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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
"cgroup file type addition / removal is updated so that file types are
added and removed instead of individual files so that dynamic file
type addition / removal can be implemented by cgroup and used by
controllers. blkio controller changes which will come through block
tree are dependent on this. Other changes include res_counter cleanup
and disallowing kthread / PF_THREAD_BOUND threads to be attached to
non-root cgroups.
There's a reported bug with the file type addition / removal handling
which can lead to oops on cgroup umount. The issue is being looked
into. It shouldn't cause problems for most setups and isn't a
security concern."
Fix up trivial conflict in Documentation/feature-removal-schedule.txt
* 'for-3.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (21 commits)
res_counter: Account max_usage when calling res_counter_charge_nofail()
res_counter: Merge res_counter_charge and res_counter_charge_nofail
cgroups: disallow attaching kthreadd or PF_THREAD_BOUND threads
cgroup: remove cgroup_subsys->populate()
cgroup: get rid of populate for memcg
cgroup: pass struct mem_cgroup instead of struct cgroup to socket memcg
cgroup: make css->refcnt clearing on cgroup removal optional
cgroup: use negative bias on css->refcnt to block css_tryget()
cgroup: implement cgroup_rm_cftypes()
cgroup: introduce struct cfent
cgroup: relocate __d_cgrp() and __d_cft()
cgroup: remove cgroup_add_file[s]()
cgroup: convert memcg controller to the new cftype interface
memcg: always create memsw files if CONFIG_CGROUP_MEM_RES_CTLR_SWAP
cgroup: convert all non-memcg controllers to the new cftype interface
cgroup: relocate cftype and cgroup_subsys definitions in controllers
cgroup: merge cft_release_agent cftype array into the base files array
cgroup: implement cgroup_add_cftypes() and friends
cgroup: build list of all cgroups under a given cgroupfs_root
cgroup: move cgroup_clear_directory() call out of cgroup_populate_dir()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"New notable features:
- The seccomp work from Will Drewry
- PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS from Andy Lutomirski
- Longer security labels for Smack from Casey Schaufler
- Additional ptrace restriction modes for Yama by Kees Cook"
Fix up trivial context conflicts in arch/x86/Kconfig and include/linux/filter.h
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
apparmor: fix long path failure due to disconnected path
apparmor: fix profile lookup for unconfined
ima: fix filename hint to reflect script interpreter name
KEYS: Don't check for NULL key pointer in key_validate()
Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4
gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?
Smack: recursive tramsmute
Yama: replace capable() with ns_capable()
TOMOYO: Accept manager programs which do not start with / .
KEYS: Add invalidation support
KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings
KEYS: Permit in-place link replacement in keyring list
KEYS: Perform RCU synchronisation on keys prior to key destruction
KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration
KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile
KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig
KEYS: Use the compat keyctl() syscall wrapper on Sparc64 for Sparc32 compat
Yama: remove an unused variable
samples/seccomp: fix dependencies on arch macros
Yama: add additional ptrace scopes
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Per pull request, for 3.5.
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BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/955892
All failures from __d_path where being treated as disconnected paths,
however __d_path can also fail when the generated pathname is too long.
The initial ENAMETOOLONG error was being lost, and ENAMETOOLONG was only
returned if the subsequent dentry_path call resulted in that error. Other
wise if the path was split across a mount point such that the dentry_path
fit within the buffer when the __d_path did not the failure was treated
as a disconnected path.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/978038
also affects apparmor portion of
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/987371
The unconfined profile is not stored in the regular profile list, but
change_profile and exec transitions may want access to it when setting
up specialized transitions like switch to the unconfined profile of a
new policy namespace.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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When IMA was first upstreamed, the bprm filename and interp were
always the same. Currently, the bprm->filename and bprm->interp
are the same, except for when only bprm->interp contains the
interpreter name. So instead of using the bprm->filename as
the IMA filename hint in the measurement list, we could replace
it with bprm->interp, but this feels too fragil.
The following patch is not much better, but at least there is some
indication that sometimes we're passing the filename and other times
the interpreter name.
Reported-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Pull request from Casey.
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Don't bother checking for NULL key pointer in key_validate() as all of the
places that call it will crash anyway if the relevant key pointer is NULL by
the time they call key_validate(). Therefore, the checking must be done prior
to calling here.
