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commit 900498a34a3ac9c611e9b425094c8106bdd7dc1c upstream.
PCM OSS read/write loops keep taking the mutex lock for the whole
read/write, and this might take very long when the exceptionally high
amount of data is given. Also, since it invokes with mutex_lock(),
the concurrent read/write becomes unbreakable.
This patch tries to address these issues by replacing mutex_lock()
with mutex_lock_interruptible(), and also splits / re-takes the lock
at each read/write period chunk, so that it can switch the context
more finely if requested.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 29159a4ed7044c52e3e2cf1a9fb55cec4745c60b upstream.
The loops for read and write in PCM OSS emulation have no proper check
of pending signals, and they keep processing even after user tries to
break. This results in a very long delay, often seen as RCU stall
when a huge unprocessed bytes remain queued. The bug could be easily
triggered by syzkaller.
As a simple workaround, this patch adds the proper check of pending
signals and aborts the loop appropriately.
Reported-by: syzbot+993cb4cfcbbff3947c21@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6708913750344a900f2e73bfe4a4d6dbbce4fe8d upstream.
In the OSS emulation plugin builder where the frame size is parsed in
the plugin chain, some places miss the possible errors returned from
the plugin src_ or dst_frames callback.
This patch papers over such places.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fe08f34d066f4404934a509b6806db1a4f700c86 upstream.
syzkaller triggered kernel warnings through PCM OSS emulation at
closing a stream:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3502 at sound/core/pcm_lib.c:1635
snd_pcm_hw_param_first+0x289/0x690 sound/core/pcm_lib.c:1635
Call Trace:
....
snd_pcm_hw_param_near.constprop.27+0x78d/0x9a0 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:457
snd_pcm_oss_change_params+0x17d3/0x3720 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:969
snd_pcm_oss_make_ready+0xaa/0x130 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1128
snd_pcm_oss_sync+0x257/0x830 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1638
snd_pcm_oss_release+0x20b/0x280 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:2431
__fput+0x327/0x7e0 fs/file_table.c:210
....
This happens while it tries to open and set up the aloop device
concurrently. The warning above (invoked from snd_BUG_ON() macro) is
to detect the unexpected logical error where snd_pcm_hw_refine() call
shouldn't fail. The theory is true for the case where the hw_params
config rules are static. But for an aloop device, the hw_params rule
condition does vary dynamically depending on the connected target;
when another device is opened and changes the parameters, the device
connected in another side is also affected, and it caused the error
from snd_pcm_hw_refine().
That is, the simplest "solution" for this is to remove the incorrect
assumption of static rules, and treat such an error as a normal error
path. As there are a couple of other places using snd_BUG_ON()
incorrectly, this patch removes these spurious snd_BUG_ON() calls.
Reported-by: syzbot+6f11c7e2a1b91d466432@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c1cfd9025cc394fd137a01159d74335c5ac978ce upstream.
The rawmidi also allows to obtaining the information via ioctl of ctl
API. It means that user can issue an ioctl to the rawmidi device even
when it's being removed as long as the control device is present.
Although the code has some protection via the global register_mutex,
its range is limited to the search of the corresponding rawmidi
object, and the mutex is already unlocked at accessing the rawmidi
object. This may lead to a use-after-free.
For avoiding it, this patch widens the application of register_mutex
to the whole snd_rawmidi_info_select() function. We have another
mutex per rawmidi object, but this operation isn't very hot path, so
it shouldn't matter from the performance POV.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 43a3542870328601be02fcc9d27b09db467336ef upstream.
The use of snd_BUG_ON() in ALSA sequencer timer may lead to a spurious
WARN_ON() when a slave timer is deployed as its backend and a
corresponding master timer stops meanwhile. The symptom was triggered
by syzkaller spontaneously.
Since the NULL timer is valid there, rip off snd_BUG_ON().
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 362bca57f5d78220f8b5907b875961af9436e229 upstream.
When the device descriptor is closed, the `substream->runtime` pointer
is freed. But another thread may be in the ioctl handler, case
SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_PCM_INFO. This case calls snd_pcm_info_user() which
calls snd_pcm_info() which accesses the now freed `substream->runtime`.
Note: this fixes CVE-2017-0861
Signed-off-by: Robb Glasser <rglasser@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3d4e8303f2c747c8540a0a0126d0151514f6468b upstream.
Some timer compat ioctls have NULL checks of timer instance with
snd_BUG_ON() that bring up WARN_ON() when the debug option is set.
Actually the condition can be met in the normal situation and it's
confusing and bad to spew kernel warnings with stack trace there.
Let's remove snd_BUG_ON() invocation and replace with the simple
checks. Also, correct the error code to EBADFD to follow the native
ioctl error handling.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 20e3f985bb875fea4f86b04eba4b6cc29bfd6b71 upstream.
commit 3179f6200188 ("ALSA: core: add .get_time_info") had a side effect
of changing the behaviour of the PCM runtime tstamp. Prior to this
change tstamp was not updated by snd_pcm_update_hw_ptr0() unless the
hw_ptr had moved, after this change tstamp was always updated.
