// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * arch/arm64/kvm/fpsimd.c: Guest/host FPSIMD context coordination helpers * * Copyright 2018 Arm Limited * Author: Dave Martin */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * Called on entry to KVM_RUN unless this vcpu previously ran at least * once and the most recent prior KVM_RUN for this vcpu was called from * the same task as current (highly likely). * * This is guaranteed to execute before kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(vcpu), * such that on entering hyp the relevant parts of current are already * mapped. */ int kvm_arch_vcpu_run_map_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { int ret; struct thread_info *ti = ¤t->thread_info; struct user_fpsimd_state *fpsimd = ¤t->thread.uw.fpsimd_state; /* * Make sure the host task thread flags and fpsimd state are * visible to hyp: */ ret = create_hyp_mappings(ti, ti + 1, PAGE_HYP); if (ret) goto error; ret = create_hyp_mappings(fpsimd, fpsimd + 1, PAGE_HYP); if (ret) goto error; vcpu->arch.host_thread_info = kern_hyp_va(ti); vcpu->arch.host_fpsimd_state = kern_hyp_va(fpsimd); error: return ret; } /* * Prepare vcpu for saving the host's FPSIMD state and loading the guest's. * The actual loading is done by the FPSIMD access trap taken to hyp. * * Here, we just set the correct metadata to indicate that the FPSIMD * state in the cpu regs (if any) belongs to current on the host. * * TIF_SVE is backed up here, since it may get clobbered with guest state. * This flag is restored by kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(vcpu). */ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { BUG_ON(!current->mm); vcpu->arch.flags &= ~(KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED | KVM_ARM64_HOST_SVE_IN_USE | KVM_ARM64_HOST_SVE_ENABLED); vcpu->arch.flags |= KVM_ARM64_FP_HOST; if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SVE)) vcpu->arch.flags |= KVM_ARM64_HOST_SVE_IN_USE; if (read_sysreg(cpacr_el1) & CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN) vcpu->arch.flags |= KVM_ARM64_HOST_SVE_ENABLED; } /* * If the guest FPSIMD state was loaded, update the host's context * tracking data mark the CPU FPSIMD regs as dirty and belonging to vcpu * so that they will be written back if the kernel clobbers them due to * kernel-mode NEON before re-entry into the guest. */ void kvm_arch_vcpu_ctxsync_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled()); if (vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED) { fpsimd_bind_state_to_cpu(&vcpu->arch.ctxt.gp_regs.fp_regs, vcpu->arch.sve_state, vcpu->arch.sve_max_vl); clear_thread_flag(TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE); update_thread_flag(TIF_SVE, vcpu_has_sve(vcpu)); } } /* * Write back the vcpu FPSIMD regs if they are dirty, and invalidate the * cpu FPSIMD regs so that they can't be spuriously reused if this vcpu * disappears and another task or vcpu appears that recycles the same * struct fpsimd_state. */ void kvm_arch_vcpu_put_fp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { unsigned long flags; bool host_has_sve = system_supports_sve(); bool guest_has_sve = vcpu_has_sve(vcpu); local_irq_save(flags); if (vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_FP_ENABLED) { u64 *guest_zcr = &vcpu->arch.ctxt.sys_regs[ZCR_EL1]; fpsimd_save_and_flush_cpu_state(); if (guest_has_sve) *guest_zcr = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ZCR_EL12); } else if (host_has_sve) { /* * The FPSIMD/SVE state in the CPU has not been touched, and we * have SVE (and VHE): CPACR_EL1 (alias CPTR_EL2) has been * reset to CPACR_EL1_DEFAULT by the Hyp code, disabling SVE * for EL0. To avoid spurious traps, restore the trap state * seen by kvm_arch_vcpu_load_fp(): */ if (vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_HOST_SVE_ENABLED) sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, 0, CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN); else sysreg_clear_set(CPACR_EL1, CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN, 0); } update_thread_flag(TIF_SVE, vcpu->arch.flags & KVM_ARM64_HOST_SVE_IN_USE); local_irq_restore(flags); }