Whilst we're at it, simplify the key_validate() function a bit and mark its
argument const.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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V4 updated to current linux-security#next
Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Modern application runtime environments like to use
naming schemes that are structured and generated without
human intervention. Even though the Smack limit of 23
characters for a label name is perfectly rational for
human use there have been complaints that the limit is
a problem in environments where names are composed from
a set or sources, including vendor, author, distribution
channel and application name. Names like
softwarehouse-pgwodehouse-coolappstore-mellowmuskrats
are becoming harder to avoid. This patch introduces long
label support in Smack. Labels are now limited to 255
characters instead of the old 23.
The primary reason for limiting the labels to 23 characters
was so they could be directly contained in CIPSO category sets.
This is still done were possible, but for labels that are too
large a mapping is required. This is perfectly safe for communication
that stays "on the box" and doesn't require much coordination
between boxes beyond what would have been required to keep label
names consistent.
The bulk of this patch is in smackfs, adding and updating
administrative interfaces. Because existing APIs can't be
changed new ones that do much the same things as old ones
have been introduced.
The Smack specific CIPSO data representation has been removed
and replaced with the data format used by netlabel. The CIPSO
header is now computed when a label is imported rather than
on use. This results in improved IP performance. The smack
label is now allocated separately from the containing structure,
allowing for larger strings.
Four new /smack interfaces have been introduced as four
of the old interfaces strictly required labels be specified
in fixed length arrays.
The access interface is supplemented with the check interface:
access "Subject Object rwxat"
access2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The load interface is supplemented with the rules interface:
load "Subject Object rwxat"
load2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The load-self interface is supplemented with the self-rules interface:
load-self "Subject Object rwxat"
load-self2 "Subject Object rwaxt"
The cipso interface is supplemented with the wire interface:
cipso "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..."
cipso2 "Subject lvl cnt c1 c2 ..."
The old interfaces are maintained for compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Dave Chinner wrote:
> Yes, because you have no idea what the calling context is except
> for the fact that is from somewhere inside filesystem code and the
> filesystem could be holding locks. Therefore, GFP_NOFS is really the
> only really safe way to allocate memory here.
I see. Thank you.
I'm not sure, but can call trace happen where somewhere inside network
filesystem or stackable filesystem code with locks held invokes operations that
involves GFP_KENREL memory allocation outside that filesystem?
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[PATCH] SMACK: Fix incorrect GFP_KERNEL usage.
new_inode_smack() which can be called from smack_inode_alloc_security() needs
to use GFP_NOFS like SELinux's inode_alloc_security() does, for
security_inode_alloc() is called from inode_init_always() and
inode_init_always() is called from xfs_inode_alloc() which is using GFP_NOFS.
smack_inode_init_security() needs to use GFP_NOFS like
selinux_inode_init_security() does, for initxattrs() callback function (e.g.
btrfs_initxattrs()) which is called from security_inode_init_security() is
using GFP_NOFS.
smack_audit_rule_match() needs to use GFP_ATOMIC, for
security_audit_rule_match() can be called from audit_filter_user_rules() and
audit_filter_user_rules() is called from audit_filter_user() with RCU read lock
held.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
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The transmuting directory feature of Smack requires that
the transmuting attribute be explicitly set in all cases.
It seems the users of this facility would expect that the
transmuting attribute be inherited by subdirectories that
are created in a transmuting directory. This does not seem
to add any additional complexity to the understanding of
how the system works.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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When checking capabilities, the question we want to be asking is "does
current() have the capability in the child's namespace?"
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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The pathname of /usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy seen from Ubuntu 12.04 Live CD is
squashfs:/usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy rather than /usr/sbin/tomoyo-editpolicy .
Therefore, we need to accept manager programs which do not start with / .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Add support for invalidating a key - which renders it immediately invisible to
further searches and causes the garbage collector to immediately wake up,
remove it from keyrings and then destroy it when it's no longer referenced.
It's better not to do this with keyctl_revoke() as that marks the key to start
returning -EKEYREVOKED to searches when what is actually desired is to have the
key refetched.
To invalidate a key the caller must be granted SEARCH permission by the key.
This may be too strict. It may be better to also permit invalidation if the
caller has any of READ, WRITE or SETATTR permission.