For an application using alsa-lib, doing snd_pcm_readi() followed by
snd_pcm_status() to estimate the age of the read samples by subtracting
status->avail * [sample rate] from status->tstamp this change degraded
the accuracy of the estimate on devices where the pcm hw does not
provide a granular hw_ptr, e.g., devices using
soc-generic-dmaengine-pcm.c and a dma-engine with residue_granularity
DMA_RESIDUE_GRANULARITY_DESCRIPTOR. The accuracy of the estimate
depended on the latency between the PCM hw completing a period and the
driver called snd_pcm_period_elapsed() to notify ALSA core, typically
determined by interrupt handling latency. After the change the accuracy
of the estimate depended on the latency between the PCM hw completing a
period and the application calling snd_pcm_status(), determined by the
scheduling of the application process. The maximum error of the
estimate is one period length in both cases, but the error average and
variance is smaller when it depends on interrupt latency.
Instead of always updating tstamp, update it only if audio_tstamp
changed.
Fixes: 3179f6200188 ("ALSA: core: add .get_time_info")
Suggested-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Henrik Eriksson <henrik.eriksson@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fc27fe7e8deef2f37cba3f2be2d52b6ca5eb9d57 upstream.
ALSA sequencer core has a mechanism to load the enumerated devices
automatically, and it's performed in an off-load work. This seems
causing some race when a sequencer is removed while the pending
autoload work is running. As syzkaller spotted, it may lead to some
use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70
sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88006c611d90 by task kworker/2:1/567
CPU: 2 PID: 567 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events autoload_drivers
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x192/0x22c lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x230/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
snd_seq_dev_release+0x4f/0x70 sound/core/seq_device.c:192
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:648 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:677 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
kobject_put+0x145/0x240 lib/kobject.c:694
put_device+0x25/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:1799
klist_devices_put+0x36/0x40 drivers/base/bus.c:827
klist_next+0x264/0x4a0 lib/klist.c:403
next_device drivers/base/bus.c:270 [inline]
bus_for_each_dev+0x17e/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:312
autoload_drivers+0x3b/0x50 sound/core/seq_device.c:117
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2097
worker_thread+0x1e4/0x1350 kernel/workqueue.c:2231
kthread+0x324/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:425
The fix is simply to assure canceling the autoload work at removing
the device.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 132d358b183ac6ad8b3fea32ad5e0663456d18d1 upstream.
The SYSEX event delivery in OSS sequencer emulation assumed that the
event is encoded in the variable-length data with the straight
buffering. This was the normal behavior in the past, but during the
development, the chained buffers were introduced for carrying more
data, while the OSS code was left intact. As a result, when a SYSEX
event with the chained buffer data is passed to OSS sequencer port,
it may end up with the wrong memory access, as if it were having a too
large buffer.
This patch addresses the bug, by applying the buffer data expansion by
the generic snd_seq_dump_var_event() helper function.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1f20f9ff57ca23b9f5502fca85ce3977e8496cb1 upstream.
syzkaller reported the lockdep splat due to the possible deadlock of
grp->list_mutex of each sequencer client object. Actually this is
rather a false-positive report due to the missing nested lock
annotations. The sequencer client may deliver the event directly to
another client which takes another own lock.
For addressing this issue, this patch replaces the simple down_read()
with down_read_nested(). As a lock subclass, the already existing
"hop" can be re-used, which indicates the depth of the call.
Reference: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/089e082686ac9b482e055c832617@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot <bot+7feb8de6b4d6bf810cf098bef942cc387e79d0ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 79fb0518fec8c8b4ea7f1729f54f293724b3dbb0 upstream.
The races among ioctl and other operations were protected by the
commit af368027a49a ("ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls") and
later fixes, but one code path was forgotten in the scenario: the
32bit compat ioctl. As syzkaller recently spotted, a very similar
use-after-free may happen with the combination of compat ioctls.
The fix is simply to apply the same ioctl_lock to the compat_ioctl
callback, too.
Fixes: af368027a49a ("ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls")
Reference: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/089e082686ac9b482e055c832617@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot <bot+e5f3c9783e7048a74233054febbe9f1bdf54b6da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8009d506a1dd00cf436b0c4cca0dcec130580a21 upstream.
The 'use' locking macros are no-ops if neither SMP or SND_DEBUG is
enabled. This might once have been OK in non-preemptible
configurations, but even in that case snd_seq_read() may sleep while
relying on a 'use' lock. So always use the proper implementations.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5803b023881857db32ffefa0d269c90280a67ee0 upstream.
The event handler in the virmidi sequencer code takes a read-lock for
the linked list traverse, while it's calling snd_seq_dump_var_event()
in the loop. The latter function may expand the user-space data
depending on the event type. It eventually invokes copy_from_user(),
which might be a potential dead-lock.
The sequencer core guarantees that the user-space data is passed only
with atomic=0 argument, but snd_virmidi_dev_receive_event() ignores it
and always takes read-lock(). For avoiding the problem above, this
patch introduces rwsem for non-atomic case, while keeping rwlock for
atomic case.
