From f562988350361bf4118dd3c3e192dff763b493d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Jones Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2011 15:10:49 +0200 Subject: audit: acquire creds selectively to reduce atomic op overhead Commit c69e8d9c01db ("CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds") added calls to get_task_cred and put_cred in audit_filter_rules. Profiling with a large number of audit rules active on the exit chain shows that we are spending upto 48% in this routine for syscall intensive tests, most of which is in the atomic ops. 1. The code should be accessing tsk->cred rather than tsk->real_cred. 2. Since tsk is current (or tsk is being created by copy_process) access to tsk->cred without rcu read lock is possible. At the request of the audit maintainer, a new flag has been added to audit_filter_rules in order to make this explicit and guide future code. Signed-off-by: Tony Jones Acked-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina --- kernel/auditsc.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index b33513a08beb..00d79df03e76 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -443,17 +443,25 @@ static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 - * otherwise. */ + * otherwise. + * + * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are + * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are + * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock. + */ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_krule *rule, struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_names *name, - enum audit_state *state) + enum audit_state *state, + bool task_creation) { - const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk); + const struct cred *cred; int i, j, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; + cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; int result = 0; @@ -637,10 +645,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, break; } - if (!result) { - put_cred(cred); + if (!result) return 0; - } } if (ctx) { @@ -656,7 +662,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; } - put_cred(cred); return 1; } @@ -671,7 +676,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { - if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) { + if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, + &state, true)) { if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -705,7 +711,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, - &state)) { + &state, false)) { rcu_read_unlock(); ctx->current_state = state; return state; @@ -743,7 +749,8 @@ void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && - audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) { + audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, + &state, false)) { rcu_read_unlock(); ctx->current_state = state; return; -- cgit v1.2.3