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2017-02-14selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattrStephen Smalley
commit 0c461cb727d146c9ef2d3e86214f498b78b7d125 upstream. SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write(): switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error. Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute, requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo without -n to clear, as in the following example: $ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate $ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 $ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate $ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell. There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we should just get rid of it. UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-12-02apparmor: fix change_hat not finding hat after policy replacementJohn Johansen
commit 3d40658c977769ce2138f286cf131537bf68bdfe upstream. After a policy replacement, the task cred may be out of date and need to be updated. However change_hat is using the stale profiles from the out of date cred resulting in either: a stale profile being applied or, incorrect failure when searching for a hat profile as it has been migrated to the new parent profile. Fixes: 01e2b670aa898a39259bc85c78e3d74820f4d3b6 (failure to find hat) Fixes: 898127c34ec03291c86f4ff3856d79e9e18952bc (stale policy being applied) Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1000287 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-11-10KEYS: Fix short sprintf buffer in /proc/keys show functionDavid Howells
commit 03dab869b7b239c4e013ec82aea22e181e441cfc upstream. This fixes CVE-2016-7042. Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption. The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout rendered as weeks: (gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7) $2 = 30500568904943 That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL. Expand the buffer to 16 chars. I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a 64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that isn't checked again on the other side. The panic incurred looks something like: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6 ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679 Call Trace: [<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84 [<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a [<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50 [<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390 [<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70 [<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150 [<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0 [<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130 [<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 [<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-10-16ima: use file_dentry()Miklos Szeredi
commit e71b9dff0634edb127f449e076e883ef24a8c76c upstream. Ima tries to call ->setxattr() on overlayfs dentry after having locked underlying inode, which results in a deadlock. Reported-by: Krisztian Litkey <kli@iki.fi> Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay") Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-08-16apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is readJohn Johansen
commit 0b938a2e2cf0b0a2c8bac9769111545aff0fee97 upstream. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-07-27KEYS: potential uninitialized variableDan Carpenter
commit 38327424b40bcebe2de92d07312c89360ac9229a upstream. If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've added a check to fix that. This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite difficult to achieve. There are three ways it can be done as the user would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link(): (1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory. In practice, this is difficult to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the attempt. (2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up and it being tested for revocation. In practice, this is difficult to time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used from the request-key upcall process. Further, users can only make use of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring has to be the caller's session keyring in practice. (3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring so that it fails with EDQUOT. The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the following: echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system. Note also that the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by changing the amount of quota used. Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen: kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821! ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25 RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8 EFLAGS: 00010092 RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300 RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202 R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 ... Call Trace: kfree+0xde/0x1bc assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36 __key_link_end+0x55/0x63 key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155 keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0 keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12 SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7 do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Fixes: f70e2e06196a ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()') Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasksJann Horn
commit 3dfb7d8cdbc7ea0c2970450e60818bb3eefbad69 upstream. It looks like smack and yama weren't aware that the ptrace mode can have flags ORed into it - PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT until now, but only for /proc/$pid/stat, and with the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS patch, all modes have flags ORed into them. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checksJann Horn
commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream. By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its credentials. To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g. in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set. The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass. While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access check is reused for things in procfs. In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely on ptrace access checks: /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in this scenario: lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar drwx------ root root /root drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file, this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access (through /proc/$pid/cwd). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-17EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisonsRyan Ware
commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream. This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp(). Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq(). Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-01-31KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()Yevgeny Pats
commit 23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2 upstream. This fixes CVE-2016-0728. If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already set as its session, we leak a keyring reference. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stddef.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <keyutils.h> int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) { int i = 0; key_serial_t serial; serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, "leaked-keyring"); if (serial < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial, KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, "leaked-keyring"); if (serial < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } } return 0; } If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in /proc/keys: 3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run, then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed. Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com> Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2015-12-19KEYS: Fix race between read and revokeDavid Howells