Also while we're at it: the superfluous irq flags is dropped in
snd_virmidi_input_open().
Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 71105998845fb012937332fe2e806d443c09e026 upstream.
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a931b9ce93841a5b66b709ba5a244276e345e63b upstream.
Commit 04c5d5a430fc ("ALSA: compress: Embed struct device") removed
the statement that used 'str' but didn't remove the variable itself.
So remove it.
[Adding stable to Cc since pr_debug() may refer to the uninitialized
buffer -- tiwai]
Fixes: 04c5d5a430fc ("ALSA: compress: Embed struct device")
Signed-off-by: Guneshwor Singh <guneshwor.o.singh@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 88c54cdf61f508ebcf8da2d819f5dfc03e954d1d upstream.
When user tries to replace the user-defined control TLV, the kernel
checks the change of its content via memcmp(). The problem is that
the kernel passes the return value from memcmp() as is. memcmp()
gives a non-zero negative value depending on the comparison result,
and this shall be recognized as an error code.
The patch covers that corner-case, return 1 properly for the changed
TLV.
Fixes: 8aa9b586e420 ("[ALSA] Control API - more robust TLV implementation")
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7e1d90f60a0d501c8503e636942ca704a454d910 upstream.
commit 4842e98f26dd80be3623c4714a244ba52ea096a8 ("ALSA: seq: Fix race at
creating a queue") attempted to fix a race reported by syzkaller. That
fix has been described as follows:
"
When a sequencer queue is created in snd_seq_queue_alloc(),it adds the
new queue element to the public list before referencing it. Thus the
queue might be deleted before the call of snd_seq_queue_use(), and it
results in the use-after-free error, as spotted by syzkaller.
The fix is to reference the queue object at the right time.
"
Even with that fix in place, syzkaller reported a use-after-free error.
It specifically pointed to the last instruction "return q->queue" in
snd_seq_queue_alloc(). The pointer q is being used after kfree() has
been called on it.
It turned out that there is still a small window where a race can
happen. The window opens at
snd_seq_ioctl_create_queue()->snd_seq_queue_alloc()->queue_list_add()
and closes at
snd_seq_ioctl_create_queue()->queueptr()->snd_use_lock_use(). Between
these two calls, a different thread could delete the queue and possibly
re-create a different queue in the same location in queue_list.
This change prevents this situation by calling snd_use_lock_use() from
snd_seq_queue_alloc() prior to calling queue_list_add(). It is then the
caller's responsibility to call snd_use_lock_free(&q->use_lock).
Fixes: 4842e98f26dd ("ALSA: seq: Fix race at creating a queue")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba3021b2c79b2fa9114f92790a99deb27a65b728 upstream.
snd_timer_user_tselect() reallocates the queue buffer dynamically, but
it forgot to reset its indices. Since the read may happen
concurrently with ioctl and snd_timer_user_tselect() allocates the
buffer via kmalloc(), this may lead to the leak of uninitialized
kernel-space data, as spotted via KMSAN:
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory in snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10
CPU: 0 PID: 1037 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2739
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x143/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1007
kmsan_check_memory+0xc2/0x140 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1086
copy_to_user ./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:725
snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10 sound/core/timer.c:2004
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:716
__do_readv_writev+0x94c/0x1380 fs/read_write.c:864
do_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:894
vfs_readv fs/read_write.c:908
do_readv+0x52a/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:934
SYSC_readv+0xb6/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:1021
SyS_readv+0x87/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1018
This patch adds the missing reset of queue indices. Together with the
previous fix for the ioctl/read race, we cover the whole problem.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d11662f4f798b50d8c8743f433842c3e40fe3378 upstream.
The read from ALSA timer device, the function snd_timer_user_tread(),
may access to an uninitialized struct snd_timer_user fields when the
read is concurrently performed while the ioctl like
snd_timer_user_tselect() is invoked. We have already fixed the races
among ioctls via a mutex, but we seem to have forgotten the race
between read vs ioctl.
This patch simply applies (more exactly extends the already applied
range of) tu->ioctl_lock in snd_timer_user_tread() for closing the
race window.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4e7655fd4f47c23e5249ea260dc802f909a64611 upstream.
The snd_use_lock_sync() (thus its implementation
snd_use_lock_sync_helper()) has the 5 seconds timeout to break out of
the sync loop. It was introduced from the beginning, just to be
"safer", in terms of avoiding the stupid bugs.
However, as Ben Hutchings suggested, this timeout rather introduces a
potential leak or use-after-free that was apparently fixed by the
commit 2d7d54002e39 ("ALSA: seq: Fix race during FIFO resize"):
for example, snd_seq_fifo_event_in() -> snd_seq_event_dup() ->
copy_from_user() could block for a long time, and snd_use_lock_sync()
goes timeout and still leaves the cell at releasing the pool.
For fixing such a problem, we remove the break by the timeout while
still keeping the warning.
Suggested-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2d7d54002e396c180db0c800c1046f0a3c471597 upstream.
