impractical to ship EVM signatures in packages. This patch adds a new portable format intended to allow distributions to include EVM signatures. It is identical to the existing format but hardcodes the inode and generation numbers to 0 and does not include the filesystem UUID even if the kernel is configured to do so. Removing the inode means that the metadata and signature from one file could be copied to another file without invalidating it. This is avoided by ensuring that an IMA xattr is present during EVM validation. Portable signatures are intended to be immutable - ie, they will never be transformed into HMACs. Based on earlier work by Dmitry Kasatkin and Mikhail Kurinnoi. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-01ima: always measure and audit files in policyMimi Zohar
commit f3cc6b25dcc5616f0d5c720009b2ac66f97df2ff upstream. All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated. Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when the file hash can not be calculated. The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest. Note: In general, adding, deleting or in anyway changing which files are included in the IMA measurement list is not a good idea, as it might result in not being able to unseal trusted keys sealed to a specific TPM PCR value. This patch not only adds file measurements that were not previously measured, but specifies that the file hash value for these files will be 0's. As the IMA measurement list ordering is not consistent from one boot to the next, it is unlikely that anyone is sealing keys based on the IMA measurement list. Remote attestation servers should be able to process these new measurement records, but might complain about these unknown records. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com> Cc: Aditya Kali <adityakali@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-12-01selinux: Add __GFP_NOWARN to allocation at str_read()Tetsuo Handa
commit 4458bba09788e70e8fb39ad003f087cd9dfbd6ac upstream. syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for this case. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0 Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-11-27apparmor: Fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqnameZubin Mithra
[ Upstream commit 250f2da49cb8e582215a65c03f50e8ddf5cd119c ] Syzkaller reported a OOB-read with the stacktrace below. This occurs inside __aa_lookupn_ns as `n` is not initialized. `n` is obtained from aa_splitn_fqname. In cases where `name` is invalid, aa_splitn_fqname returns without initializing `ns_name` and `ns_len`. Fix this by always initializing `ns_name` and `ns_len`. __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 memcmp+0xe3/0x160 lib/string.c:861 strnstr+0x4b/0x70 lib/string.c:934 __aa_lookupn_ns+0xc1/0x570 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:209 aa_lookupn_ns+0x88/0x1e0 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:240 aa_fqlookupn_profile+0x1b9/0x1010 security/apparmor/policy.c:468 fqlookupn_profile+0x80/0xc0 security/apparmor/label.c:1844 aa_label_strn_parse+0xa3a/0x1230 security/apparmor/label.c:1908 aa_label_parse+0x42/0x50 security/apparmor/label.c:1943 aa_change_profile+0x513/0x3510 security/apparmor/domain.c:1362 apparmor_setprocattr+0xaa4/0x1150 security/apparmor/lsm.c:658 security_setprocattr+0x66/0xc0 security/security.c:1298 proc_pid_attr_write+0x301/0x540 fs/proc/base.c:2555 __vfs_write+0x119/0x9f0 fs/read_write.c:485 vfs_write+0x1fc/0x560 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x101/0x260 fs/read_write.c:598 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:610 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:607 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:607 do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Fixes: 3b0aaf5866bf ("apparmor: add lib fn to find the "split" for fqnames") Reported-by: syzbot+61e4b490d9d2da591b50@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2018-11-13ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'Eric Biggers
commit 1e4c8dafbb6bf72fb5eca035b861e39c5896c2b7 upstream. The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold a 'long' value. Increase it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-29Revert "uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct ↵Lubomir Rintel
member name" commit 8c0f9f5b309d627182d5da72a69246f58bde1026 upstream. This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell: ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute': ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'? struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private, ^~~~~~~ dh_private This reverts commit 8a2336e549d385bb0b46880435b411df8d8200e8. Fixes: 8a2336e549d3 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name") Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-26security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()Eric Biggers
[ Upstream commit 87ea58433208d17295e200d56be5e2a4fe4ce7d6 ] lsm_append() should return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed. Fixes: d69dece5f5b6 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-26evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailableMatthew Garrett
[ Upstream commit e2861fa71641c6414831d628a1f4f793b6562580 ] When EVM attempts to appraise a file signed with a crypto algorithm the kernel doesn't have support for, it will cause the kernel to trigger a module load. If the EVM policy includes appraisal of kernel modules this will in turn call back into EVM - since EVM is holding a lock until the crypto initialisation is complete, this triggers a deadlock. Add a CRYPTO_NOLOAD flag and skip module loading if it's set, and add that flag in the EVM case in order to fail gracefully with an error message instead of deadlocking. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-26Smack: Fix handling of IPv4 traffic received by PF_INET6 socketsPiotr Sawicki