The primary use for this is to evict keys that are cached in special keyrings,
such as the DNS resolver or an ID mapper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Do an LRU discard in keyrings that are full rather than returning ENFILE. To
perform this, a time_t is added to the key struct and updated by the creation
of a link to a key and by a key being found as the result of a search. At the
completion of a successful search, the keyrings in the path between the root of
the search and the first found link to it also have their last-used times
updated.
Note that discarding a link to a key from a keyring does not necessarily
destroy the key as there may be references held by other places.
An alternate discard method that might suffice is to perform FIFO discard from
the keyring, using the spare 2-byte hole in the keylist header as the index of
the next link to be discarded.
This is useful when using a keyring as a cache for DNS results or foreign
filesystem IDs.
This can be tested by the following. As root do:
echo 1000 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
kr=`keyctl newring foo @s`
for ((i=0; i<2000; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a $kr; done
Without this patch ENFILE should be reported when the keyring fills up. With
this patch, the keyring discards keys in an LRU fashion. Note that the stored
LRU time has a granularity of 1s.
After doing this, /proc/key-users can be observed and should show that most of
the 2000 keys have been discarded:
[root@andromeda ~]# cat /proc/key-users
0: 517 516/516 513/1000 5249/20000
The "513/1000" here is the number of quota-accounted keys present for this user
out of the maximum permitted.
In /proc/keys, the keyring shows the number of keys it has and the number of
slots it has allocated:
[root@andromeda ~]# grep foo /proc/keys
200c64c4 I--Q-- 1 perm 3b3f0000 0 0 keyring foo: 509/509
The maximum is (PAGE_SIZE - header) / key pointer size. That's typically 509
on a 64-bit system and 1020 on a 32-bit system.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Make use of the previous patch that makes the garbage collector perform RCU
synchronisation before destroying defunct keys. Key pointers can now be
replaced in-place without creating a new keyring payload and replacing the
whole thing as the discarded keys will not be destroyed until all currently
held RCU read locks are released.
If the keyring payload space needs to be expanded or contracted, then a
replacement will still need allocating, and the original will still have to be
freed by RCU.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Make the keys garbage collector invoke synchronize_rcu() prior to destroying
keys with a zero usage count. This means that a key can be examined under the
RCU read lock in the safe knowledge that it won't get deallocated until after
the lock is released - even if its usage count becomes zero whilst we're
looking at it.
This is useful in keyring search vs key link. Consider a keyring containing a
link to a key. That link can be replaced in-place in the keyring without
requiring an RCU copy-and-replace on the keyring contents without breaking a
search underway on that keyring when the displaced key is released, provided
the key is actually destroyed only after the RCU read lock held by the search
algorithm is released.
This permits __key_link() to replace a key without having to reallocate the key
payload. A key gets replaced if a new key being linked into a keyring has the
same type and description.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
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Announce the (un)registration of a key type in the core key code rather than
in the callers.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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Reorganise the keys directory Makefile to put all the core bits together and
the type-specific bits after.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot
of key-related options.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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This patch removes ip_queue support which was marked as obsolete
years ago. The nfnetlink_queue modules provides more advanced
user-space packet queueing mechanism.
This patch also removes capability code included in SELinux that
refers to ip_queue. Otherwise, we break compilation.
Several warning has been sent regarding this to the mailing list
in the past month without anyone rising the hand to stop this
with some strong argument.
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Linux 3.4-rc5
Merge to pull in prerequisite change for Smack:
86812bb0de1a3758dc6c7aa01a763158a7c0638a
Requested by Casey.
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- Use uid_eq when comparing kuids
Use gid_eq when comparing kgids
- Use make_kuid(user_ns, 0) to talk about the user_namespace root uid
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users
of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make
in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and
CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile
and behave correctly.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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As a first step to converting struct cred to be all kuid_t and kgid_t
values convert the group values stored in group_info to always be
kgid_t values. Unless user namespaces are used this change should
have no effect.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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- Transform userns->creator from a user_struct reference to a simple
kuid_t, kgid_t pair.
In cap_capable this allows the check to see if we are the creator of
a namespace to become the classic suser style euid permission check.
This allows us to remove the need for a struct cred in the mapping
functions and still be able to dispaly the user namespace creators
uid and gid as 0.