When a new event is queued while processing to resize the FIFO in
snd_seq_fifo_clear(), it may lead to a use-after-free, as the old pool
that is being queued gets removed. For avoiding this race, we need to
close the pool to be deleted and sync its usage before actually
deleting it.
The issue was spotted by syzkaller.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c520ff3d03f0b5db7146d9beed6373ad5d2a5e0e upstream.
When snd_seq_pool_done() is called, it marks the closing flag to
refuse the further cell insertions. But snd_seq_pool_done() itself
doesn't clear the cells but just waits until all cells are cleared by
the caller side. That is, it's racy, and this leads to the endless
stall as syzkaller spotted.
This patch addresses the racy by splitting the setup of pool->closing
flag out of snd_seq_pool_done(), and calling it properly before
snd_seq_pool_done().
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+aqqy8bZA1fFieifNxR2fAfFQQABcBHj801+u5ePV0URw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f3ac9f737603da80c2da3e84b89e74429836bb6d upstream.
The sequencer FIFO management has a bug that may lead to a corruption
(shortage) of the cell linked list. When a sequencer client faces an
error at the event delivery, it tries to put back the dequeued cell.
When the first queue was put back, this forgot the tail pointer
tracking, and the link will be screwed up.
Although there is no memory corruption, the sequencer client may stall
forever at exit while flushing the pending FIFO cells in
snd_seq_pool_done(), as spotted by syzkaller.
This patch addresses the missing tail pointer tracking at
snd_seq_fifo_cell_putback(). Also the patch makes sure to clear the
cell->enxt pointer at snd_seq_fifo_event_in() for avoiding a similar
mess-up of the FIFO linked list.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 71321eb3f2d0df4e6c327e0b936eec4458a12054 upstream.
When a user sets a too small ticks with a fine-grained timer like
hrtimer, the kernel tries to fire up the timer irq too frequently.
This may lead to the condensed locks, eventually the kernel spinlock
lockup with warnings.
For avoiding such a situation, we define a lower limit of the
resolution, namely 1ms. When the user passes a too small tick value
that results in less than that, the kernel returns -EINVAL now.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 37a7ea4a9b81f6a864c10a7cb0b96458df5310a3 upstream.
snd_seq_pool_done() syncs with closing of all opened threads, but it
aborts the wait loop with a timeout, and proceeds to the release
resource even if not all threads have been closed. The timeout was 5
seconds, and if you run a crazy stuff, it can exceed easily, and may
result in the access of the invalid memory address -- this is what
syzkaller detected in a bug report.
As a fix, let the code graduate from naiveness, simply remove the loop
timeout.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+YdhDV2H5LLzDTJDVF-qiYHUHhtRaW4rbb4gUhTCQB81w@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4842e98f26dd80be3623c4714a244ba52ea096a8 upstream.
When a sequencer queue is created in snd_seq_queue_alloc(),it adds the
new queue element to the public list before referencing it. Thus the
queue might be deleted before the call of snd_seq_queue_use(), and it
results in the use-after-free error, as spotted by syzkaller.
The fix is to reference the queue object at the right time.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3aa02cb664c5fb1042958c8d1aa8c35055a2ebc4 upstream.
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 027a9fe6835620422b6713892175716f3613dd9d upstream.
The ALSA proc handler allows currently the write in the unlimited size
until kmalloc() fails. But basically the write is supposed to be only
for small inputs, mostly for one line inputs, and we don't have to
handle too large sizes at all. Since the kmalloc error results in the
kernel warning, it's better to limit the size beforehand.
This patch adds the limit of 16kB, which must be large enough for the
currently existing code.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6809cd682b82dfff47943850d1a8c714f971b5ca upstream.
Currently the ALSA proc handler allows read or write even if the proc
file were write-only or read-only. It's mostly harmless, does thing
but allocating memory and ignores the input/output. But it doesn't
tell user about the invalid use, and it's confusing and inconsistent
in comparison with other proc files.
This patch adds some sanity checks and let the proc handler returning
an -EIO error when the invalid read/write is performed.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8ddc05638ee42b18ba4fe99b5fb647fa3ad20456 upstream.
