From f7e5cc0c40dff92bad2894153f675c6c542ba2f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lothar=20Wa=C3=9Fmann?= Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2009 23:10:21 +0000 Subject: net/can bugfix: use after free bug in can protocol drivers Fix a use after free bug in can protocol drivers The release functions of the can protocol drivers lack a call to sock_orphan() which leads to referencing freed memory under certain circumstances. This patch fixes a bug reported here: https://lists.berlios.de/pipermail/socketcan-users/2009-July/000985.html Signed-off-by: Lothar Wassmann Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/can/bcm.c | 3 +++ net/can/raw.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 95d7f32643ae..1d17e41b892d 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -1469,6 +1469,9 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock) bo->ifindex = 0; } + sock_orphan(sk); + sock->sk = NULL; + release_sock(sk); sock_put(sk); diff --git a/net/can/raw.c b/net/can/raw.c index 6aa154e806ae..3482546e8884 100644 --- a/net/can/raw.c +++ b/net/can/raw.c @@ -306,6 +306,9 @@ static int raw_release(struct socket *sock) ro->bound = 0; ro->count = 0; + sock_orphan(sk); + sock->sk = NULL; + release_sock(sk); sock_put(sk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b13bb2e9933b9dfa25c81d959d847c843481111e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Lothar=20Wa=C3=9Fmann?= Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2009 23:12:25 +0000 Subject: net/can: add module alias to can protocol drivers Add appropriate MODULE_ALIAS() to facilitate autoloading of can protocol drivers Signed-off-by: Lothar Wassmann Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/can/bcm.c | 1 + net/can/raw.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 1d17e41b892d..72720c710351 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ static __initdata const char banner[] = KERN_INFO MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PF_CAN broadcast manager protocol"); MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Oliver Hartkopp "); +MODULE_ALIAS("can-proto-2"); /* easy access to can_frame payload */ static inline u64 GET_U64(const struct can_frame *cp) diff --git a/net/can/raw.c b/net/can/raw.c index 3482546e8884..f4cc44548bda 100644 --- a/net/can/raw.c +++ b/net/can/raw.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static __initdata const char banner[] = MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PF_CAN raw protocol"); MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Urs Thuermann "); +MODULE_ALIAS("can-proto-1"); #define MASK_ALL 0 -- cgit v1.2.3 From aa6a03eb0ae859c1371555ef381de4c96ca1e4e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patrick McHardy Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2009 14:01:54 +0200 Subject: netfilter: xt_osf: fix nf_log_packet() arguments The first argument is the address family, the second one the hook number. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/netfilter/xt_osf.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c index 863e40977a4d..0f482e2440b4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_osf.c @@ -330,7 +330,8 @@ static bool xt_osf_match_packet(const struct sk_buff *skb, fcount++; if (info->flags & XT_OSF_LOG) - nf_log_packet(p->hooknum, 0, skb, p->in, p->out, NULL, + nf_log_packet(p->family, p->hooknum, skb, + p->in, p->out, NULL, "%s [%s:%s] : %pi4:%d -> %pi4:%d hops=%d\n", f->genre, f->version, f->subtype, &ip->saddr, ntohs(tcp->source), @@ -345,7 +346,7 @@ static bool xt_osf_match_packet(const struct sk_buff *skb, rcu_read_unlock(); if (!fcount && (info->flags & XT_OSF_LOG)) - nf_log_packet(p->hooknum, 0, skb, p->in, p->out, NULL, + nf_log_packet(p->family, p->hooknum, skb, p->in, p->out, NULL, "Remote OS is not known: %pi4:%u -> %pi4:%u\n", &ip->saddr, ntohs(tcp->source), &ip->daddr, ntohs(tcp->dest)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 941297f443f871b8c3372feccf27a8733f6ce9e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2009 14:03:40 +0200 Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack: nf_conntrack_alloc() fixes When a slab cache uses SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU, we must be careful when allocating objects, since slab allocator could give a freed object still used by lockless readers. In particular, nf_conntrack RCU lookups rely on ct->tuplehash[xxx].hnnode.next being always valid (ie containing a valid 'nulls' value, or a valid pointer to next object in hash chain.) kmem_cache_zalloc() setups object with NULL values, but a NULL value is not valid for ct->tuplehash[xxx].hnnode.next. Fix is to call kmem_cache_alloc() and do the zeroing ourself. As spotted by Patrick, we also need to make sure lookup keys are committed to memory before setting refcount to 1, or a lockless reader could get a reference on the old version of the object. Its key re-check could then pass the barrier. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 7508f11c5b39..b5869b9574b0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -561,23 +561,38 @@ struct nf_conn *nf_conntrack_alloc(struct net *net, } } - ct = kmem_cache_zalloc(nf_conntrack_cachep, gfp); + /* + * Do not use kmem_cache_zalloc(), as this cache uses + * SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU. + */ + ct = kmem_cache_alloc(nf_conntrack_cachep, gfp); if (ct == NULL) { pr_debug("nf_conntrack_alloc: Can't alloc conntrack.\n"); atomic_dec(&net->ct.count); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } - + /* + * Let ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].hnnode.next + * and ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].hnnode.next unchanged. + */ + memset(&ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_MAX], 0, + sizeof(*ct) - offsetof(struct nf_conn, tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_MAX])); spin_lock_init(&ct->lock); - atomic_set(&ct->ct_general.use, 1); ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple = *orig; + ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].hnnode.pprev = NULL; ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple = *repl; + ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].hnnode.pprev = NULL; /* Don't set timer yet: wait for confirmation */ setup_timer(&ct->timeout, death_by_timeout, (unsigned long)ct); #ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS ct->ct_net = net; #endif + /* + * changes to lookup keys must be done before setting refcnt to 1 + */ + smp_wmb(); + atomic_set(&ct->ct_general.use, 1); return ct; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_conntrack_alloc); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4dc6dc7162c08b9965163c9ab3f9375d4adff2c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2009 23:13:10 +0000 Subject: net: sock_copy() fixes Commit e912b1142be8f1e2c71c71001dc992c6e5eb2ec1 (net: sk_prot_alloc() should not blindly overwrite memory) took care of not zeroing whole new socket at allocation time. sock_copy() is another spot where we should be very careful. We should not set refcnt to a non null value, until we are sure other fields are correctly setup, or a lockless reader could catch this socket by mistake, while not fully (re)initialized. This patch puts sk_node & sk_refcnt to the very beginning of struct sock to ease sock_copy() & sk_prot_alloc() job. We add appropriate smp_wmb() before sk_refcnt initializations to match our RCU requirements (changes to sock keys should be committed to memory before sk_refcnt setting) Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index ba5d2116aea1..d9eec153d531 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -919,13 +919,19 @@ static inline void sock_lock_init(struct sock *sk) af_family_keys + sk->sk_family); } +/* + * Copy all fields from osk to nsk but nsk->sk_refcnt must not change yet, + * even temporarly, because of RCU lookups. sk_node should also be left as is. + */ static void sock_copy(struct sock *nsk, const struct sock *osk) { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK void *sptr = nsk->sk_security; #endif - - memcpy(nsk, osk, osk->sk_prot->obj_size); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct sock, sk_copy_start) != + sizeof(osk->sk_node) + sizeof(osk->sk_refcnt)); + memcpy(&nsk->sk_copy_start, &osk->sk_copy_start, + osk->sk_prot->obj_size - offsetof(struct sock, sk_copy_start)); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK nsk->sk_security = sptr; security_sk_clone(osk, nsk); @@ -1140,6 +1146,11 @@ struct sock *sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, const gfp_t priority) newsk->sk_err = 0; newsk->sk_priority = 0; + /* + * Before updating sk_refcnt, we must commit prior changes to memory + * (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt for details) + */ + smp_wmb(); atomic_set(&newsk->sk_refcnt, 2); /* @@ -1855,6 +1866,11 @@ void sock_init_data(struct socket *sock, struct sock *sk) sk->sk_stamp = ktime_set(-1L, 0); + /* + * Before updating sk_refcnt, we must commit