[ Upstream commit 129a99890936766f4b69b9da7ed88366313a9210 ] A socket which has sk_family set to PF_INET6 is able to receive not only IPv6 but also IPv4 traffic (IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses). Prior to this patch, the smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6() could have been called for socket buffers containing IPv4 packets, in result such traffic was allowed. Signed-off-by: Piotr Sawicki <p.sawicki2@partner.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-15uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member nameRandy Dunlap
commit 8a2336e549d385bb0b46880435b411df8d8200e8 upstream. Since this header is in "include/uapi/linux/", apparently people want to use it in userspace programs -- even in C++ ones. However, the header uses a C++ reserved keyword ("private"), so change that to "dh_private" instead to allow the header file to be used in C++ userspace. Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191051 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0db6c314-1ef4-9bfa-1baa-7214dd2ee061@infradead.org Fixes: ddbb41148724 ("KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-09-09cap_inode_getsecurity: use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias()Eddie.Horng
commit 355139a8dba446cc11a424cddbf7afebc3041ba1 upstream. The code in cap_inode_getsecurity(), introduced by commit 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"), should use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias() do handle unhashed dentry correctly. This is needed, for example, if execveat() is called with an open but unlinked overlayfs file, because overlayfs unhashes dentry on unlink. This is a regression of real life application, first reported at https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-unionfs/msg05363.html Below reproducer and setup can reproduce the case. const char* exec="echo"; const char *newargv[] = { "echo", "hello", NULL}; const char *newenviron[] = { NULL }; int fd, err; fd = open(exec, O_PATH); unlink(exec); err = syscall(322/*SYS_execveat*/, fd, "", newargv, newenviron, AT_EMPTY_PATH); if(err<0) fprintf(stderr, "execveat: %s\n", strerror(errno)); gcc compile into ~/test/a.out mount -t overlay -orw,lowerdir=/mnt/l,upperdir=/mnt/u,workdir=/mnt/w none /mnt/m cd /mnt/m cp /bin/echo . ~/test/a.out Expected result: hello Actually result: execveat: Invalid argument dmesg: Invalid argument reading file caps for /dev/fd/3 The 2nd reproducer and setup emulates similar case but for regular filesystem: const char* exec="echo"; int fd, err; char buf[256]; fd = open(exec, O_RDONLY); unlink(exec); err = fgetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 256); if(err<0) fprintf(stderr, "fgetxattr: %s\n", strerror(errno)); gcc compile into ~/test_fgetxattr cd /tmp cp /bin/echo . ~/test_fgetxattr Result: fgetxattr: Invalid argument On regular filesystem, for example, ext4 read xattr from disk and return to execveat(), will not trigger this issue, however, the overlay attr handler pass real dentry to vfs_getxattr() will. This reproducer calls fgetxattr() with an unlinked fd, involkes vfs_getxattr() then reproduced the case that d_find_alias() in cap_inode_getsecurity() can't find the unlinked dentry. Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.14 Signed-off-by: Eddie Horng <eddie.horng@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-08-24Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inodeCasey Schaufler
[ Upstream commit 7b4e88434c4e7982fb053c49657e1c8bbb8692d9 ] Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode /proc clean-up in commit 1bbc55131e59bd099fdc568d3aa0b42634dbd188 resulted in smack_task_to_inode() being called before smack_d_instantiate. This resulted in the smk_inode value being ignored, even while present for files in /proc/self. Marking the inode as instant here fixes that. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-08-03ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)Mimi Zohar
[ Upstream commit fd90bc559bfba743ae8de87ff23b92a5e4668062 ] Don't differentiate, for now, between kernel_read_file_id READING_FIRMWARE and READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enumerations. Fixes: a098ecd firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer (since 4.8) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-06-05selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecuritySachin Grover
commit efe3de79e0b52ca281ef6691480c8c68c82a4657 upstream. Call trace: [<ffffff9203a8d7a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428 [<ffffff9203a8dbf8>] show_stack+0x28/0x38 [<ffffff920409bfb8>] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124 [<ffffff9203d187e8>] print_address_description+0x68/0x258 [<ffffff9203d18c00>] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0 [<ffffff9203d1927c>] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffff9203d1776c>] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0 [<ffffff9203d17cdc>] memcpy+0x34/0x68 [<ffffff9203d75348>] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160 [<ffffff9203d75490>] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120 [<ffffff9203d75d68>] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8 [<ffffff9203d76fb4>] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0 [<ffffff9203a83f70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr() on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string, it would result in a panic. To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context instead of the length passed by the userspace process. Signed-off-by: Sachin Grover <sgrover@codeaurora.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-05-30ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithmPetr Vorel