I hit this with syzkaller:
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 1327 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ #190
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
task: ffff88011278d600 task.stack: ffff8801120c0000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82c8ba07>] [<ffffffff82c8ba07>] snd_hrtimer_start+0x77/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffff8801120c7a60 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000007
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 1ffff10023483091 RDI: 0000000000000048
RBP: ffff8801120c7a78 R08: ffff88011a5cf768 R09: ffff88011a5ba790
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffed00234b9ef1 R12: ffff880114843980
R13: ffffffff84213c00 R14: ffff880114843ab0 R15: 0000000000000286
FS: 00007f72958f3700(0000) GS:ffff88011aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000603001 CR3: 00000001126ab000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff880114843980 ffff880111eb2dc0 ffff880114843a34 ffff8801120c7ad0
ffffffff82c81ab1 0000000000000000 ffffffff842138e0 0000000100000000
ffff880111eb2dd0 ffff880111eb2dc0 0000000000000001 ffff880111eb2dc0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff82c81ab1>] snd_timer_start1+0x331/0x670
[<ffffffff82c85bfd>] snd_timer_start+0x5d/0xa0
[<ffffffff82c8795e>] snd_timer_user_ioctl+0x88e/0x2830
[<ffffffff8159f3a0>] ? __follow_pte.isra.49+0x430/0x430
[<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff815a26fa>] ? do_wp_page+0x3aa/0x1c90
[<ffffffff8132762f>] ? put_prev_entity+0x108f/0x21a0
[<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff816b0733>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1050
[<ffffffff813510af>] ? cpuacct_account_field+0x12f/0x1a0
[<ffffffff816b05a0>] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x200/0x200
[<ffffffff81002f2f>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x3cf/0xdb0
[<ffffffff815045ba>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x9a/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81002b60>] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x190/0x190
[<ffffffff82001a97>] ? check_preemption_disabled+0x37/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81d93889>] ? security_file_ioctl+0x89/0xb0
[<ffffffff816b167f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0
[<ffffffff816b15f0>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x1050/0x1050
[<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0
[<ffffffff83c32b2a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: c7 c7 c4 b9 c8 82 48 89 d9 4c 89 ee e8 63 88 7f fe e8 7e 46 7b fe 48 8d 7b 48 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 04 84 c0 7e 65 80 7b 48 00 74 0e e8 52 46
RIP [<ffffffff82c8ba07>] snd_hrtimer_start+0x77/0x100
RSP <ffff8801120c7a60>
---[ end trace 5955b08db7f2b029 ]---
This can happen if snd_hrtimer_open() fails to allocate memory and
returns an error, which is currently not checked by snd_timer_open():
ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT)
- snd_timer_user_tselect()
- snd_timer_close()
- snd_hrtimer_close()
- (struct snd_timer *) t->private_data = NULL
- snd_timer_open()
- snd_hrtimer_open()
- kzalloc() fails; t->private_data is still NULL
ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START)
- snd_timer_user_start()
- snd_timer_start()
- snd_timer_start1()
- snd_hrtimer_start()
- t->private_data == NULL // boom
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6b760bb2c63a9e322c0e4a0b5daf335ad93d5a33 upstream.
I got this:
divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 1327 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ #189
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
task: ffff8801120a9580 task.stack: ffff8801120b0000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] [<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1da/0x3f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88011aa87da8 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: 0000000000004f76 RBX: ffff880112655e88 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880112655ea0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff88011aa87e00 R08: ffff88013fff905c R09: ffff88013fff9048
R10: ffff88013fff9050 R11: 00000001050a7b8c R12: ffff880114778a00
R13: ffff880114778ab4 R14: ffff880114778b30 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f071647c700(0000) GS:ffff88011aa80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000603001 CR3: 0000000112021000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
0000000000000000 ffff880114778ab8 ffff880112655ea0 0000000000004f76
ffff880112655ec8 ffff880112655e80 ffff880112655e88 ffff88011aa98fc0
00000000b97ccf2b dffffc0000000000 ffff88011aa98fc0 ffff88011aa87ef0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813abce7>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x347/0xa00
[<ffffffff82c8bbc0>] ? snd_hrtimer_close+0x130/0x130
[<ffffffff813ab9a0>] ? retrigger_next_event+0x1b0/0x1b0
[<ffffffff813ae1a6>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x136/0x4b0
[<ffffffff813ae220>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x1b0/0x4b0
[<ffffffff8120f91e>] local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0xf0
[<ffffffff81227ad3>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x13/0xc0
[<ffffffff83c35086>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0
[<ffffffff83c3416c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xa0
<EOI>
[<ffffffff83c3239c>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x60
[<ffffffff82c8185d>] snd_timer_start1+0xdd/0x670
[<ffffffff82c87015>] snd_timer_continue+0x45/0x80
[<ffffffff82c88100>] snd_timer_user_ioctl+0x1030/0x2830
[<ffffffff8159f3a0>] ? __follow_pte.isra.49+0x430/0x430
[<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff815a26fa>] ? do_wp_page+0x3aa/0x1c90
[<ffffffff815aa4f8>] ? handle_mm_fault+0xbc8/0x27f0
[<ffffffff815a9930>] ? __pmd_alloc+0x370/0x370
[<ffffffff82c870d0>] ? snd_timer_pause+0x80/0x80
[<ffffffff816b0733>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x193/0x1050
[<ffffffff816b05a0>] ? ioctl_preallocate+0x200/0x200
[<ffffffff81002f2f>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x3cf/0xdb0
[<ffffffff815045ba>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x9a/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81002b60>] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x190/0x190
[<ffffffff82001a97>] ? check_preemption_disabled+0x37/0x1e0
[<ffffffff81d93889>] ? security_file_ioctl+0x89/0xb0
[<ffffffff816b167f>] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0
[<ffffffff816b15f0>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x1050/0x1050
[<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0
[<ffffffff83c32b2a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Code: e8 fc 42 7b fe 8b 0d 06 8a 50 03 49 0f af cf 48 85 c9 0f 88 7c 01 00 00 48 89 4d a8 e8 e0 42 7b fe 48 8b 45 c0 48 8b 4d a8 48 99 <48> f7 f9 49 01 c7 e8 cb 42 7b fe 48 8b 55 d0 48 b8 00 00 00 00
RIP [<ffffffff82c8bd9a>] snd_hrtimer_callback+0x1da/0x3f0
RSP <ffff88011aa87da8>
---[ end trace 6aa380f756a21074 ]---
The problem happens when you call ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE) on a
completely new/unused timer -- it will have ->sticks == 0, which causes a
divide by 0 in snd_hrtimer_callback().