prior changes to memory + * (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt for details) + */ + smp_wmb(); atomic_set(&sk->sk_refcnt, 1); atomic_set(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc, 1); atomic_set(&sk->sk_drops, 0); -- cgit v1.2.3 From e3afe7b75ed8f809c1473ea9b39267487c187ccb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Dykstra Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2009 05:04:51 +0000 Subject: tcp: Fix MD5 signature checking on IPv4 mapped sockets Fix MD5 signature checking so that an IPv4 active open to an IPv6 socket can succeed. In particular, use the correct address family's signature generation function for the SYN/ACK. Reported-by: Stephen Hemminger Signed-off-by: John Dykstra Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 5a1ca2698c88..7c107eb876c8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -1160,6 +1160,7 @@ struct request_sock_ops tcp_request_sock_ops __read_mostly = { #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG static struct tcp_request_sock_ops tcp_request_sock_ipv4_ops = { .md5_lookup = tcp_v4_reqsk_md5_lookup, + .calc_md5_hash = tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb, }; #endif diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 5bdf08d312d9..bd62712848fa 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -2261,7 +2261,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG /* Okay, we have all we need - do the md5 hash if needed */ if (md5) { - tp->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(md5_hash_location, + tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(md5_hash_location, md5, NULL, req, skb); } #endif diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 58810c65b635..ae3d65753562 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -896,6 +896,7 @@ struct request_sock_ops tcp6_request_sock_ops __read_mostly = { #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG static struct tcp_request_sock_ops tcp_request_sock_ipv6_ops = { .md5_lookup = tcp_v6_reqsk_md5_lookup, + .calc_md5_hash = tcp_v6_md5_hash_skb, }; #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From e547bc1eccf539b7403138d8ded913ffd2b7fd0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Dykstra Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2009 09:23:22 +0000 Subject: tcp: Use correct peer adr when copying MD5 keys When the TCP connection handshake completes on the passive side, a variety of state must be set up in the "child" sock, including the key if MD5 authentication is being used. Fix TCP for both address families to label the key with the peer's destination address, rather than the address from the listening sock, which is usually the wildcard. Reported-by: Stephen Hemminger Signed-off-by: John Dykstra Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 7c107eb876c8..6d88219c5e22 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, */ char *newkey = kmemdup(key->key, key->keylen, GFP_ATOMIC); if (newkey != NULL) - tcp_v4_md5_do_add(newsk, inet_sk(sk)->daddr, + tcp_v4_md5_do_add(newsk, newinet->daddr, newkey, key->keylen); newsk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_MASK; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index ae3d65753562..d849dd53b788 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -1442,7 +1442,7 @@ static struct sock * tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, */ char *newkey = kmemdup(key->key, key->keylen, GFP_ATOMIC); if (newkey != NULL) - tcp_v6_md5_do_add(newsk, &inet6_sk(sk)->daddr, + tcp_v6_md5_do_add(newsk, &newnp->daddr, newkey, key->keylen); } #endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From f249fb783092471a4808e5fc5bda071d2724810d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?R=C3=A9mi=20Denis-Courmont?= Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2009 00:47:04 +0000 Subject: Fix error return for setsockopt(SO_TIMESTAMPING) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit I guess it should be -EINVAL rather than EINVAL. I have not checked when the bug came in. Perhaps a candidate for -stable? Signed-off-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/sock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index d9eec153d531..bbb25be7ddfe 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ set_rcvbuf: case SO_TIMESTAMPING: if (val & ~SOF_TIMESTAMPING_MASK) { - ret = EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; break; } sock_valbool_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_TX_HARDWARE, -- cgit v1.2.3