[ Upstream commit ab60368ab6a452466885ef4edf0cefd089465132 ] IMA requires having it's hash algorithm be compiled-in due to it's early use. The default IMA algorithm is protected by Kconfig to be compiled-in. The ima_hash kernel parameter allows to choose the hash algorithm. When the specified algorithm is not available or available as a module, IMA initialization fails, which leads to a kernel panic (mknodat syscall calls ima_post_path_mknod()). Therefore as fallback we force IMA to use the default builtin Kconfig hash algorithm. Fixed crash: $ grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4 .config CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m [ 0.000000] Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.12.14-2.3-default root=UUID=74ae8202-9ca7-4e39-813b-22287ec52f7a video=1024x768-16 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty resume=/dev/disk/by-path/pci-0000:00:07.0-part3 splash=silent showopts ima_hash=md4 ... [ 1.545190] ima: Can not allocate md4 (reason: -2) ... [ 2.610120] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 2.611903] IP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 [ 2.612967] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 2.613080] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 2.613080] Modules linked in: autofs4 [ 2.613080] Supported: Yes [ 2.613080] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.12.14-2.3-default #1 [ 2.613080] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 2.613080] task: ffff88003e2d0040 task.stack: ffffc90000190000 [ 2.613080] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 [ 2.613080] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000193e88 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 2.613080] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880037071728 [ 2.613080] RBP: 0000000000008000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 61c8864680b583eb R12: 00005580ff10086f [ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000008000 [ 2.613080] FS: 00007f5c1da08940(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037002000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 [ 2.613080] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2.613080] Call Trace: [ 2.613080] ? shmem_mknod+0xbf/0xd0 [ 2.613080] ima_post_path_mknod+0x1c/0x40 [ 2.613080] SyS_mknod+0x210/0x220 [ 2.613080] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 [ 2.613080] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c1bfde570 [ 2.613080] RSP: 002b:00007ffde1c90dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000085 [ 2.613080] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5c1bfde570 [ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000008000 RDI: 00005580ff10086f [ 2.613080] RBP: 00007ffde1c91040 R08: 00005580ff10086f R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000104000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005580ffb99660 [ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002 [ 2.613080] Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 44 8d 14 09 41 55 41 54 55 53 44 89 d3 09 cb 48 83 ec 38 48 8b 05 c5 03 29 01 <4c> 8b 20 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d7 01 00 00 4c 89 44 24 08 89 54 24 20 [ 2.613080] RIP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 RSP: ffffc90000193e88 [ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] ---[ end trace 9a9f0a8a73079f6a ]--- [ 2.673052] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009 [ 2.673052] [ 2.675337] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 2.676405] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009 Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-05-30ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interfaceJiandi An
[ Upstream commit fac37c628fd5d68fd7298d9b57ae8601ee1b4723 ] TPM_CRB driver provides TPM CRB 2.0 support. If it is built as a module, the TPM chip is registered after IMA init. tpm_pcr_read() in IMA fails and displays the following message even though eventually there is a TPM chip on the system. ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=-19) Fix IMA Kconfig to select TPM_CRB so TPM_CRB driver is built in the kernel and initializes before IMA. Signed-off-by: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-05-30integrity/security: fix digsig.c build error with header fileRandy Dunlap
[ Upstream commit 120f3b11ef88fc38ce1d0ff9c9a4b37860ad3140 ] security/integrity/digsig.c has build errors on some $ARCH due to a missing header file, so add it. security/integrity/digsig.c:146:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/ Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-29commoncap: Handle memory allocation failure.Tetsuo Handa
commit 1f5781725dcbb026438e77091c91a94f678c3522 upstream. syzbot is reporting NULL pointer dereference at xattr_getsecurity() [1], for cap_inode_getsecurity() is returning sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data) when memory allocation failed. Return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a55ba438506fe68649a5f50d2d82d56b365e0107 Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc8e06 ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities") Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+9369930ca44f29e60e2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+ Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-19apparmor: fix resource audit messages when auditing peerJohn Johansen
commit b5beb07ad32ab533027aa988d96a44965ec116f7 upstream. Resource auditing is using the peer field which is not available when the rlim data struct is used, because it is a different element of the same union. Accessing peer during resource auditing could cause garbage log entries or even oops the kernel. Move the rlim data block into the same struct as the peer field so they can be used together. CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 86b92cb782b3 ("apparmor: move resource checks to using labels") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-04-19apparmor: fix display of .ns_name for containersJohn Johansen
commit 040d9e2bce0a5b321c402b79ee43a8e8d2fd3b06 upstream. The .ns_name should not be virtualized by the current ns view. It needs to report the ns base name as that is being used during startup as part of determining apparmor policy namespace support. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1746463 Fixes: d9f02d9c237aa ("apparmor: fix display of ns name") Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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