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 11749e086b2766cccf6217a527ef5c5604ba069c upstream.
I got this with syzkaller:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref on address 0000000000000020
Read of size 32 by task syz-executor/22519
CPU: 1 PID: 22519 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0-rc2+ #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2
014
0000000000000001 ffff880111a17a00 ffffffff81f9f141 ffff880111a17a90
ffff880111a17c50 ffff880114584a58 ffff880114584a10 ffff880111a17a80
ffffffff8161fe3f ffff880100000000 ffff880118d74a48 ffff880118d74a68
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81f9f141>] dump_stack+0x83/0xb2
[<ffffffff8161fe3f>] kasan_report_error+0x41f/0x4c0
[<ffffffff8161ff74>] kasan_report+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff82c84b54>] ? snd_timer_user_read+0x554/0x790
[<ffffffff8161e79e>] check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8161e9c1>] kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[<ffffffff82c84b54>] snd_timer_user_read+0x554/0x790
[<ffffffff82c84600>] ? snd_timer_user_info_compat.isra.5+0x2b0/0x2b0
[<ffffffff817d0831>] ? proc_fault_inject_write+0x1c1/0x250
[<ffffffff817d0670>] ? next_tgid+0x2a0/0x2a0
[<ffffffff8127c278>] ? do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff8174653a>] ? fsnotify+0x72a/0xca0
[<ffffffff81674dfe>] __vfs_read+0x10e/0x550
[<ffffffff82c84600>] ? snd_timer_user_info_compat.isra.5+0x2b0/0x2b0
[<ffffffff81674cf0>] ? do_sendfile+0xc50/0xc50
[<ffffffff81745e10>] ? __fsnotify_update_child_dentry_flags+0x60/0x60
[<ffffffff8143fec6>] ? kcov_ioctl+0x56/0x190
[<ffffffff81e5ada2>] ? common_file_perm+0x2e2/0x380
[<ffffffff81746b0e>] ? __fsnotify_parent+0x5e/0x2b0
[<ffffffff81d93536>] ? security_file_permission+0x86/0x1e0
[<ffffffff816728f5>] ? rw_verify_area+0xe5/0x2b0
[<ffffffff81675355>] vfs_read+0x115/0x330
[<ffffffff81676371>] SyS_read+0xd1/0x1a0
[<ffffffff816762a0>] ? vfs_write+0x4b0/0x4b0
[<ffffffff82001c2c>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8150455a>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.4+0x3a/0x1e0
[<ffffffff816762a0>] ? vfs_write+0x4b0/0x4b0
[<ffffffff81005524>] do_syscall_64+0x1c4/0x4e0
[<ffffffff810052fc>] ? syscall_return_slowpath+0x16c/0x1d0
[<ffffffff83c3276a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
==================================================================
There are a couple of problems that I can see:
- ioctl(SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT), which potentially sets
tu->queue/tu->tqueue to NULL on memory allocation failure, so read()
would get a NULL pointer dereference like the above splat
- the same ioctl() can free tu->queue/to->tqueue which means read()
could potentially see (and dereference) the freed pointer
We can fix both by taking the ioctl_lock mutex when dereferencing
->queue/->tqueue, since that's always held over all the ioctl() code.
Just looking at the code I find it likely that there are more problems
here such as tu->qhead pointing outside the buffer if the size is
changed concurrently using SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS.
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 816f318b2364262a51024096da7ca3b84e78e3b5 upstream.
When a seq-virmidi driver is initialized, it registers a rawmidi
instance with its callback to create an associated seq kernel client.
Currently it's done throughly in rawmidi's register_mutex context.