This fixes CVE-2015-7550. There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key. This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key and doesn't check for a NULL pointer. Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking semaphore instead of before. I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code. This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version: #include <sys/types.h> #include <keyutils.h> #include <pthread.h> void *thr0(void *arg) { key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg; keyctl_revoke(key); return 0; } void *thr1(void *arg) { key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg; char buffer[16]; keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16); return 0; } int main() { key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING); pthread_t th[5]; pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_join(th[0], 0); pthread_join(th[1], 0); pthread_join(th[2], 0); pthread_join(th[3], 0); return 0; } Build as: cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread Run as: while keyctl-race; do :; done as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be summarised as: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7 [<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0 [<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-11-26Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris
into for-linus2
2015-11-25KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user keyDavid Howells
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key type method must be aware that the error code may be there. The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type: keyctl request2 user user "" @u keyctl add user user "a" @u which manifests itself as: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046 PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046 RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82 RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82 R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700 FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82 ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5 ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136 [<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129 [< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730 [<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908 [< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125 [<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60 [<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185 Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX. A similar bug can be tripped by: keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u keyctl add trusted user "a" @u This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that will crashes. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-11-24selinux: fix bug in conditional rules handlingStephen Smalley
commit fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") introduced a bug into the handling of conditional rules, skipping the processing entirely when the caller does not provide an extended permissions (xperms) structure. Access checks from userspace using /sys/fs/selinux/access do not include such a structure since that interface does not presently expose extended permission information. As a result, conditional rules were being ignored entirely on userspace access requests, producing denials when access was allowed by conditional rules in the policy. Fix the bug by only skipping computation of extended permissions in this situation, not the entire conditional rules processing. Reported-by: Laurent Bigonville <bigon@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: fixed long lines in patch description] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.3 Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-11-10Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netLinus Torvalds
Pull networking fixes from David Miller: 1) Fix null deref in xt_TEE netfilter module, from Eric Dumazet. 2) Several spots need to get to the original listner for SYN-ACK packets, most spots got this ok but some were not. Whilst covering the remaining cases, create a helper to do this. From Eric Dumazet. 3) Missiing check of return value from alloc_netdev() in CAIF SPI code, from Rasmus Villemoes. 4) Don't sleep while != TASK_RUNNING in macvtap, from Vlad Yasevich. 5) Use after free in mvneta driver, from Justin Maggard. 6) Fix race on dst->flags access in dst_release(), from Eric Dumazet. 7) Add missing ZLIB_INFLATE dependency for new qed driver. From Arnd Bergmann. 8) Fix multicast getsockopt deadlock, from WANG Cong. 9) Fix deadlock in btusb, from Kuba Pawlak. 10) Some ipv6_add_dev() failure paths were not cleaning up the SNMP6 counter state. From Sabrina Dubroca. 11) Fix packet_bind() race, which can cause lost notifications, from Francesco Ruggeri. 12) Fix MAC restoration in qlcnic driver during bonding mode changes, from Jarod Wilson. 13) Revert bridging forward delay change which broke libvirt and other userspace things, from Vlad Yasevich. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits) Revert "bridge: Allow forward delay to be cfgd when STP enabled" bpf_trace: Make dependent on PERF_EVENTS qed: select ZLIB_INFLATE net: fix a race in dst_release() net: mvneta: Fix memory use after free. net: Documentation: Fix default value tcp_limit_output_bytes macvtap: Resolve possible __might_sleep warning in macvtap_do_read() mvneta: add FIXED_PHY dependency net: caif: check return value of alloc_netdev net: hisilicon: NET_VENDOR_HISILICON should depend on HAS_DMA drivers: net: xgene: fix RGMII 10/100Mb mode netfilter: nft_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper net_sched: em_meta: use skb_to_full_sk() helper sched: cls_flow: use skb_to_full_sk() helper netfilter: xt_owner: use skb_to_full_sk() helper smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helper net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() bpf: doc: correct arch list for supported eBPF JIT dwc_eth_qos: Delete an unnecessary check before the function call "of_node_put" bonding: fix panic on non-ARPHRD_ETHER enslave failure ...
2015-11-08smack: use skb_to_full_sk() helperEric Dumazet
This module wants to access sk->sk_security, which is not available for request sockets. Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-08net: add skb_to_full_sk() helper and use it in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid()Eric Dumazet
Generalize selinux_skb_sk() added in commit 212cd0895330 ("selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()") so that we can use it other contexts. Use it right away in selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-06mm, page_alloc: rename __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIMMel Gorman
__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and could not sleep. Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic context and callers that are not willing to sleep. The latter should clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake. As clearing __GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the wrong flags. This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing them prevents it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-11-05Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem update from James Morris: "This is mostly maintenance updates across the subsystem, with a notable update for TPM 2.0, and addition of Jarkko Sakkinen as a maintainer of that" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (40 commits) apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependency selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_struct selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be static selinux: use sprintf return value selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools() selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core() selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity() selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sid selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate call selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE default KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data KEYS: Provide a script to extract a module signature KEYS: Provide a script to extract the sys cert list from a vmlinux file keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members used certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list KEYS: use kvfree() in add_key Smack: limited capability for changing process label TPM: remove unnecessary little endian conversion vTPM: support little endian guests char: Drop owner assignment from i2c_driver ...