- Remove the now unnecessary delayed_work in free_user_ns.
All that is left for free_user_ns to do is to call kmem_cache_free
and put_user_ns. Those functions can be called in any context
so call them directly from free_user_ns removing the need for delayed work.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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GCC complains that we don't use "one" any more after 389da25f93 "Yama:
add additional ptrace scopes".
security/yama/yama_lsm.c:322:12: warning: ?one? defined but not used
[-Wunused-variable]
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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This expands the available Yama ptrace restrictions to include two more
modes. Mode 2 requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE for PTRACE_ATTACH, and mode 3
completely disables PTRACE_ATTACH (and locks the sysctl).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Add missing "personality.h"
security/commoncap.c: In function 'cap_bprm_set_creds':
security/commoncap.c:510: error: 'PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/commoncap.c:510: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
security/commoncap.c:510: error: for each function it appears in.)
Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi <jhbird.choi@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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A kernel with Smack enabled will fail if tmpfs has xattr support.
Move the initialization of predefined Smack label
list entries to the LSM initialization from the
smackfs setup. This became an issue when tmpfs
acquired xattr support, but was never correct.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Add support for AppArmor to explicitly fail requested domain transitions
if NO_NEW_PRIVS is set and the task is not unconfined.
Transitions from unconfined are still allowed because this always results
in a reduction of privileges.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
v18: new acked-by, new description
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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This fixes builds where CONFIG_AUDIT is not defined and
CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK=y.
This got introduced by the stack-usage reducation commit 48c62af68a40
("LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union").
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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We don't need this variable and it just eats stack space. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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avc_add_callback now just used for registering reset functions
in initcalls, and the callback functions just did reset operations.
So, reducing the arguments to only one event is enough now.
Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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avc_add_callback now only called from initcalls, so replace the
weak GFP_ATOMIC to GFP_KERNEL, and mark this function __init
to make a warning when not been called from initcalls.
Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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We no longer need the distinction. We only need data after we decide to do an
audit. So turn the "late" audit data into just "data" and remove what we
currently have as "data".
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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It's just takin' up space.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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It isn't needed. If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug. So why waste the cycles?
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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We did a lot of work to shrink the common_audit_data. Add a BUILD_BUG_ON
so future programers (let's be honest, probably me) won't do something
foolish like make it large again!
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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There are no legitimate users. Always use current and get back some stack
space for the common_audit_data.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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apparmor is the only LSM that uses the common_audit_data tsk field.
Instead of making all LSMs pay for the stack space move the aa usage into
the apparmor_audit_data.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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Just open code it so grep on the source code works better.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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selinux_inode_has_perm is a hot path. Instead of declaring the
common_audit_data on the stack move it to a noinline function only used in
the rare case we need to send an audit message.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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Both callers could better be using file_has_perm() to get better audit
results.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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We pay a rather large overhead initializing the common_audit_data.
Since we only need this information if we actually emit an audit
message there is little need to set it up in the hot path. This patch
splits the functionality of avc_has_perm() into avc_has_perm_noaudit(),
avc_audit_required() and slow_avc_audit(). But we take care of setting
up to audit between required() and the actual audit call. Thus saving
measurable time in a hot path.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the
number of entries in these arrays to 0. If we error out and then get back
into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief
that they are non-zero length.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
cc: stable@kernel.org
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I'm not really sure what the idea behind the sel_div function is, but it's
useless. Since a and b are both unsigned, it's impossible for a % b < 0.
That means that part of the function never does anything. Thus it's just a
normal /. Just do that instead. I don't even understand what that operation
was supposed to mean in the signed case however....
If it was signed:
sel_div(-2, 4) == ((-2 / 4) - ((-2 % 4) < 0))
((0) - ((-2) < 0))
((0) - (1))
(-1)
What actually happens:
sel_div(-2, 4) == ((18446744073709551614 / 4) - ((18446744073709551614 % 4) < 0))
((4611686018427387903) - ((2 < 0))
(4611686018427387903 - 0)
((unsigned int)4611686018427387903)
(4294967295)
Neither makes a whole ton of sense to me. So I'm getting rid of the
function entirely.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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It's possible that the caller passed a NULL for scontext. However if this
is a defered mapping we might still attempt to call *scontext=kstrdup().
This is bad. Instead just return the len.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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