Recently it was found that this may lead to a deadlock another rawmidi
device that is being attached with the sequencer is accessed, as both
open with the same register_mutex. This was actually triggered by
syzkaller, as Dmitry Vyukov reported:
======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
4.8.0-rc1+ #11 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor/7154 is trying to acquire lock:
(register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341
but task is already holding lock:
(&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff850138bb>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x5b/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:495
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&grp->list_mutex){++++.+}:
[<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746
[<ffffffff863f6199>] down_read+0x49/0xc0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:22
[< inline >] deliver_to_subscribers sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:681
[<ffffffff85005c5e>] snd_seq_deliver_event+0x35e/0x890 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:822
[<ffffffff85006e96>] > snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch+0x126/0x170 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2418
[<ffffffff85012c52>] snd_seq_system_broadcast+0xb2/0xf0 sound/core/seq/seq_system.c:101
[<ffffffff84fff70a>] snd_seq_create_kernel_client+0x24a/0x330 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2297
[< inline >] snd_virmidi_dev_attach_seq sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:383
[<ffffffff8502d29f>] snd_virmidi_dev_register+0x29f/0x750 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:450
[<ffffffff84fd208c>] snd_rawmidi_dev_register+0x30c/0xd40 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1645
[<ffffffff84f816d3>] __snd_device_register.part.0+0x63/0xc0 sound/core/device.c:164
[< inline >] __snd_device_register sound/core/device.c:162
[<ffffffff84f8235d>] snd_device_register_all+0xad/0x110 sound/core/device.c:212
[<ffffffff84f7546f>] snd_card_register+0xef/0x6c0 sound/core/init.c:749
[<ffffffff85040b7f>] snd_virmidi_probe+0x3ef/0x590 sound/drivers/virmidi.c:123
[<ffffffff833ebf7b>] platform_drv_probe+0x8b/0x170 drivers/base/platform.c:564
......
-> #0 (register_mutex#5){+.+.+.}:
[< inline >] check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1829
[< inline >] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1939
[< inline >] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2266
[<ffffffff814791f4>] __lock_acquire+0x4d44/0x4d80 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3335
[<ffffffff8147a3a8>] lock_acquire+0x208/0x430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3746
[< inline >] __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:521
[<ffffffff863f0ef1>] mutex_lock_nested+0xb1/0xa20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:621
[<ffffffff84fd6d4b>] snd_rawmidi_kernel_open+0x4b/0x260 sound/core/rawmidi.c:341
[<ffffffff8502e7c7>] midisynth_subscribe+0xf7/0x350 sound/core/seq/seq_midi.c:188
[< inline >] subscribe_port sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:427
[<ffffffff85013cc7>] check_and_subscribe_port+0x467/0x5c0 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:510
[<ffffffff85015da9>] snd_seq_port_connect+0x2c9/0x500 sound/core/seq/seq_ports.c:579
[<ffffffff850079b8>] snd_seq_ioctl_subscribe_port+0x1d8/0x2b0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:1480
[<ffffffff84ffe9e4>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x184/0x1e0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2225
[<ffffffff84ffeae8>] snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl+0xa8/0x110 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2440
[<ffffffff85027664>] snd_seq_oss_midi_open+0x3b4/0x610 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:375
[<ffffffff85023d67>] snd_seq_oss_synth_setup_midi+0x107/0x4c0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c:281
[<ffffffff8501b0a8>] snd_seq_oss_open+0x748/0x8d0 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_init.c:274
[<ffffffff85019d8a>] odev_open+0x6a/0x90 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c:138
[<ffffffff84f7040f>] soundcore_open+0x30f/0x640 sound/sound_core.c:639
......
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&grp->list_mutex);
lock(register_mutex#5);
lock(&grp->list_mutex);
lock(register_mutex#5);
*** DEADLOCK ***
======================================================
The fix is to simply move the registration parts in
snd_rawmidi_dev_register() to the outside of the register_mutex lock.
The lock is needed only to manage the linked list, and it's not
necessarily to cover the whole initialization process.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e4ec8cc8039a7063e24204299b462bd1383184a5 upstream.
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9a47e9cff994f37f7f0dbd9ae23740d0f64f9fe6 upstream.
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cec8f96e49d9be372fdb0c3836dcf31ec71e457e upstream.
The stack object “tread” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f388cdcdd160687c6650833f286b9c89c50960ff upstream.
snd_ctl_remove() has a notification for the removal event. It's
superfluous when done during the device got disconnected. Although
the notification itself is mostly harmless, it may potentially be
harmful, and should be suppressed. Actually some components PCM may
free ctl elements during the disconnect or free callbacks, thus it's
no theoretical issue.
This patch adds the check of card->shutdown flag for avoiding
unnecessary notifications after (or during) the disconnect.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a8ff48cb70835f48de5703052760312019afea55 upstream.
The chmap ctls assigned to PCM streams are freed in the PCM disconnect
callback. However, since the disconnect callback isn't called when
the card gets freed before registering, the chmap ctls may still be
left assigned. They are eventually freed together with other ctls,
but it may cause an Oops at pcm_chmap_ctl_private_free(), as the
function refers to the assigned PCM stream, while the PCM objects have
been already freed beforehand.
The fix is to free the chmap ctls also at PCM free callback, not only
at PCM disconnect.
Reported-by: Laxminath Kasam <b_lkasam@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3fa6993fef634e05d200d141a85df0b044572364 upstream.
The user timer tu->qused counter may go to a negative value when
multiple concurrent reads are performed since both the check and the
decrement of tu->qused are done in two individual locked contexts.
This results in bogus read outs, and the endless loop in the
user-space side.
The fix is to move the decrement of the tu->qused counter into the
same spinlock context as the zero-check of the counter.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4a07083ed613644c96c34a7dd2853dc5d7c70902 upstream.