2015-11-05selinux: fix random read in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()Eric Dumazet
In commit e446f9dfe17b ("net: synack packets can be attached to request sockets"), I missed one remaining case of invalid skb->sk->sk_security access. Dmitry Vyukov got a KASan report pointing to it. Add selinux_skb_sk() helper that is responsible to get back to the listener if skb is attached to a request socket, instead of duplicating the logic. Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-01Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller
2015-10-23Merge tag 'keys-next-20151021' of ↵James Morris
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
2015-10-22Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris
into next
2015-10-22apparmor: clarify CRYPTO dependencyArnd Bergmann
The crypto framework can be built as a loadable module, but the apparmor hash code can only be built-in, which then causes a link error: security/built-in.o: In function `aa_calc_profile_hash': integrity_audit.c:(.text+0x21610): undefined reference to `crypto_shash_update' security/built-in.o: In function `init_profile_hash': integrity_audit.c:(.init.text+0xb4c): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_shash' This changes Apparmor to use 'select CRYPTO' like a lot of other subsystems do. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2015-10-21selinux: Use a kmem_cache for allocation struct file_security_structSangwoo
The size of struct file_security_struct is 16byte at my setup. But, the real allocation size for per each file_security_struct is 64bytes in my setup that kmalloc min size is 64bytes because ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN is 64. This allocation is called every times at file allocation(alloc_file()). So, the total slack memory size(allocated size - request size) is increased exponentially. E.g) Min Kmalloc Size : 64bytes, Unit : bytes Allocated Size | Request Size | Slack Size | Allocation Count --------------------------------------------------------------- 770048 | 192512 | 577536 | 12032 At the result, this change reduce memory usage 42bytes per each file_security_struct Signed-off-by: Sangwoo <sangwoo2.park@lge.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: removed extra subject prefix] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: ioctl_has_perm should be staticGeliang Tang
Fixes the following sparse warning: security/selinux/hooks.c:3242:5: warning: symbol 'ioctl_has_perm' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Acked-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: use sprintf return valueRasmus Villemoes
sprintf returns the number of characters printed (excluding '\0'), so we can use that and avoid duplicating the length computation. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: use kstrdup() in security_get_bools()Rasmus Villemoes
This is much simpler. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: use kmemdup in security_sid_to_context_core()Rasmus Villemoes
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: remove pointless cast in selinux_inode_setsecurity()Rasmus Villemoes
security_context_to_sid() expects a const char* argument, so there's no point in casting away the const qualifier of value. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: introduce security_context_str_to_sidRasmus Villemoes
There seems to be a little confusion as to whether the scontext_len parameter of security_context_to_sid() includes the nul-byte or not. Reading security_context_to_sid_core(), it seems that the expectation is that it does not (both the string copying and the test for scontext_len being zero hint at that). Introduce the helper security_context_str_to_sid() to do the strlen() call and fix all callers. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: do not check open perm on ftruncate callJeff Vander Stoep
Use the ATTR_FILE attribute to distinguish between truncate() and ftruncate() system calls. The two other cases where do_truncate is called with a filp (and therefore ATTR_FILE is set) are for coredump files and for open(O_TRUNC). In both of those cases the open permission has already been checked during file open and therefore does not need to be repeated. Commit 95dbf739313f ("SELinux: check OPEN on truncate calls") fixed a major issue where domains were allowed to truncate files without the open permission. However, it introduced a new bug where a domain with the write permission can no longer ftruncate files without the open permission, even when they receive an already open file. Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21selinux: change CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE defaultPaul Moore
Change the SELinux checkreqprot default value to 0 so that SELinux performs access control checking on the actual memory protections used by the kernel and not those requested by the application. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-10-21KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
2015-10-21keys: Be more consistent in selection of union members usedInsu Yun
key->description and key->index_key.description are same because they are unioned. But, for readability, using same name for duplication and validation seems better. Signed-off-by: Insu Yun <wuninsu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-21KEYS: use kvfree() in add_keyGeliang Tang
There is no need to make a flag to tell that this memory is allocated by kmalloc or vmalloc. Just use kvfree to free the memory. Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-21Merge branch 'smack-for-4.4' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next ↵James Morris
into next
2015-10-20Merge branch 'next' of ↵James Morris
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
2015-10-19Smack: limited capability for changing process labelZbigniew Jasinski
This feature introduces new kernel interface: - <smack_fs>/relabel-self - for setting transition labels list This list is used to control smack label transition mechanism. List is set by, and per process. Process can transit to new label only if label is on the list. Only process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability can add labels to this list. With this list, process can change it's label without CAP_MAC_ADMIN but only once. After label changing, list is unset. Changes in v2: * use list_for_each_entry instead of _rcu during label write * added missing description in security/Smack.txt Changes in v3: * squashed into one commit Changes in v4: * switch from global list to per-task list * since the per-task list is accessed only by the task itself there is no need to use synchronization mechanisms on it Changes in v5: * change smackfs interface of relabel-self to the one used for onlycap multiple labels are accepted, separated by space, which replace the previous list upon write Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski <z.jasinski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-19KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyringDavid Howells
If request_key() is used to find a keyring, only do the search part - don't do the construction part if the keyring was not found by the search. We don't really want keyrings in the negative instantiated state since the rejected/negative instantiation error value in the payload is unioned with keyring metadata. Now the kernel gives an error: request_key("keyring", "#selinux,bdekeyring", "keyring", KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted) Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-19keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chipsJarkko Sakkinen
Call tpm_seal_trusted() and tpm_unseal_trusted() for TPM 2.0 chips. We require explicit 'keyhandle=' option because there's no a fixed storage root key inside TPM2 chips. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (on TPM 1.2) Tested-by: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Tested-by: Kevin Strasser <kevin.strasser@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-10-19keys, trusted: move struct trusted_key_options to trusted-type.hJarkko Sakkinen
Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
2015-10-17Merge branch 'master' of ↵Pablo Neira Ayuso
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next This merge resolves conflicts with 75aec9df3a78 ("bridge: Remove br_nf_push_frag_xmit_sk") as part of Eric Biederman's effort to improve netns support in the network stack that reached upstream via David's net-next tree. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c
2015-10-16netfilter: remove hook owner refcountingFlorian Westphal
since commit 8405a8fff3f8 ("netfilter: nf_qeueue: Drop queue entries on nf_unregister_hook") all pending queued entries are discarded. So we can simply remove all of the owner handling -- when module is removed it also needs to unregister all its hooks. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2015-10-15KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyringDavid Howells
The following sequence of commands: i=`keyctl add user a a @s` keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t keyctl unlink $i @s tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already exist by that name within the user's keyring set. However, if the upcall fails, the code sets keyring->type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some other error code. When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty() on keyring->type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error. Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names list - which oopses like this: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 ... Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8126e051>] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88 RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40 RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000 ... CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff8126c756>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f [<ffffffff8126ca71>] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351 [<ffffffff8105ec9b>] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547 [<ffffffff8105fd17>] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361 [<ffffffff8105faa9>] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8 [<ffffffff810648ad>] kthread+0xf3/0xfb [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 [<ffffffff815f2ccf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [<ffffffff810647ba>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2 Note the value in RAX. This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY. The solution is to only call ->destroy() if the key was successfully instantiated. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
2015-10-11net: synack packets can be attached to request socketsEric Dumazet
selinux needs few changes to accommodate fact that SYNACK messages can be attached to a request socket, lacking sk_security pointer (Only syncookies are still attached to a TCP_LISTEN socket) Adds a new sk_listener() helper, and use it in selinux and sch_fq Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported by: kernel test robot <ying.huang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-09Smack: pipefs fix in smack_d_instantiateRoman Kubiak
This fix writes the task label when smack_d_instantiate is called, before the label of the superblock was written on the pipe's inode. Signed-off-by: Roman Kubiak <r.kubiak@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09Smack: Minor initialisation improvementJosé Bollo
This change has two goals: - delay the setting of 'smack_enabled' until it will be really effective - ensure that smackfs is valid only if 'smack_enabled' is set (it is already the case in smack_netfilter.c) Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09smack: smk_ipv6_port_list should be staticGeliang Tang
Fixes the following sparse warning: security/smack/smack_lsm.c:55:1: warning: symbol 'smk_ipv6_port_list' was not declared. Should it be static? Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2015-10-09Smack: fix a NULL dereference in wrong smack_import_entry() usageLukasz Pawelczyk
'commit e774ad683f42 ("smack: pass error code through pointers")' made this function return proper error codes instead of NULL. Reflect that. This is a fix for a NULL dereference introduced in 'commit 21abb1ec414c ("Smack: IPv6 host labeling")' echo "$SOME_IPV6_ADDR \"test" > /smack/ipv6host (this should return EINVAL, it doesn't) cat /smack/ipv6host (derefences 0x000a) Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>