ALSA system timer backend stops the timer via del_timer() without sync
and leaves del_timer_sync() at the close instead. This is because of
the restriction by the design of ALSA timer: namely, the stop callback
may be called from the timer handler, and calling the sync shall lead
to a hangup. However, this also triggers a kernel BUG() when the
timer is rearmed immediately after stopping without sync:
kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:966!
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8239c94e>] snd_timer_s_start+0x13e/0x1a0
[<ffffffff8239e1f4>] snd_timer_interrupt+0x504/0xec0
[<ffffffff8122fca0>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[<ffffffff8239ec64>] snd_timer_s_function+0xb4/0x120
[<ffffffff81296b72>] call_timer_fn+0x162/0x520
[<ffffffff81296add>] ? call_timer_fn+0xcd/0x520
[<ffffffff8239ebb0>] ? snd_timer_interrupt+0xec0/0xec0
....
It's the place where add_timer() checks the pending timer. It's clear
that this may happen after the immediate restart without sync in our
cases.
So, the workaround here is just to use mod_timer() instead of
add_timer(). This looks like a band-aid fix, but it's a right move,
as snd_timer_interrupt() takes care of the continuous rearm of timer.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0ab1ace856205d10cbc1924b2d931c01ffd216a6 upstream.
The commit [d507941beb1e: ALSA: pcm: Correct PCM BUG error message]
made the warning prefix back to "BUG:" due to its previous wrong
prefix. But a kernel message containing "BUG:" seems taken as an Oops
message wrongly by some brain-dead daemons, and it annoys users in the
end. Instead of teaching daemons, change the string again to a more
reasonable one.
Fixes: 507941beb1e ('ALSA: pcm: Correct PCM BUG error message')
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3a72494ac2a3bd229db941d51e7efe2f6ccd947b upstream.
The timer user status compat ioctl returned the bogus struct used for
64bit architectures instead of the 32bit one. This patch addresses
it to return the proper struct.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 197b958c1e76a575d77038cc98b4bebc2134279f upstream.
The OSS sequencer client tries to drain the pending events at
releasing. Unfortunately, as spotted by syzkaller fuzzer, this may
lead to an unkillable process state when the event has been queued at
the far future. Since the process being released can't be signaled
any longer, it remains and waits for the echo-back event in that far
future.
Back to history, the draining feature was implemented at the time we
misinterpreted POSIX definition for blocking file operation.
Actually, such a behavior is superfluous at release, and we should
just release the device as is instead of keeping it up forever.
This patch just removes the draining call that may block the release
for too long time unexpectedly.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+Y4kD-aBGj37rf-xBw9bH3GMU6P+MYg4W1e-s-paVD2pg@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 513ace79b657e2022a592e77f24074e088681ecc upstream.
X32 ABI uses the 64bit timespec in addition to 64bit alignment of
64bit values. This leads to incompatibilities in some PCM ioctls
involved with snd_pcm_channel_info, snd_pcm_status and
snd_pcm_sync_ptr structs. Fix the PCM compat ABI for these ioctls
like the previous commit for ctl API.
Reported-by: Steven Newbury <steve@snewbury.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b24e7ad1fdc22177eb3e51584e1cfcb45d818488 upstream.
X32 ABI takes the 64bit timespec, thus the timer user status ioctl becomes
incompatible with IA32. This results in NOTTY error when the ioctl is
issued.
Meanwhile, this struct in X32 is essentially identical with the one in
X86-64, so we can just bypassing to the existing code for this
specific compat ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2251fbbc1539f05b0b206b37a602d5776be37252 upstream.
Like the previous fixes for ctl and PCM, we need a fix for
incompatible X32 ABI regarding the rawmidi: namely, struct
snd_rawmidi_status has the timespec, and the size and the alignment on
X32 differ from IA32.
This patch fixes the incompatible ioctl for X32.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6236d8bb2afcfe71b88ecea554e0dc638090a45f upstream.
The X32 ABI takes the same alignment like x86-64, and this may result
in the incompatible struct size from ia32. Unfortunately, we hit this
in some control ABI: struct snd_ctl_elem_value differs between them
due to the position of 64bit variable array. This ends up with the
unknown ioctl (ENOTTY) error.
The fix is to add the compat entries for the new aligned struct.
Reported-and-tested-by: Steven Newbury <steve@snewbury.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 13d5e5d4725c64ec06040d636832e78453f477b7 upstream.
The commit [7f0973e973cd: ALSA: seq: Fix lockdep warnings due to
double mutex locks] split the management of two linked lists (source
and destination) into two individual calls for avoiding the AB/BA
deadlock. However, this may leave the possible double deletion of one
of two lists when the counterpart is being deleted concurrently.
It ends up with a list corruption, as revealed by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch fixes it by checking the list emptiness and skipping the
deletion and the following process.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CACT4Y+bay9qsrz6dQu31EcGaH9XwfW7o3oBzSQUG9fMszoh=Sg@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 7f0973e973cd ('ALSA: seq: Fix lockdep warnings due to 'double mutex locks)
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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